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CONFIDENTIAL

(12898)



**F.O.**

**406**

## FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

## EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XVI

**CLOSED  
UNTIL**

1976

JANUARY TO JUNE 1925

55

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**EASTERN AFFAIRS**

PART XVI

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**ERRATUM.**

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CONFIDENTIAL

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XVI.

CHAPTER I.—MOSUL.

[E 2242/214/65]

No. 1.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquis della Torretta.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, April 23, 1925.*

THE position of His Majesty's Government having been regularised by the decision adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on the 27th September, 1924, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government are happy to give the Italian Government the explanations and assurances contained in the memorandum attached to the present note.

2. Copies of the Anglo-Irak Treaty of the 10th October, 1922, and subsidiary agreements, and of the above-mentioned decision of the Council of the League of Nations, are enclosed herein for convenience of reference.

3. I shall be grateful if you will be so good as to acknowledge the receipt of this communication.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Memorandum respecting Irak.*

HIS Britannic Majesty's Government agree that article 11 of the Anglo-Irak Treaty shall be regarded as applying to Italy.

2. His Britannic Majesty's Government do not intend to preclude Italian enterprise from participation in public works, services and utilities and in the development of the natural resources of the country, so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. In the event of such participation, His Britannic Majesty's Government are prepared favourably to consider using their good offices with the Irak Government to secure a special arrangement with the Italian Government with the object of regulating the conditions of such Italian labour as might consequently be admitted to Irak.

3. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that, in virtue of the provisions of article 9 of the Anglo-Irak Treaty and of the Judicial Agreement made under that article, foreign nationals, including, of course, Italian nationals, will have the right to be tried by a court consisting of a single British judge, or presided over by a British judge, according to the gravity of the case, except in cases of contravention, and that in appeal or revision the court shall be presided over by a British judge and constituted in accordance with article 2 (d) of that agreement.

4. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that nothing in article 3 of the Anglo-Irak Treaty is intended to restrict the opening of new schools, or to restrict the right of such schools to admit pupils of another



community. The supervision of the Irak Government will be strictly limited to the ensurance of public order and administration. His Britannic Majesty's Government affirm that they have no intention of authorising any arbitrary interference in the internal affairs of any religious community.

5. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that consignments imported into Irak for the use of Italian religious, educational or eleemosynary institutions, will, in regard to customs duties, be admitted to the same privileges as those afforded to other foreign institutions of a similar character. Such institutions are at present granted the free import of articles of a nature or kind which can only be destined exclusively for religious use in mosques, churches, synagogues and seminaries, and also of school apparatus, other than school books, if imported direct by the school concerned, to the value of 80 rupees per annum for each pupil who is educated free of charge. There is no intention of withdrawing any of these privileges, and His Britannic Majesty's Government will use its good offices to see that they are maintained, and, if circumstances permit, extended.

Foreign Office, April 23, 1925.

[E 2676/214/65]

No. 2.

Marquis della Torretta to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 6.)

(Translation.)

Sir,

Italian Embassy, London, April 29, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 23rd instant, in which you inform me that His Britannic Majesty's Government are happy to give the Italian Government the explanations and assurances contained in the memorandum enclosed therein.

In thanking your Excellency for your courteous communication, I, on my side, have the honour to state, in conformity with instructions which I have received, that the Italian Government have taken note of the explanations and assurances in question which are contained in the memorandum mentioned above, dated the 23rd April.

I have, &c.

TORRETTA.

[E 2731/32/65]

No. 3.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 9.)

(Secret.)

Sir,

Downing Street, May 8, 1925.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of Mr. Secretary Chamberlain, copy of a despatch from the High Commissioner, Bagdad, on the subject of the Turco-Irak Frontier Commission.

I am, &c.

J. E. MASTERTON SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Sir H. Dobbs to Mr. Amery.

(Secret "B.")

Sir,

Bagdad, April 16, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to my despatch Secret "A," dated the 9th April, 1925, and to transmit herewith a copy of the final diary of the British assessor to the League of Nations Frontier Commission.

2. A copy of this despatch, together with its enclosure, is being sent to His Britannic Majesty's representative at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

H. DOBBS.

High Commissioner for Irak.

Final Diary of the British Assessor to the League of Nations Frontier Commission.

To complete my diaries I have written the following résumé of the work done by the commission and of what I thought were their final impressions and the probable line they will take in making their recommendations to the Council of the League:—

Looking back, I feel that the commission came to Irak from Europe and Turkey in such a frame of mind that their preliminary experiences in Bagdad and Mosul rendered them more suspicious of the British and Irak Governments than ever was realised at the time—very suspicious as they were thought to be. The reasons for this are not clear. They were without doubt *bien travaillés* by the Turks in Angora, and perhaps also the fact that Great Britain had ever consented to refer to the League the case of the "Mosul question" (as they always called it in loose conversation) had given them the idea that there were, in fact, very strong reasons for the rendition of the vilayet to Turkey. They possibly already felt before they reached Angora that, had Great Britain been convinced of the justice of her case, she would have had more courage of her convictions. It is not impossible, again, that after they had seen the representatives of the British Government in London, they may have met and had conversations with members of various British and foreign industrial groups, who may have given voice to apprehensions lest the Irak Government, if left to her own devices in four years' time, should be less able to safeguard industrial enterprises than the Turkish Government. Some of these may have even gone so far as to suggest that British officials whose careers depended upon Irak might conceivably be found to allow their personal desires to colour the evidence they had collected for the commission.

Whatever the reasons were, the three members of the commission during the first month of their stay in Bagdad and Mosul showed themselves extremely suspicious of any interpreters offered by the British assessor, and appeared to regard as unwelcome any information as to the character and social position of witnesses they called, or any information volunteered by our side other than the replies to their *questionnaires*. Even the replies to the questions of procedure were not welcomed; the president, in spite of the clause in the terms of reference requiring the commission to give "due consideration to the views expressed by the interested parties as regards procedure," stated the question had been wrongly included in the *questionnaire*. The commission at this time continually intimated that they would welcome no advice as to their procedure. The presence with the Turkish delegation of the two Iraki outlaws introduced complications which increased the suspicions of the commission. In their anxiety to show themselves neutral they seemed unable to appreciate the fact that the community called Irak might harbour such strong resentment against two traitorous members that the Government could not accept full responsibility for their security, without having the right to take what measures it thought necessary for their protection. This, again, was possibly due to the pictures they had formed in their imagination of a Mosul Vilayet inhabited by a majority of Turks whose importance had brought the territory into contest. The comparison by Djavad Pasha of the quarters offered to the Turkish delegation in the Levy camp to his prison quarters at Malta struck a sympathetic chord with the commissioners. The measures which the commissioners would accept for the protection of the Turks could not unfortunately be settled before the commission moved to Mosul, and the unfortunate situation created by Count Teleki and Djavad Pasha going out into the streets of Mosul immediately upon their arrival, when the police were confused by Teleki's interference with their rightful attempts to stop the small demonstrations which had been arranged by the pro-Turkish party in Mosul, increased their resentment with the British and Iraki side. Persuaded as it now seems they must have been that a substantial proportion of the inhabitants of Mosul were inclined to Turkey, they read in the combination of the admittedly somewhat obvious police measures which had really been arranged for the protection of the Turks, and the pro-Iraki demonstrations which were arranged by the Committee of Defence, and which, as the commission had interfered with the suppression by police of the pro-Turkish demonstrations, were difficult to restrain by the local administration, an organised conspiracy between the police (supported by the military forces) and the pro-Irak party for the suppression of the views of the substantial pro-Turkish population. Their suspicions actuated them to visit almost surreptitiously the houses of certain inhabitants, most of whom were disreputable persons whose names they had received presumably from Djavad



Pasha, but one or two of them were notables who had been for a long time cloaking pro-Turkish intrigues under the guise of patriotic but extreme Arab nationalism. These are the people one was wont to describe in reports as "extreme Arab," but not pro-Turk—their anti-British activities are dictated solely by the hope that they may thereby get better terms for Iraq from the British. The commission, when they visited and talked privately to such people, whom they had seen posing as sincere members of the Independence and Defence Committees, found, as they thought, confirmation of their suspicions that these outwardly fervent Iraqi committees were really artificial organisations set up by fear and bribery by the local Government. The arrest of twelve persons, who, after visiting Djevad Pasha, gave by their talk grave cause for concern to the local authorities, was taken by the commission as a further attempt to suppress legitimate pro-Turkish sentiment. Similar arrests made in Arbil, Kirkuk and Suleimanieh just before or during the investigations of the commission in those liwas when their previous ideas of enormous pro-Turkish populations had been dispelled and their suspicions allayed, were accepted as necessary for law and order, and as not affecting the impartiality of the enquiry. Meanwhile, they had still considered the Iraqi Government as fully responsible for the security of the Turkish delegation, as the Turkish Government did not reply to a request that they should accept the measures of discreet surveillance proposed by the commission for their protection. The situation was brought to a head when the commission announced an intention of dividing into sub-commissions and leaving Mosul suddenly for secret destinations, and the British assessor replied that the matter had now got beyond his competence and asked for his Excellency the High Commissioner to visit Mosul. Before the High Commissioner reached Mosul, the commission produced a certificate signed by Djevad Pasha, accepting in the name of his Government full responsibility for the security of his delegation, thus changing the whole position. The plans of the commission at the same time underwent a complete *volte-face*; they declared that the sub-commissions would depart publicly for Arbil, Kirkuk and Kifri. His Excellency the High Commissioner spoke frankly to the commission, and they admitted that they had been allowing themselves to get into a "defensive" attitude towards Iraq. After the three sub-commissions had left Mosul, the president, who had remained behind, visited Sinjar, Tel Afar, Akra and the home nahiyas of Mosul. Although the obvious police escorts in Mosul had been removed, and no pro-Iraq demonstrations were allowed, a series of unfortunate incidents further embellished by the tongue of the youngest of the subordinates of the commission, M. Weber, kept alive the president's suspicions. At Tel Afar the pro-Iraq answers of the majority of the witnesses of both sides consorted strangely with a pro-Turkish demonstration, and the whole incident seemed to the president explained by the complaints of police attempts to suppress Turkish demonstrations, and the excessive activity of the armed police before his own eyes on the previous day. Unfortunate accidents of stupid but really innocent farashes suspected of listening at the door to the president's enquiries, the prominence of the Committee of Defence at Tel Afar and Akra when the president was annoyed that Asif Effendi always seemed to have preceded his visits, and the parrot-like replies in many cases vitiated the impressions which should have been left in his mind by a large majority of pro-Iraq witnesses.

Before he left Mosul for Kirkuk, the president was still sufficiently suspicious to listen to the venomous prattle of M. Weber, who had apparently insinuated that delays in the receipt of the president's letters were caused by their being held up and opened, presumably by me.

The commission had no doubt heard in Angora a great deal in praise of the plebiscite as a method of settling the dispute. I feel now that the commission were keenly desirous themselves to make recommendations for the frontier and not merely to recommend that the council should resort to a plebiscite. At the same time they appeared to have already decided before they came to Bagdad to carry out themselves a species of plebiscite. They announced a scheme of having the troops withdrawn from and holding a plebiscite in areas which they would choose suddenly, so as to avoid the possibilities of propaganda. The difficulties of removing troops were pointed out and the scheme was never again heard of, but the president's investigations in the Mosul Liwa resolved themselves into a plebiscite conducted amongst the witnesses suggested by the two assessors. As his suspicions still prevented him from receiving from me any notes to explain the relative importance of each witness, the replies were really at the time very little indication to him of the feeling of the

people. Meanwhile, the commissioners in Arbil and Kirkuk had been working in an atmosphere which they declared much more congenial than Mosul. The police surveillance of the Turkish experts, if it existed, was not obvious or even visible, and no demonstrations of any kind were ever allowed. Colonel Paulis, at Kirkuk, eventually approved of the local administration dealing quite severely with pro-Turkish agitators. The commissioners were of course reminded that the whole question had changed when Djevad had given his certificate of responsibility, and that Arbil and Kirkuk were much smaller than Mosul and therefore demonstrations were easier to control. It was not possible to explain another and very real reason, that in Arbil and Kirkuk the commandant of police was feared by the people, and therefore his merely known wishes were respected; while in Mosul the commandant not only was neither feared nor respected by the people, but also had forfeited any hope he had of controlling the demonstrative elements of either side by his foolish belief in the loyalty of the Kashmulla family, whose labours during the stay of the commission were of more value to Turkey than the Turkish delegation themselves.

Besides having their suspicions gradually dispelled by the strict calm and gradually discovering that there was not, in fact, quite such an enormous pro-Turkish element as they must have at first imagined, the commissioners were gradually finding out for themselves that the organisation of the country was patriarchal and almost feudal, and that witnesses varied in importance according to the number of their followers and the extent of their property. Colonel Paulis, in Kirkuk, had already begun to ask for notes on the personality and property of each witness he had seen. At Suleimanieh the president adopted a procedure suggested by Colonel Paulis, which eventually became the regular procedure used by the commission. A group of about a score of witnesses would be summoned and a preliminary discourse would be addressed to them by Colonel Paulis in the presence of both assessors and translated in turn by them or by their experts. Certain general ethnologic and economic questions would be asked and then the witnesses would be asked to go into the commissioner's room one by one for a secret enquiry. This procedure was maintained during the investigations made after the commission's return to Mosul, and right up to the end of the enquiry.

With regard to the witnesses interviewed at Suleimanieh, Arbil and Kirkuk, those named on the Turkish and British lists were summoned, and the British assessor would be asked for list describing their property, personality and social importance. These notes were normally to be verified from the Turkish experts and the witnesses themselves, but in actual practice, as the ignorance and fallibility of the Turkish experts became more evident, they were more and more accepted as true. After the return to Mosul a start was made by choosing the first twenty-five or fifty from each list. The British assessor, however, pointed out that his list had been compiled to include both pro-Turkish and pro-Iraq witnesses, and those names mentioned on Djevad's lists and not mentioned on his list were persons of no importance and no status in this country. The commission accepted the contention, and demanded in their place the following list:—

1. The principal proprietors of Mosul town with their properties.
2. The secondary electors of Mosul town.
3. Persons who had been members of the municipal council during the last twenty years.
4. The ulama of eight mosques chosen by Colonel Paulis on account of their size as it appeared on the chart of Mosul town.

The commission later asked for notes upon each of these witnesses to be handed to them if possible before they left finally or, if this was not possible, to be sent after them to Geneva. The president came to me and asked for similar notes upon the witnesses he had seen before he left Mosul for Kirkuk. It will be seen from the above that the commission gradually began to rely upon the local administration and the British assessor for their information instead of upon the Turkish delegation. As a means of assisting the commission with information, Djevad was not well chosen by the Turkish Government for the appointment of assessor. His ignorance was complete, and when separated from his experts, pathetic; at meal times, for instance, he would hang on the replies of the British assessor until the latter had barely managed to get them off his tongue, and then he would repeat them in a loud voice in the hope that the commission might believe that it was he who had the information. On the other hand, being in his own country a very senior general



with European reputation, he at first was naturally treated with greater respect than his counterpart, a junior and little known official. It became evident very soon to me, and before the end it must have been realised by the commission, that the Turkish case depended entirely upon sentiment. Signor Roddolo, before the commission left Bagdad, stated several times that the Turkish delegates had been chosen for "propaganda." It may appear that Djevad was chosen partly because, having been the military commandant of the Diarbekr front, he would be the most likely to remind the inhabitants of the prestige of their Governors during recent past centuries, and partly, perhaps, because he was commanding in the Dardanelles when the president was his military attaché. Nazim was chosen since he accompanied the Turkish troops which transgressed the frontier last autumn and because he was a pro-Turkish rebel of Kirkuk, and Fattah because of his relationship to Sheikh Mahmud. Kiamil, who appeared to be the one gentleman of the party, was chosen for his ability and his knowledge of Irak, where he was educated and fought during the war. The Turks sent no one who had anything to do with the compilation of their case for the Lausanne, Constantinople, Geneva or Brussels Conferences, and no one who could assist the commission with accurate (and therefore, perhaps, prejudicial to the Turkish case) information. As far as I can make out the Turkish delegation never requested the commission to investigate any of the facts of the case, nor ever drew their attention to points made in their memoranda. When asked by the commission to produce proof of some of the statistics of population, they had included in their memoranda such as the existence of 32,980 Turks in the Suleimanieh district, Djevad either replied that the police prevented him from having such intercourse with the people as would enable him to prove the assertions, or he took the line that all the original memoranda and statements of both parties were made wildly under the impression that they would not be subjected to local investigation, and they should therefore be disregarded; the only important point was the wishes of the mass of the people, and not those of the notables cited as witnesses. I believe the commission eventually tied down Djevad to a written admission that the Irak Government population statistics were in the main reliable; he made for the errors in the statistics of his own Government the plea that they were made before the war.

The Turkish assessor gradually lost by his childish behaviour the prestige which he had at the beginning of the commission. The British experts gained accordingly. At Tel Afar he became so excited that he gave away the president's lunch to the pro-Turk demonstrators, and when leaving Mosul for Arbil he involved himself in an unseemly *fracas* with an Arab army officer at the Kuwair ferry. At every place he visited, he hastened out to the bazaar and demonstratively saluted everybody, doing his best to provoke outbursts by shouting in a loud voice. His ungovernable tempers irritated the commission. At Dohuk he sat in a chair, posing like a king upon a throne, while the commissioners remained standing, and demanded to take over the administration straight away.

Though he had freedom of movement in Mosul, he made only one visit, and that to the disreputable quarter of the town, where a demonstration had been arranged by one of his experts who had visited it on the previous day. In most cases the witnesses he included on his lists were persons of no social standing or of the criminal classes. The police in Mosul strongly suspect him of endeavouring to stir up disorder in the town and the liwa.

He told me that he was on bad terms with the members of the modern Turkish party—this lends some weight to the rumour that Mustafa Kemal had sent him upon this mission to discredit him. Signor Roddolo told Mr. Edmonds that he would be the Turkish general who would command this front in case of war with Great Britain—in this case Great Britain's responsibilities are the greater, since Djevad has been allowed to tour the whole area and will have compiled, no doubt, useful notes upon the persons who exhibited anti-Turk sentiments, especially in Zakho and Mosul. The presence of the much-discussed undesirables, Nazim and Fattah, assisted or damaged the Turkish cause in various degrees in various places. In Mosul city their existence, in that it had caused all the vexatious delays and suspicions over the question of their protection, was of assistance to the Turks. In Arbil and Kirkuk, the Iraqi cause benefited from the splitting up into sub-commissions, as pro-Turk notables of many families, which were jealous of the Naftaji family, voted pro-Irak partly out of their personal grudge against Nazim. In Suleimanieh the Turks lost through playing the Sheikh Mahmud tune through Fattah Beg. In Zakho the presence of Nazim, though he had accompanied the Turkish punitive forces last autumn, was of little assistance to the Turks. In Kifri,

where Count Pourtales was given, curious as it may seem, the status of commissioner, and when Fattah Beg was given wide opportunities of propaganda, the Suleimanieh outlaw's presence assisted the Turks. In this respect the whole commission may perhaps be considered to have been at first somewhat unfair. While the Turkish delegation might expect the right of bringing before the commission any pro-Turkish feeling that had already existed, they should not have the right to stir up new feeling where none had existed. The licence given to the Turks to mix with the people gave them just this opportunity. It is true that the commission expressly forbade the Turks to indulge in propaganda, but it would have been impossible to obtain proof of their guilt. If the Turkish Government had any right to claim that pro-Turkish feeling existed in the vilayet they would have had registered in Turkey the names of the pro-Turks, and it was therefore, I consider, rather unfair that the commission should consider that Djevad's mission was to stir up and produce pro-Turkish feeling. Otherwise, and especially in the case of Colonel Paulis at Kirkuk, and the rest of the commission after their return to Mosul, they showed themselves fairly considerate and sympathetic towards the local administration. They were ready to admit the enormous strain they had put upon the administration by their enquiries, and, at the first sign of peace and order breaking, they hastily closed down the enquiry and made preparations to leave immediately. Mosul had to bear the strain of some part of the commission permanently residing in Mosul, and of the commission returning to Mosul and recommencing its enquiries. It was not perhaps surprising that one place should break under the tension.

With regard to their methods of enquiry, their procedure appears never to have been thought out, and the method finally maintained was one which they gradually subsided into rather than deliberately planned and adopted. They did not appear to have read more than superficially the answers to the additional *questionnaires* they put before us in this country, and they never, unless specially requested or reminded by the British assessor, sat down to test their veracity by special investigations in the districts concerned in those answers. They were probably suffering from acute mental indigestion of reading matter when they left, but it is hoped that they will accept for gospel the statements made in the answers to the *questionnaire* when they re-read and consider them, as they found reliable our village lists and population statistics and other matter which they were able to verify. As soon as I found the enquiry was developing upon the lines of a plebiscite, and it became more and more certain that the Turkish witnesses included an indiscreetly large proportion of persons of low standing or ill-repute, I endeavoured to strike at this weak point. I refrained from pressing the president too hard during his early tours in Mosul to accept my criticisms of the pro-Turkish witnesses, and endeavoured to disarm his suspicions by occasionally dispensing with a list of witnesses and arranging for the assembly, in addition to the Turkish witnesses, of all the mukhtars of the particular district and allowing him to choose as he liked. Sometimes this plan produced, as it did at Maklub, a large number of pro-Turk witnesses, of whom Djevad did not know, but, in the long run, I think it vastly reduced M. de Wiensen's suspicions. After leaving Mosul I found that Colonel Paulis had already been accepting notes upon the importance of each witness, and by this time the president of his own accord was beginning to ask for them, and from Suleimanieh onwards I endeavoured to develop an intensive campaign of crediting and discrediting witnesses, and of assisting the commission to form a suitable estimate of the size of the population which was represented by each witness. In the Mosul town and kadha where the population is much thicker, and, at the same time, more races and religions are mingled than in other districts of the vilayet, the commission made a serious attempt to obtain representative witnesses. In this respect they were greatly impressed by the lists which exist for this liwa only, showing the numbers and composition of every single village in every single nahiya of the whole liwa. They checked the veracity of these lists by enquiring from various witnesses, and the president one day made an expedition by himself to check them by enquiring from various villages picked at random. I noticed that, having verified their lists in the case of the Mosul Kadha, they were accepted as infallible for the other kadhas. This will be a great assistance, when they come to work out the population represented by the Doski, who voted pro-Turk, and find that only 5,000 people are represented out of a total for the kadha of 24,000, 9,000 of whom are Christians and Jews. Similarly, the doubtful Guli and Sindi number only 4,800 out of a total in the Zakho Kadha of 15,000, of which 5,000 are Christians and Jews. I found the



*[Handwritten musical notation on a single staff]*

The pre-Talib pre-war Liwa and village records for Talib pre-war have no cover. The case that such records or village lists that they were really fervent Nationalists hoping by displaying of Anglophobia to get better terms with it is held in the future is available. The copy showed that certain useful if not indispensable records have not yet been collected. Accurate village-by-village population lists exist only for the Mauliwa, and great difficulty was experienced in obtaining accurate figures to show the relative production of grain in the three vilayets of Irak. The existing records are insufficient to prepare an accurate map to show the boundaries and composition of the population of the southern vilayets.



*Report of the Irak Frontier Commission.*

#### Note on the British Obligation to Accept the Recommendations.

BY article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923, the frontier between Turkey and Irak was to be agreed between Turkey and Great Britain. In the event of an agreement, the dispute was to be referred to the Council of the League. No agreement was arrived at, and the fixing of the frontier was referred to the League accordingly on the 6th August, 1924.

2. The Council of the League was obliged to deal with a troublesome question as to the maintenance of the *status quo* in the area through which the frontier would ultimately pass, and the matter was therefore before the council in meetings at Geneva in September and again at Brussels in October 1924. At the meeting on the 30th September the council decided to set up a special committee of three persons to advise it as to the frontier which should be adopted, and settled at that meeting the scope of the committee's duties. At that meeting Great Britain repeated an undertaking already given on the 25th September (see annex), and Turkey also gave an undertaking to accept the decision of the council.

3. In accordance with this decision a committee of three was appointed, provided for by the Act of 1844, to prepare a report on the subject. The committee, consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Admiralty, and the Secretary of the War Office, has since that time been engaged in the preparation of its report. It is now ready for presentation to the House of Commons. The report is a very valuable one, and it is to be hoped that it will be accepted by the House of Commons. The report is a very valuable one, and it is to be hoped that it will be accepted by the House of Commons.

4. The point is not a true intersection of the old tracks, given that on the 25th and 30th September 1944, the two tracks were not yet joined together. It was the junction of the old road, and a new part of the road, which is now a junction of two roads.

If evidence were available and could be brought forward that the committee had been bribed or that the committee had been false to its trust and had deliberately misled the Council, for reasons stated above, the Council would have no right to continue to employ the committee. The British representative in the council on the ground that the committee had not performed the function for which it was appointed.

It is unlikely that any such situation will arise. What may well happen is that the report may seem so unsatisfactory that the British authorities in Iraq, and even in London, may find it difficult to believe that it is an honest report, and the British member of the council may therefore be pressed to object to it, and even to protest against its acceptance by the council; but nevertheless there may be no specific breach of duty on the part of members of the committee which can be pointed to. It is, therefore, necessary to know—

- (a.) Whether, when the question of accepting the report comes before the council, the British member will be entitled to vote;
- (b.) Whether acceptance of the report requires a unanimous decision; and
- (c.) Whether it is now open to the British member to vote against the acceptance of the report and thus prevent a unanimous decision.

... Great Britain of  
... or the exclusion of the  
... community, and article 15 only  
applies when the council is dealing with a dispute which has been brought before it  
as one likely to lead to a rupture. The Irak frontier has not come before the Council  
on that footing at all. It has been submitted to the council as a neutral and impartial  
body well qualified to decide between two parties who have failed to come to a direct  
agreement.

Question (b).—Unanimity will be necessary. Under article 5 of the covenant unanimity is necessary except where otherwise expressly provided, and there is no provision which authorises a majority vote in this case.

Question (e).—The practice of the council since the League came into being has been to accept the report of an expert committee appointed to investigate and

recommend a solution of a matter such as that with which the League is confronted in the Irak frontier. Only where the committee has exceeded its functions or misconceived its instructions has the council modified or rejected a report.

When the British and Turkish representatives undertook, on the 25th and 30th September, 1924, to accept the decision of the council, the other members of the council will have understood them to have pledged themselves not to obstruct acceptance by the council of the report of the committee which was to be appointed if the rest of the council thought it wise to accept that report. On no other basis would it be possible for the council to come to a decision as to a settlement of a dispute in such cases. The report of a committee dealing with a difference as to which the two parties are in acute disagreement is never likely to give complete satisfaction to both of them, and if, when they pledged themselves to accept the decision of the council, they retained the liberty to prevent the council coming to any decision at all, the pledge would be valueless and the council would be impotent as a body for harmonising such differences.

It is immaterial whether a pledge such as that given by the British member on the 25th September (see annex) is regarded as a pledge not to vote at all when the report ultimately comes before the council or whether it is regarded as a pledge not to vote against the opinion of the majority. The important point is that the pledge will have been understood by the other members of the council as an undertaking to refrain from destroying the unanimity required. What obliges the British member, therefore, to refrain from voting against the acceptance of the report is the pledge given by his

other members that it implied acquiescence in the council's practice of accepting the report of the expert committee if the members of the council not concerned in the dispute thought it wise to do so.

It may be well to add a word as to the position of Turkey. Turkey is not a member of the League, and the provision in article 4 as to representatives of States not on the council sitting as members of the council during the consideration of matters specially affecting their interests is limited to States which are members of the League. There is, in fact, no provision in the covenant which in terms gives Turkey the right to vote when the matter comes before the council. It is inconceivable, however, that Turkey would have agreed to article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne except upon the assumption that she would stand on a footing of equality with the British Empire when the question came before the council. The council will no doubt desire Turkey to sit at the council table during the discussion of the Iraq frontier, but, if it came to a vote, it is difficult to see how Turkey could be allowed to vote. This is a strong argument in favour of the view that, as a matter of equity, the British representative should not vote either.

C. J. B. H.

Foreign Office, May 21, 1925.

ANSWER

Thirtieth Session of the Council of the League.)

*Extract from the Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting, held at Geneva, Thursday,  
September 25, 1924, at 10:20 a.m.*

M. BRANTING (*rapporteur*) read the following note:—

"In the first place how do the British and Turkish delegations understand the reference to the council provided for in article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne? I believe that I am right in thinking that, according to the statements of the British and Turkish delegations, it is not a restricted council, but a council of the great powers."

LORD PARMEOR. To the first of the two questions which the rapporteur has asked, my reply is entirely in the affirmative. The British Government does regard the treaty as placing the council in the position of an arbitrator whose ultimate award must be accepted in advance by both parties. Therefore, in the most explicit terms, I desire to say that the British Government would consider itself bound by the determination of the council.



*Extract from the Minutes of the Seventeenth Meeting, held at Geneva, Tuesday, September 30, 1924, at 10.30 A.M.*

M. BRANTING read the following report:—

"After conversation with representatives of both parties concerned, I have ascertained with satisfaction that the divergence of views on the scope of the question submitted to the council is not such as had at first appeared to me.

"Lord Parmoor reminded me that the effect of his declaration to the council was that his Government accept in advance the council's decision regarding the frontier between Turkey and Iraq. . . .

"His Excellency Fethi Bey, to whom I communicated the results of this conversation, informed me that the misunderstanding which had arisen appeared to him to be dispelled, and that he agreed to the question being submitted in the form indicated by Lord Parmoor.

"I then reminded him that the British Government had declared that they accepted, in advance, the council's decision, whereas the Turkish Government, through the medium of their delegate, had declared that they would submit to the authority of the council under the terms of article 15 of the covenant. I asked his Excellency Fethi Bey if he could, on behalf of his Government, now give an undertaking to accept the council's recommendation.

"His Excellency Fethi Bey replied that on this point there was no disagreement between his Government and the British Government, and that he would be prepared to make a declaration in the sense referred to.

M. BRANTING: . . . I beg to move the following resolution:—

"The council, having had the question of the delimitation of the frontier between Turkey and Iraq referred to it under article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne;

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of the British and Turkish Governments, who undertook on behalf of their respective Governments to accept the council's decision;

"With a view to collecting the facts and data which it requires to fulfil the mission entrusted to it under article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne;

"Decides to set up a special committee of three members. . . .

In reply to the president, LORD PARMOOR said that he accepted the resolution.

His Excellency FETHI BEY also accepted the resolution. He hoped that the observations he had just made would be taken into consideration.

E 2986 32 65]

No 5.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office. (Received May 23)*

Sir,

*Downing Street, May 22, 1925*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of Mr Secretary Chamberlain, copies of papers on the subject of the Turco-Irak frontier question.

I am &c

J. E. MASTERTON SMITH

Enclosure 1 in No 5

*Count Pourtales to Mr R. P. Jardine*

(Translation.)

THE Commission of Enquiry, nominated by the League of Nations with the view of settling the question of the frontier between Turkey and Iraq, would be grateful to Mr Jardine if he would kindly have furnished to it with the shortest possible delay, an account of the stages of the British military occupation of Mesopotamia. The commission begs him also, when furnishing this information, to include in the account the dates of the occupation of the old Mosul Vilayet.

*Geneva, May 14, 1925*

E 3365 32 65]

Enclosure 2 in No 5

*Vote by Mr Jardine on the British Military Occupation of Irak*

*First Stage. Capture of the Basra Vilayet*

War between Turkey and Great Britain was declared on the 29th October, 1914. On the 6th November a British force took the Fort of Fao, and after defeating the Turks in several small engagements, entered Basra on the 21st November. The British forces were followed to Kurra which was occupied on the 9th December. Another British victory at Sha'ailah on the 12th April 1915, was followed, on the 3rd June, by the occupation of Amara. Nasiriyah the western apex of the strategic triangle between Basra, Amara and Kut was captured on the 24th July 1915. By the 1st August the whole of the Basra Vilayet was now under the British military occupation.

*Second Stage: Advance to Kut. Siege of Kut. Unsuccessful Operations for Relief of Kut.*

On the 29th September, 1915, Kut was captured and the Turks were followed by the British cavalry as far as Aziziyah. On the 22nd November the British defeated the Turks at Ctesiphon, but were forced by the arrival of large Turkish reinforcements to withdraw to Kut, where the force was invested, on the 7th December, by a superior Turkish force. The early months of 1916 were spent in unsuccessful operations to relieve the beleaguered garrison, which was compelled by starvation to surrender on the 29th April, 1916.

The Turkish commander had promised to refrain from reprisals upon the British prisoners of war, but immediately upon entry hanged some of the best known citizens.

*Third Stage: Operations for the Recovery of Kut and Capture of Bagdad. Occupation of the Bagdad Vilayet.*

Having completed his preparations, General Maude began operations at the end of 1916 for the dislodgement of the Turkish forces at Kut from the position in which, with its immense natural advantages for defence, they had strongly entrenched themselves. On the 23rd February, 1917, the position was forced, and the Turkish forces evacuated. On the 11th March 1917, and the British forces advanced to a line short of the Jazul Hamrin on the east, to Samarra on the north and Fajujah on the west. Ramadi on the Euphrates and Tekrit on the Tigris were captured in the autumn of 1917. The Turkish forces evacuated the Bagdad Vilayet and the British forces occupied the frontier. The greater part of the Bagdad Vilayet was under the British military occupation at the end of 1917.

*Fourth Stage: The advance into the Mosul Vilayet. Destruction of the Turkish Forces in front of Mosul. Occupation of the Mosul Vilayet and the whole of Mesopotamia at the Armistice.*

At the beginning of 1916 the British forces advanced to Kirkuk and Kifri, withdrawing for the hot weather to Tuz Khurmatu between Kifri and Kirkuk.

From Sulaimanich, Sheikh Mahmud sent letters offering either to hand over the reins of government to the British or to act himself as British representative. He was appointed to carry on the local administration. In October 1918 the British forces in Irak were instructed to occupy Mosul, and at the end of that month the whole of the Turkish Tigris army which constituted the bulk of the force defending Mosul was cut off and forced to surrender. Meanwhile Kirkuk had been recaptured on the 24th October and the British forces advanced towards Altun Kupri and Arbil. The Mudros armistice came into force on the 31st October, 1918. By the clauses of the armistice the Turks were bound to surrender all garrisons in Mesopotamia, and the Allies had the right to occupy any strategical point. On the 1st November Turkish officers met the British cavalry at Hammam Ali and informed them that an armistice had been signed. On the 2nd November the general officer commanding-in-chief informed the Turkish







*The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31)*

(No. 204)

(Telegraphic) R

Paris, May 30, 1925

YOL R telegram No. 153.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs has no precise information, but will enquire as to reason for movements of troops. It presumes reason to be return of tired troops from scene of Kurdish revolt and their replacement by fresh troops.

*The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 2)*

(No. 207)

(Telegraphic)

Paris, June 1, 1925

MY telegram No. 204.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs received yesterday through Ministry of War a telegram from General Sarrail, to the following effect:—

"Kurdistan situation is without change. For twenty days from 24th May fresh Turkish reinforcements will be taken across Syria. Government is actively engaged in crushing Progressists."

M. Briand being away, I requested Mr. Phipps to point out to M. Berthelot that, as the Government had previously announced suppression of revolt, there was no apparent reason for the fresh Turkish reinforcements being telegraphed to French Ambassador at Constantinople to inform Turkish Government that it was inadmissible that slightest semblance of a menace should be directed against Great Britain or Iraq by Turkey. M. Berthelot added that the reinforcements were necessary to suppress the revolt which His Majesty's Government might desire.

*The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 4)*

(No. 210)

(Telegraphic)

[By Bag]

Paris, June 3, 1925

MY telegram No. 207 of 1st June.

The Political Director at the Quai d'Orsay states that the Turkish Ambassador informed him yesterday that the trains now being sent across the Syrian railways were carrying a certain number of recruits to reinforce the Diarbekir division, which was below strength. The trains on their way back were bringing away the troops from the scene of the Kurdish rebellion. More troops, therefore, were coming back to the west than were being sent eastwards.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)*

(No. 163)

(Telegraphic)

[By Bag]

Foreign Office, June 4, 1925

Please inform French Government that I greatly appreciate their offer to take any action which His Majesty's Government may desire.

I am advised that the Turkish Government are sending eastward Turkish troops to reinforce the spot for suppressing remaining rebels in Kurdistan, where the revolt has been officially declared at an end. Further reinforcements, therefore,

unless balanced by corresponding withdrawal, can only be regarded as increasing potential threat to Iraq.

Failing definite corroboration by French military authorities in Syria of Turkish Ambassador's statement (your telegram No. 210 of 3rd June) that more troops are being sent eastward, the French Government can see their way to suspend immediately permission for passage of Turkish troops eastward. If, however, French military authorities are satisfied that fresh troops are really required by withdrawal of troops already there, the persistence of revolt calling for military force, such action would not be necessary.

Matter is urgent, as over half the period has already elapsed.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 90, in R.)

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople)*

(No. 91)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, June 4, 1925.

NEWS that the French military authorities in Syria have accorded permission for the transfer of the 1st Turkish Army Corps over the Syrian Railway at the rate of two trains daily for twenty days from 24th May is causing His Majesty's Government some anxiety. There are already in Kurdistan the VIth and VIIth Corps which should be amply sufficient to suppress any remaining rebels in Kurdistan, where the revolt has been officially declared at an end. The despatch of further reinforcements, therefore, in the absence of reliable information of a corresponding withdrawal of troops already in Kurdistan, can only be regarded as increasing the potential threat to Iraq and must have a disturbing effect in the Mosul Vilayet.

The trains now being sent across the Syrian Railway are only carrying recruits to reinforce the Diarbekir division, and on their return are bringing westward the Adana and Konia divisions, so that more troops are returning westward than are going eastward.

French Government have offered to take any action we may desire, and you will see from my telegram No. 163 to Paris, repeated to you as No. 90, what we are asking them to do. They have already instructed their representative at Constantinople to inform the Turkish Government that it was inadmissible that the slightest semblance of a menace should be directed against Great Britain or Iraq by Turkey.

With reference to the assurances given to you by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on your recent visit to Angora, you should, unless you have information rendering such action unnecessary, inform Turkish Government that His Majesty's Government are at a loss to understand present reinforcement of troops in Kurdistan now that the revolt has been officially declared at an end, and cannot but regard it with some disquiet as constituting a potential threat to Iraq and an actual and immediate element of disturbance within the Mosul Vilayet. They will therefore be glad to receive any reassuring explanation the Turkish Government may be able to offer.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul-General Sutow (Beirut)*

(No. 11)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, June 4, 1925

YOL R telegram No. 15 of 31st May. Turkish troop movements in neighbourhood of Iraq frontier.

Following for liaison officer.

"Is there any explanation of the eastward transfer of the 1st Corps now that suppression of the Kurdish revolt has been officially announced by the Turkish Government. For example, is anything known of the relief or demobilisation of the VIth or VIIth Corps already in Kurdistan? Turkish Ambassador in Paris states that trains are carrying recruits to reinforce the Diarbekir division and are bringing back on their return journey the Adana and Konia divisions, so that more troops are returning westwards than are passing eastwards."



No. 13

*The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 6)*

(No. 214)

[By Bag.]

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, June 5, 1925

YOC R telegram No. 183 of 4th June. Movement of Turkish troops.  
I saw M. Briand this afternoon, having first ascertained that French War Office, while aware of transport of demobilised men, could not give proportion of those going westward. M. Briand had received information from French Ambassador here regarding return of demobilised men, which he considered satisfactory. He had himself shared your uneasiness at the figures of troops gone eastward, and has been communicating with General Sarrail, instructing him to provide two trains a day to transport troops westward. He assured me that the utmost vigilance will be exercised, he having impressed this on the French authorities in Syria.

No. 14

*Consul General Satow to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 6)*

(No. 17)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, June 5, 1925

FOLLOWING for Air Ministry from liaison officer:—

"French officially informed from Angora that reservists of Vth and VIIth Divisions are being transported by rail for present movement of troops, although number proceeding east still appears greater than number going west.

"Between 20th May and 1st June inclusive 15 officers and 7,321 men passed eastwards. No units mentioned, so presumably recruits and reinforcements. 31st May 18 officers and 703 men passed westwards, presumably reservists for demobilisation. Destination of eastbound troops Derbiseh.

"Foreign Office telegram No. 11 just received. Think above explains position."

(Repeated to "Aviation," Palestine, and Bagdad.)

No. 15

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 9.)*

(No. 80.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, June 7, 1925

YOC R telegram No. 91.

I have spoken to French Ambassador about situation, and neither he nor I believe that Turks intend any action so serious as to cause a breach with His Majesty's Government. His military information received direct from General M... is that Turkish Government is moving only recruits to eastern provinces. He tells me that General Sarrail was seriously concerned at Turkish concentration at Adana, and therefore gaily allowed troops to pass eastward over Syrian Railway but actually stopped at Jerablus a trainload of troops proceeding westward. French Ambassador assured him to countermand latter measure.

I have also pressed note to Turkish Government in the sense of your instructions asking for reassuring explanations, but omitting only reference to disquieting effect in Iraq of their manoeuvres, which I think would be injudicious.

Copy by bag

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 27.)

No. 16

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 10)*

(No. 83)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, June 10, 1925

FOLLOWING for War Office from military attaché:—

Reliable observer located practically all units of 1st Corps in Smyrna-Aidin-Menemen area between 24th May and 6th June. Saw no movement of troops except approximately one battalion in the train in Menemen station, destination unknown.

"24th and details of 51st infantry regiment in train at Reshadieh station (junction for Sokia) en route for So..."

"Reliable American source states that demobilisation of reserves called up to replace these in the force now operating in eastern vilayets, 850 men from each division not now engaged will be drafted to that area, approximately 10,000 men. Demobilisation of reservists will proceed concurrently with arrival of these drafts."

No. 17

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 10)*

(No. 84)

(Telegraphic.) R

Constantinople, June 10, 1925

MY telegram No. 82.

I have now received note reaffirming Minister for Foreign Affairs' oral declaration to me that "Turkish Government desire to cultivate best relations with His Majesty's Government, and that nothing is farther from its intentions than to take any action liable to constitute a menace to Iraq." Note adds that demobilisation is proceeding, and that such movements of troops as are taking place are governed solely by necessities of internal situation, and in no way constitute menace to any neighbouring Power.

Copy by bag

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 29.)

E 196 32 65

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 12)*

(No. 20.)

Sir,

Constantinople, January 7, 1925

1. I HAVE the honour to report that the League of Nations Sub-Commission for the Delimitation of the Iraq Frontier arrived in Constantinople in the last days of the year, and while in Turkey are the guests of the Government. They have now left for Angora, and, after discussion there with the Turkish Government, propose to proceed by rail to Syria and Iraq. It is said that they will stop at Konia en route to be received by the Turkish authorities, who are at present preparing to offer a visit to that city.

2. I have avoided contact with the sub-commission, thinking it better to allow the Turks to do their worst with them unhampered by any influence I might try to exert. I have therefore forwarded to them documents from yourself, and an invitation from Sir H. Dicks to stay with him at his house while they are at Bagdad—an invitation which the sub-commission have accepted. Beyond that, and apart from a short friendly conversation with Count Teleki at a social function, I have had no communication with the sub-commission.

3. The Turkish press have clearly received a *mot d'ordre* to write about the frontier question during the presence here of the League's representatives. A number of articles have appeared in the papers, the importance of the Mosul Vilayet to Turkey, and insisting usually that for Great Britain the whole question is one of oil. The articles have been moderate in tone and nothing more than could have been expected in the circumstances.

I have, &c

R. C. LINDSAY



*Consul London to Sir W. Tyrrell — (Received June 12.)*

(No. 22)  
(Telegraphic)

*Geneva, June 12, 1925*

FOLLOWING from Secretary of State:—

Council of League of Nations yesterday dealt with remaining items of agenda. At private session British delegate explained anxiety of His Majesty's Government that decision on Iraq frontier should be taken as soon as possible. As it seemed unlikely that council would be prepared to take question before September session he hoped council might meet two days earlier than would be normally the case, in order that it might get this question out of the way if possible before assembly sessions interfere with its work. Council of League of Nations is therefore provisionally summoned to meet on 2nd September.

## CHAPTER II.—ARABIA.

Z 100 10 911

No

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain — (Received January 6, 1925)*

(No 116. Secret)

*Jeddah, December 11, 1924*

Sir, I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 20th November to the 11th December.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit and Bahrain.

I have, &  
R. W. BULLARD

Enclosure 1 in No. 20

*Report for the Period November 20-December 11, 1924*

THE Indian newspaper, the "Moslem Outlook," has cited the use of the term "Wahabis" by the English press as an attempt to prejudice the Moslem world against Ibn Saud. As several prominent Indian Mahometan Nationalists have used the same term in interviews reported in the "Moslem Outlook," the charge need not be taken seriously. Nevertheless, it appears to be true that the followers of Ibn Saud object to the name "Wahabi," and that they call themselves Moslems, or Ikhwan (brethren), and claim to be plain Hanbalis, i.e., members of one of the four orthodox Sunni sects. The common name for them here is "Mudaiyinah." This is apparently a corruption of "Mutadaiyinah" (singular Mutadaiyin) from "tadaiyana" = to follow the (true) religion.

2. The proposal to bring down foreign subjects (chiefly Javanese) in caravans under escort came to nothing, because the Hedjaz Government have no control outside the defences of Jeddah. The Wahabis hold the road down to Bahrah, the half-way halting-place, but from there to the Jeddah defences there are tribes which, while nominally under Hedjaz Government control, would probably rob the caravans, and the Hedjaz Government cannot provide an escort of "regular" troops.

Very few foreigners have reached Jeddah since the date of the last report. They were all Javanese. Some of these maintained that the Wahabis had prevented them from reading Maulids—the various lives of the Prophet, by which they, and, indeed, most Moslems, set great store.

3. The Wahabis followed up the lesson to the Harb by nearly annihilating two small tribes, the Bani Jabir and the Burakit, within 10 or 15 miles of Jeddah. There seems good evidence that women and children, as well as men, were killed. Both tribes had sent to Mecca and declared themselves to be "Mudaiyinah," but they had doubtless given similar assurances of loyalty to Ali, and the ruthless attack was presumably meant as retribution for double-dealing. As a warning, the fate of these two tribes has been most effective; it is unlikely that the Wahabis would have anything to fear from the tribes if they advanced on Jeddah. Ali has lost all faith in the promises of the Hedjaz Government, and has ceased to supply them with the tribes, and without that not even promises are to be had. All Bedouin have been sent away from Jeddah. This rids the city of a most disorderly and untrustworthy element, and, moreover, helps to relieve the strain on the water supply.

The Hedjaz Government are therefore dependent upon the so-called regular army, strengthened—or, at least, increased in number—by several hundred volunteers, most of whom are from the mandated territory of Palestine. The health of these volunteers is becoming a serious problem, as they are suffering from dysentery or malaria, or both. Many of them still want to get away, but this agency is acting on a policy, approved by His Majesty's Government, of refusing to receive applications for release while doing what can be done unofficially to secure an improvement in conditions.



Tahain Pasha professes to believe that he could beat off an army of 20,000 Wahabists, but it is doubtful whether he is serious in this contention. People here who know the Wahabi methods of fighting say that Khalid would think nothing of sending 200 or 300 camelry to death against the barbed wire if he could thereby effect an entry. It is unlikely that the Hedjaz army would stand once the defences were pierced, even if it waited for that.

4. The P. and O. steamship "Nore" called at Jeddah on the 22nd November and landed three aeroplanes from England for the Hedjaz Government. The first to be assembled proved to be a D H 9 with a Siddeley-Puma engine—a war plane, but not fitted with a machine gun. The second, also a De Havilland, has a Diesel engine, it is a commercial machine fitted with a cabin to carry two passengers besides the pilot and a mechanic. The third is said to be of the same type as the second. None of the machines is new.

The only pilot, the Russian, Shirokov, goes out on a reconnaissance nearly every morning and evening. He always uses the first machine, having smashed the undercarriage of the second on landing after his first flight in it. As he refuses to fly over enemy territory at less than 9,000 or 10,000 feet, and as his observer is a one-eyed officer, who always wears dark glasses when he goes up, it is not believed that the reports brought back are of great value. M. Shirokov is constantly being pressed by the army commander, Tahain Pasha, to drop bombs on supposed enemy concentrations, but has so far refused. There are no aeroplane bombs in the country. Tahain Pasha wanted M. Shirokov to drop hand grenades, and was with difficulty persuaded that if they didn't blow the machine to pieces they would burst before reaching the ground. He then proposed that shells should be dropped, and himself made an experiment with two, but neither exploded. He is, nevertheless, pressing that explosives of some kind should be dropped on Mecca, and he and M. Shirokov seem to persuade the King alternatively for and against this policy. It is difficult to see what could be gained by the bombing of Mecca by a non Moslem airman, whereas the

M. Shirokov may eventually yield to pressure. He receives from the Hedjaz Government a salary of £500 a month, a black uniform, and, as in supplements this quite inadequate ration by heavy purchases and by drinking at the expense of his admirers, he may one day reach the point of exasperation at which the prospect of dropping explosives on Mecca will cease to appear objectionable.

There are several British airmen in Suez who appear to have been engaged for service in the Hedjaz. They have undertaken not to proceed to the Hedjaz without the express permission of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Resident at Aden reports the arrival there, for some unknown consignee in Jeddah, of over a million rounds of small arms ammunition from England.

The "Nore" has also brought a quantity of small arms and ammunition, and the "Nore" They have paid about £50,000 to a General Newland, who has a business of some kind in Egypt, to purchase munitions for them in Egypt, and they have, however, heard through the Arab agent in Cairo that His Majesty's Government have refused a licence for the export. This they cannot understand, as the Hedjaz is a signatory of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1919, but they have probably not read the articles of the Convention which prohibit the export of arms for preventing munitions from falling into the hands of people who have no stable Government.

5. Ibn Saud arrived at Mecca on Friday, the 5th December, and all Jeddah is in a state of excitement. The position of the city, which has been a subject of contention between Ibn Saud and the consular corps in Jeddah. Copies of these letters are attached. The contention, implicit in his letter of the 21st November, that, having once warned us to remove our nationals either to Mecca or to some other specified place, he could with impunity fall on the city, could not be accepted. His last letter, to which a formal acknowledgment has been sent, is more reasonable.

6. From Ibn Saud's letters to the foreign representatives and to Amin Rihani, Sayyid Talib Pasha and Mr. Philby, three points emerge clearly:—

- (1) He considers Jeddah essential to Mecca;
- (2) He still insists that "the Shereef" Ali should leave Jeddah;
- (3) He still maintains that the decision must be left to the Moslem world.

What is not known is whether he is prepared to try to seize Jeddah by force if Ali refuses to leave the country, and, above all, who, in Ibn Saud's opinion, constitute the Moslem world. It is known that he has been working with the Caliphate Committee in London, and it is therefore not surprising that he should cling so tenaciously to their policy. So far as is known, the only Moslem Government which has appointed a delegation to Jeddah is the Government of India. It is necessary to state that they are nominees of the Caliphate Committee, and must have credentials from His Majesty's Government or from the Government of India. Java and Malaya appear to be disinclined to take any active part in the decision, and not even the Egyptians have appointed a delegation. It is true that the president of the Syrian Federation has sent a telegram to Ibn Saud applauding his policy, but this is generally regarded as a French rather than a Moslem pronouncement, and has, moreover, been openly attacked by many Syrians.

7. Of the would-be peacemakers assembled in Jeddah, the only one who has much chance of success is the Saudi Tahir Pasha. Even he has been told by Ibn Saud that he must not interfere in the dispute, but he hopes to go to Mecca in a few days, as an old friend of Ibn Saud's, and to try to bring about a settlement. Mr. Philby have both been reminded that, as non Moslems, they must not interfere in a purely Moslem question. The latest letter to Mr. Philby says that Ibn Saud is prepared to meet him, later, at Bahrah, if he has any purely personal business to discuss; but Mr. Philby is debarred from going to Bahrah, even for that limited purpose, by the instructions from His Majesty's Government, which do not permit him to go into the interior.

8. I understand that the Foreign Secretary here has protested to the acting French consul very strongly in regard to the telegram sent to Ibn Saud by the president of the Syrian Federation, Subhi Bey Barakat. The Hedjaz Government contend, with some reason, that the telegram could not have been sent without the approval of the French authorities, and that it therefore constitutes a serious breach of neutrality by the French.

9. The Egyptian Red Crescent Society has sent a unit to Jeddah. They wished to send a unit to the Wahabists, but the latter have refused to accept it, stating that this might not be feasible at present. The Jeddah unit was welcomed by the Hedjaz Government with open arms and given the whole town to choose a place on which to pitch its tents.

A letter from the King of the Hedjaz, King Abdul Aziz, very cordial in speech, has been received here, and it is believed that the King of the Hedjaz has been very friendly to the Red Crescent Society, and that the Red Crescent Society is sending the unit to Jeddah, and that the unit will be very helpful in the Hedjaz.

10. A party of about thirty persons who left Mecca three days after the arrival of the unit, and who were in the Hedjaz for some time, they bring was received while the earlier part of this report was being typed. They state that Ibn Saud is still at Akaba, and that he is still sending frequent telegrams to his son and to various officials, all signed, as though he were still King, by his "Head of the Hashimite office." Two telegrams received from him within a few days of the arrival of the unit, and which were signed by him, were:—The Hedjaz steamship "Tawil" ran aground near Akaba, and Hussein wired:

- (1) "Your steamer has sunk"
- (2) "Our steamer has floated off again"

R W BULLARD



Enclosure 2 in No. 20.

*Ibn Saud to Consular Corps*(Translation)  
(After greetings.)*Riyadh, 24th Rabi' al Thani, 1343*  
(21st November, 1924).

WE have received your letter of 24th Rabi' al Thani (November 21st, 1924), and have noted what you say. As to the remarks regarding the protection of our nationals and the safeguarding of them against the dangers of war, we think it necessary to remind your Highness that the respect for our nationals (i.e., the right they have to be respected in person and property) is based on the rules of international law applicable to war time, and we invite you, in the names of our Govern-

1. That you should appoint for your nationals a suitable place either in or outside Jeddah and inform us of its situation, so that we may send some of our men to guard and protect them.
2. That, if you wish, you should send them to Mecca, where they would be near the sacred shrine and far from the calamities and perils of war. We would give them a warm welcome, and allot them a place suitable for their occupation.

We beg you to send to the people of Jeddah our enclosed letter, so that they may understand the matter fully. We do not hold ourselves responsible for anything subsequent to this our proclamation.

(Compliments.)

(Seal of Ibn Saud.)

*Ibn Saud to "All the People of Jeddah"*(Translation)  
(After greetings.)*Riyadh, 24th Rabi' al Thani, 1343*  
(21st November, 1924).

YOU are doubtless aware that the greater part of the Moslem world have declared that they do not wish the Hedjaz to be ruled by Hussein and his sons. YOU are also aware that you are under the treaty and protection of Allah both yourselves and your property if you follow the course adopted by the people of Mecca. As to the presence of the Amir Ali among you and his leaving in accordance with the views of the Moslem world, we advise you to leave the town and to stay in some appointed place or to proceed to Mecca for the protection of your lives and property, or to seize the Sherief Ali bin-Hussein and to deport him from your country. If you act otherwise, by helping the said (Ali) or adhering to his cause, we are free from blame before the Moslem world, and the consequences of whatever may happen are upon him who gives rise to them.

(Seal of Ibn Saud.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 20.

*Consular Corps to Ibn Saud**Jeddah, 5th Jumada 'I Awwal, 1343*  
(2nd December, 1924).

(After greetings.)

WE have received your letter of 24th Rabi' al Thani (November 21st, 1924), and have noted what you say. As to the remarks regarding the protection of our nationals and the safeguarding of them against the dangers of war, we think it necessary to remind your Highness that the respect for our nationals (i.e., the right they have to be respected in person and property) is based on the rules of international law applicable to war time, and we invite you, in the names of our Govern-

ments, to respect the persons and property of our nationals, otherwise, you will be responsible for anything that may happen to them anywhere and at any time.

As to the letter addressed to the people of Jeddah, we are unable to deliver it on account of the rule of neutrality we follow, which does not permit our interference in any manner whatsoever. We therefore return it herewith.

(Compliments.)

HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S AGENT AND CONSUL  
ITALIAN CONSUL GENERAL  
ACTING FRENCH CONSUL-GENERAL,  
NETHERLANDS VICE-CONSUL  
ACTING PERSIAN CONSUL.

Enclosure 4 in No. 20.

*Ibn Saud to Consular Corps.*(Translation.)  
(After greetings.)*Mecca, 9th Jumada 'I Awwal, 1343*  
(5th December, 1924).

I HAVE received your letter of 9th Jumada 'I Awwal (December 1st) and noted its contents.

Your nationals are respected by us with the respect due to the people of the Moslem lands, and we will in no wise allow any harm to come upon their persons or their property. Only, as Jeddah may become the scene of hostilities, and since without Jeddah the material and moral situation of Mecca cannot be good, I beg you to notify your nationals that, in case of conflict between our forces and the forces of the Sherief Ali, everyone who is under your protection should refrain from approaching the scene of conflict and should take refuge in his house. By this means alone can we safeguard the lives of your nationals, whom we respect and honour with all our hearts.

(Greetings.)

(Seal of Ibn Saud.)

No. 21.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 17.)*

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, January 17, 1925*

YOUR telegram No. 4.

Southern shipping force consists of steamer "Tawil" and (Foreign Minister declares) certain number of dhows. Northern steamship "Ragmatan."

No British craft brought in. I have reserved our rights in writing, and will watch developments.

No. 22.

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 17.)*

(No. 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, January 17, 1925*

CIRCULAR All addresses

Wahabis closing in, expected to make a night attack about new moon. They can hardly fail to take Jeddah.



(No. 10 )  
(Telegraphic )

*Jeddah, January 17, 1925*

INDIAN deputation admit in writing that their aim is to establish republic in Hedjaz in which King Hussein and his family shall have no part, and that until Islamic conference it is proposed to summon has decided about Government, they wish country to be under Ibn Saud. Authorities here consequently refuse to facilitate their meeting with Sultan, who seems very anxious to meet them  
(sent to Simla)

E 354 10 911

No 23

*Consul Bullard to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 21, 1925)*

(No. 119.)

1997

*Jeddah, December 30, 1924*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 12th to the 30th December

2 Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartoum, Aden, Zanzibar, Bagdad, Bombay, Calcutta, Baku, Batavia, Ceylon, Hongkong, Singapore, Bussore, Koweit, Bahrein and Muscat.

I have, &c

R. W. BULLARD

Enclosure in No. 24

Report for the Period December 12-30, 1924

(Secret.)

A LONG report is not required, as there is hope of peace between Nejd and the Hijaz. The only serious trouble is the propaganda which is being conducted between Mecca and Jeddah. Ibn Saud has started a newspaper at Mecca, the "Umm al Kura" (i.e., "Mother of Towns").

king Hussein, it is intelligible. Some extracts from the first two numbers are

out a copy of it came into my hands and the passages which were omitted from the second printing will be found in the appendix. They show that Ibn Saud is more reasonable than some of the people with him. Nevertheless, the account, given in the first number, of the alleged agreement between the ulama of Nejd and Mecca as to the main articles of faith suggests to what extent Ibn Saud is compelled to

of Mecca would ever approve of tenets which are repugnant to most of the pilgrims

of a saint, and saying prayers and burning candles at tombs are common practices which it would be impossible to suppress without stirring up fierce opposition.

first wife, and of his mother Aminah, have been demolished. The Wahabis have also demolished a house which is said to be the Prophet's, and is, in any case, very ancient.

Jeddah now publishes twice a week a small newspaper called "Barid al-  
their barbarity towards the people of Taif, and on the almost complete failure of  
the proposed conference at Mecca being two Indians chosen by the Caliphate Committee.  
On the 18th December it published a long proclamation to the people of Mecca, in  
which King Ali announced that he was about to march out to recapture Mecca, and  
urged them to stand firm and to endure a little while longer the sufferings which  
the necessity to blockade Ibn Saud compelled the Hedjaz Government to inflict on

2 After an interval, so long that the Hedjaz Government had almost given up hope of any treaty, further letters from Ibn Saud. Sayyid Talib Paasha was told not to come to Mecca, as people whom Ibn Saud did not wish to offend had spoken against his coming. The letter to Mr Philby was friendly, but vague. It was only the letter to Amin Ribani, the Americanised Syrian Christian, who visited Nejd a year or two ago, which was important. Ibn Saud asked Ribani to send him a full and frank expression of his views. Ribani at once sent him a memorandum warning him, I understand, that he would be foolish to allow himself to be entangled in Hedjaz affairs to please the self-styled Moslem world. Ibn Saud's reply arrived on the 25th December. The Foreign Secretary, Sheikh Fuad, tells me, in confidence, that the reply offers good hopes of peace. Ibn Saud is willing to meet representatives of the Hedjaz Government. Two of the points on which Ibn Saud insists are that the treaty should be signed at Mecca and that it should be a treaty of friendship. The latter is presumably wanted as a sop to the Moslem extremists, who pretend that the object of the treaty is to bring the Hedjaz under British influence.

3 There has been no military move on either side since the last report was written, except that, on the 9th December, two aeroplanes, piloted by Russians, dropped four shells near Babrah, the half-way halting place on the road to Mecca. The Hedjaz Government believe that it was this that induced Ibn Saud to send a conciliatory reply! The promise to advance on Mecca contained in King Ali's proclamation can be dismissed as baseless, the Hedjaz army could not possibly undertake an offensive movement.

The Hedjaz air service now has three pilots and six mechanics—all Russians. Mr King, one of the three British airmen who were stated in the last report to be at Suez, decided to come to Jeddah to try to come to a settlement with the Hedjaz Government, as he had not enough money to take him home. The Hedjaz Government acceded to the representations of this agency that Mr King should not be employed, and he himself, on having the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act pointed out to him, gave a written declaration not to work for the Hedjaz Government either as pilot or mechanic or instructor. He leaves for England on the 31st December with about £100 more than the Hedjaz Government could be required to pay under their contract with him. The person to whom the affair does least credit appears to be General Sir Foster Newland, who engaged Mr King and signed the contract in the name of the Hedjaz Government.

Six Germans arrived on the 25th December for service in the Hedjaz army. According to their own statements they belong to various arms, but possibly they are all sent for the same reason. They have been sent to the Hedjaz Government, as these cases are not admitted in Germany, sometimes as deserters. They are sent to the Hedjaz, which, speaking in Germany is well known to be a small £5,000 has not been paid for some time previously. But when the Hedjaz Government, warned by the failure of their attempt to get £50,000 worth of munitions from England, refuse to pay for until they reach Jeddah.

4. There is little doubt that Ibn Saud could take Jeddah if he made a serious attack. His failure to do so is attributed here mainly to the presence of foreigners at the city. It is also stated that the British and American consuls in Jeddah have been ordered to leave the city. It is also stated that the British and American consuls in Jeddah have been ordered to leave the city. It is also stated that the British and American consuls in Jeddah have been ordered to leave the city.

Mecca at the present time. The Meccan newspaper says that ample food is now arriving from Rabigh, Luth and Kurfudah, and doubtless trade could be diverted to those ports in time, but private news from Mecca shows that the town is still very short of such imports as rice, sugar, tea and petroleum. To increase the







No. 25

Field Marshal Viscount Allenby to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 27.)

No. 38)

Telegraphic)

Cairo, January 27, 1925

FOLLOWING from Khartam.—

"Should Jeddah fall and Russian aviators there be evacuated to Suakin, it is proposed to treat them like other refugees, i.e., undergo quarantine and then await steamer for European or other port. As regards members of Soviet mission, I propose to refuse admission to Sudan or, alternatively, sent to Egypt on completion of quarantine. I am anxious not to allow them to stay in Sudan longer than absolutely necessary."

I should be glad of immediate instructions in order that I may, if necessary, approach Egyptian Government with reference to entry of members of Soviet agency into Egypt.  
(Repeated to Jeddah)

No. 26

Consul Bullard to Field Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received January 28.)

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, January 26, 1925

YOUR telegram No. 38 addressed to Foreign Office.

Soviet staff would leave only in case of a general evacuation, which is not anticipated.

The only remaining airman obtained visa for Persia.

All Russian mechanics came from Egypt, where they had been working, and will want to return there. They are not recognised by Soviet here, and I believe them to be anti-Bolshevik.

(Sent to Khartam)

No. 27

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul Bullard (Jeddah)

(No. 6.)

Telegraphic)

For information, January 20, 1925

(A/R) telegram No. 38 of 27th January repeated to you and your telegram No. 12 of 28th January. I proposed evacuation of Russian aviators and Soviet mission from Jeddah.

I am sure you are satisfied that general evacuation is a matter of fact, and not otherwise, you should warn airmen and Soviet mission that they cannot be permitted to leave the Sudan.

If they should wish to proceed to Egypt, you should inform Lord Allenby.

Assessed to Jeddah, No. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

No. 28

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 14.)

(Telegraphic) R.

Jeddah, February 2, 1925

No harm done to foreign subjects in the course of recent fighting. Wahabis using guns captured at Mecca, are dropping small shells on the town, but none of them explode.

No. 29

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah (via Port Sudan) February 1, 1925.

AFTER some fighting in villages within 2 miles of Jeddah, and two partial night attacks on entrenchments, Wahabis seem to have abandoned for the present hope of taking the town by force.

Hedjaz Government unduly elated at this unexpected success, but I think secretly conscious that unless Ibn Saud gives up the struggle in a month or two (this is most unlikely; he seems more determined than ever to get rid of Ali somehow) they must collapse from lack of funds.

Immediate prospect is inaction on both sides for some weeks.  
(Sent to India.)

[E 623 10/91]

No. 30.

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 3.)

No. 3. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, January 8, 1925

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 31st December, 1924–8th January, 1925.

2. The report is divided into two parts: the first dealing with the situation in the Hedjaz, and the second dealing with the situation in the Gulf. The first part deals with the situation in the Hedjaz, and the second part deals with the situation in the Gulf.

Khartam, 1st January 1925. I have, &c.

Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Muskat.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD

Enclosure in No. 30

Report for the Period December 31, 1924–January 8, 1925

THE hopes based—by no means unreasonably—on the letter from Ibn Saud to Amin Rihani, to which I referred in my last report, came to nothing. After an ominous silence of ten days, Rihani received, on the 4th January, another letter from Ibn Saud, saying that he must not interfere, and that the sword must decide. At the moment when this letter arrived, all the Jeddah guns were firing in the direction of a considerable body of horsemen—assumed to be a Wahabi reconnaissance party—which had emerged from the foothills into the plain at a distance of 4 or 5 miles from Jeddah. This movement was not altogether unexpected, as fairly reliable reports had already been received that the Wahabi force had left Mecca in the direction of Jeddah and other places on the coast, and that Ibn Saud himself was at Hada near Bahrah, on the Jeddah Mecca road. The only casualties in the bombardment, which lasted for several hours, were some perfectly friendly sheep, but the Hedjaz Government announce a great victory, and urge the people of Mecca to cut the Wahabis' communications. But that is not at all in the Mecca people's line. If it were a question of the purse or throat of a pilgrim . . .

2. Since the "battle" of the 4th January nothing whatever has happened, and, as the moon is near the full, the Wahabis, who like to attack on dark nights, are not expected to make a serious attempt on Jeddah for the next few days. The only offensive weapon the Hedjaz Government possess—the air arm—is very weak. Only one of the three recently arrived De Havilland aeroplanes is working, and only one of the three Russian pilots makes any serious flights. This officer dropped a shell or two near Bahrah on the 4th or 5th January.

3. Rabigh, a small port to the north of Jeddah, is to be blockaded with effect from the 16th January. The blockade of the southern ports of Lith, Kufudah and Hali has been undertaken in so casual a fashion that it has been necessary to remind the Hedjaz Government that a blockade that is not effective. The blockading force consists of the Hedjaz steamship "Tawil," which is so slow that she must take over twenty-four hours merely to pass from one end of the blockaded line to the other—a distance of about



No. 32

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austin Chamberlain.—(Received February 13.)*

(No. 6. Secret.)

*Jeddah, January 19, 1925*

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Muskat.

I have, &c  
R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 32.

Report for the Period January 9-19, 1925

(Secret.)

IT is expected that Ibn Saud will make a night attack within the next few days, towards the time of the new moon. His forces have raided to within a mile or two of Jeddah, without encountering any resistance from the Hedjaz tribes, and are now encamped at places some 8 or 9 miles from the town. The Jeddah defences consist of a semi-circular barbed-wire fence (it can hardly be described as an entanglement), which must be about 3 miles in length. To defend this, there are—apart from orderlies, stretcher-bearers, &c.—about 700 men. These are armed with at least four different kinds of rifle: British, German, Russian and Austrian, and there is so little ammunition for the British rifles (some 200 in number) that they would soon be useless. Few of the officers and still fewer of the men are Hedjazis, and the officers are by no means united; the Arabs hate the Turks, the Turks despise the Arabs, and of the Arabs many are politicians rather than fighting men. Some 200 men (said to be Druses, most of them) arrived from Akaba a few days ago, but it is doubtful if they will be of much use. The artillery will be useless against a night attack by scattered forces, and even in daylight it is ineffective, as the gunners have not yet learned how to prevent the shell from bursting high in the air.

2 It would seem that even if the Hedjaz Government were not defeated in battle, they must collapse very soon for lack of funds. They have been trying to recover from General Sir Foster Newland at least part of the sums paid to him for the purchase of munitions in England, but so far without success. King Hussein is known to have large sums of money but he spends his money with no thought of not to give Ibn Saud an exaggerated sense of his importance by condescending to negotiate with him. Meanwhile, the Hedjaz Government seems to exist precariously on forced loans, which produce £10,000 or so every few weeks. The troops—mostly Palestinians, to whom the attraction offered was good pay—have not been paid for the Arabic month, which ended over three weeks ago.

2. The six Germans whose arrival was reported, left on the 9th January. They seem to have been engaged on silly orders from the Amir Abdullah, and to have been promised salary at a rate far beyond the Hedjaz Government's power to pay. They refused to be beaten down, and left in a body. One was an officer, the others n.c.o.'s. Two were for armoured cars, two for artillery and two for infantry. It appears that armoured cars and munitions were ordered in Germany, but the export was forbidden by the German Government because the buyers tried to get them out under a false name. After this, attempts seem to have been made, through an Arab in Trieste, to purchase armoured cars and aeroplane bombs in Italy, with what success is not known.

4 For several days two aeroplanes went up every day. They dropped "bombs" on several occasions but the only effect of their flight has been to make the Turkish Government more and more uneasy. On the 18th January, when the two aeroplanes were flying over the Wahabi camps an explosion was seen to take place in one of them. It turned out, however, to be a misfire. The pilot was M. Stokow, a Russian refugee, and with him were two Arabs, one of whom was Umar Shakir, editor of

[18631]

*Consul Bullard to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 10)*

(No 24)

(Felegnecce, R)

*Siddak (via Wireless), February 9, 1925*

NY telegram No. 14

Wahabis resumed bombardment of town 6th February, but with shells that exploded. Another tank and wounded ~~project~~ <sup>person</sup> ~~person~~ <sup>for</sup> ~~for~~ <sup>by</sup> British casualties. This agency hit once and narrowly missed several times but no serious damage done. ~~On 10th February~~ <sup>On 11th February</sup> British Indians are leaving for Sukkin.

(Sent to India)



the "Falab" newspaper in King Hussein's time. This man, a Syrian, was a trained agriculturalist, but preferred violent journalism to the more humdrum occupation of agriculture. Having been condemned to death by the French, he had been allowed to go and drop bombs on the Wahabis, and on the fatal occasion he seems to have secured a seat in the aeroplane, without authority, through friendship with the Arab observer. It is assumed that he tried to throw one of the make-shift bombs, and that it exploded in the aeroplane. The aeroplane was seen to have been set on fire. With this casualty and the departure of a pilot who fell ill, the number of Russian pilots is reduced to one.

The blockade can possibly be considered as a success in the contention raised by this agency, that the steamship "Tawil" could not be regarded as constituting an effective blockade of the southern ports, the Hedjaz Government stated that the blockade was quite effective, the "Tawil" being supported by a patrol of dhows, the number of which was, however, an Admiralty secret. Just after this, however, the "Tawil" returned to Jeddah, as did the "Raghmatan," which had been sent up to institute the blockade of Rabigh. Both of them, as well as the larger steamer "Radhwa," are standing by for a possible evacuation. So far, the blockade is a success.

It may be said that the presence of the Consular Corps and Ibn Saud about the safety of foreigners was at an end, but he revived the subject with a rather naive letter which, with the subsequent correspondence is given as an enclosure to this report. The contention that any harm that might be done to the foreigners by the Wahabis would be done by the Wahabis themselves, and that Ibn Saud is a little uneasy about some of the local Arabs, whose help he has asked, is a little naive. It is true that the Wahabis would appeal to them, and that his letter is for quotation if these Arabs should get out of hand. In any case, our only weapon is to continue to insist to Ibn Saud on the rights of non-combatant foreigners, since, if the Jeddah defences give, the King, with all the officials and as many of the troops as can join them, will leave the country, and will be able to do so without any harm to the foreigners.

7 The delegates sent to Jeddah by the Indian Caliphate Committee finally gave up the pretence that they had come to the Hedjaz solely in the interests of peace, and gave the Foreign Secretary a copy of their aims (see Enclosure 3). The references to Hedjaz participation, at the end of paragraphs 2 and 7, were not in the original they had with them, but were added here as a sop to such nationalist feeling as there is in Jeddah, the last thing the Caliphate Committee seem to have thought of is the views of the Hedjaz people. The aims agree closely with those set forth by Ibn Saud, and support the evidence that he and the Indian Moslem extremists have been working together. The reference to the Imam Yahya is interesting. It was stated here several months ago that Ibn Saud and the Imam were to co-operate to seize the whole of Asir and to divide the spoil between them, Hodeidah, of course, going to the Imam. This may explain the rather greater activity the Imam has been showing lately.

The delegates are still here. They wrote to Ibn Saud saying that they wanted to see him, and asking him three questions: (1) whether the reports of atrocities committed by Wahabis at Taif were true; (2) whether by treaty he had placed Nejd under foreign influence; and (3) whether he had given any concession or concessions to the Wahabis. Ibn Saud's answer was that as to their questions they should not believe his enemies, they would be fully satisfied when they met him. In view, however, of the delegates' admitted hostility to King Ali and of the general nature of their proposals, the Hedjaz Government was not at all surprised that the delegates should have been so hostile. The delegates called on me (not until ten days after their arrival) in the hope, apparently, that I would try to get them to see Ibn Saud, but a reference to the complete independence of the Hedjaz quenched that hope.

The delegates are greatly disappointed, I think, to find no British officers here. If we were to send a British officer, the presence of the British officers, whose enlistment in the Hedjaz army at the critical moment might rouse suspicion in more open minds than these Indians seem to possess.

The delegates called on the Soviet agent. He attacked them at once, describing their programme as useless and asking why the Moslems of the U.S.S.R. (who, he said, constituted one third of the Moslems of the world), had not been consulted. It is possible that the scene was staged for the benefit of the Foreign Secretary, who was present, but the Foreign Secretary does not think so; and I think that if the delegates had been consulted with the Soviet agent, I should have heard of it and I have heard nothing. On the other hand the Caliphate Committee programme has points which could hardly fail to attract M. Zinoviev.

The Caliphate Committee have the right to pay five times daily, which has long been in force in Nejd, has been extended to Mecca. The municipality have issued an order that everyone is to go to the Great Mosque, or, if that is very far off, to some other mosque, when the call to prayer is given. Inspectors have been appointed to see that the order is obeyed, disobedience will be punished in accordance with the Shara' Law.

It is a pity to think of the ill-effects of the Wahabis in Mecca turning out to be a disaster, and that they are sure to surprise every morning.

R. W. RICHARD

## Enclosure 2 in No. 32

### Correspondence between Ibn Saud and the Consular Corps at Jeddah

#### (1) Ibn Saud to Consular Corps

Jeddah, 10th January 1924.  
After greeting you, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th inst. and to inform you that I have received it. I have also received the letter of the 10th inst. from the Consular Corps, and I have read it. I am sorry to hear that you are not satisfied with the answer given to you by the Consular Corps, and I am sorry to hear that you are not satisfied with the answer given to you by the Consular Corps. I am sorry to hear that you are not satisfied with the answer given to you by the Consular Corps, and I am sorry to hear that you are not satisfied with the answer given to you by the Consular Corps.

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We have been driven to this by the Sharif Ali taking refuge in Jeddah and refusing to come out and fight in the open, and the responsibility for any harm that may be done to buildings or people, will rest on him who compelled us to take this action.

I call upon you and upon the civilised world to witness that it is impossible that our troops should (even) touch one of the non-combatant inhabitants or of your subjects. I have already conveyed this to you in my letter dated 9th January 1924. I wish to draw your attention so that you might know beforehand about the harm which our enemy may do to us.

(Compliments.)

[Seal of Ibn Saud.]



(ii.) *Consular Corps to Ibn Saud*

(Translation.)

(After greetings.)

*Jeddah, January 11, 1925.*

WE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Highness's letter dated the 14th Jamad-ul-Thani, 1343 (the 9th January, 1925). We desire to take this opportunity to remind your Highness of our various replies regarding the protection and safeguard of the lives and property of our nationals. We desire also to remind you that your Highness's letter of the 14th Jamad-ul-Thani, 1343, dated the 9th Jamad-ul-Awwal.

\* In view of the presence of consuls in Jeddah representing their Governments or Governments interested, those Governments will naturally be accurately informed as to the responsibility for what may happen.

As to the Taif incidents, we reserve all our rights in their entirety.

(Respects.)

[Signatures of British, Italian, French, Dutch, Persian, Russian and Belgian representatives.]

(iii.) *Ibn Saud to Consular Corps*

(Translation)

(After greetings.)

*Mecca, January 14, 1925*

I HAVE received your letter dated the 11th January, 1925, and noted its contents.

I beg to assure you again that our troops respect your subjects (their properties and their souls) as they respect all other non-combatant inhabitants, and that they cannot exceed the limits of the orders given to them. But I wished to draw your kind attention to what may occur in future in order that you may bear witness on the subject.

With best respects

(Seal of Ibn Saud)

Enclosure 3 in No. 32

*Aims of the Indian Caliphate Committee as given to the Foreign Secretary to the Hedjaz Government by the Delegation, in writing, about January 13, 1925*

TO set up a lawful (i.e., in accordance with Shara' Law) Republican Government in the Hedjaz, which shall be independent internally and whose foreign policy shall be such as to satisfy the Moslem world and meet its views in regard to the complete and absolute independence of the country—an independence free from foreign influence whether open or concealed.

2. To call a Moslem conference for the formation of this republic, in which there shall participate delegates from admittedly independent-minded Moslem societies in Moslem lands which are under domination, and representatives of the independent Moslem Governments, and delegates of the Hedjaz.

3. Neither the Hedjaz nor the Arab lands shall have any connection whatsoever with this assembly or in any matter affecting the centralisation of the Hedjaz.

4. To bring about general unity and religious brotherhood between the Arab rulers as the commands of Islam dictate, so that no room may be left for foreign power that the way not be opened for strife to enter the country, that the Hedjaz be united with the Arab lands and that the Arab lands appear in perfect unity before the world and with united force against the enemy.

5. Mecca to be the seat of the conference, if circumstances permit.

6. The Sultan of Nejd and the Imam Yahya to be entrusted with the task of assembling the delegates of the Arab Moslem rulers for the proposed conference.

\* There is a piece of bad drafting here, due to the difficulty of preparing an exact draft to satisfy seven individuals when they have no common language but Arabic, and of that several have only a very elementary knowledge.

What should have been written is this: "In view of the presence of consuls in Jeddah, the Governments represented or interested will naturally."

† Presumably means "Central Government."

7. To fix as early a date as possible for the conference [it should be] before the expiry of the coming pilgrim season. The invitations to the Moslem world to be issued by Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya and the Hedjaz people.

8. Until the conference has come to a final decision about the Hedjaz and the form of its Government, the Hedjaz territories to be governed temporarily by elected delegates of the people [sic] under the over-lordship of Ibn Saud.

SHAH SI LAIMAN NADWI

ABDUL KADIR KUSURI

MAULVI ABDUL MAJID BADAYUNI

No. 33

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul Bullard (Jeddah)*

[By Admiralty Wireless.]

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic) R

*Foreign Office, February 17, 1925*

"TIMES" quotes message from Beirut stating that several members of staffs of European consulates have been wounded by shell fire.

What are the facts?

No. 34

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, (Received February 18)*

[Via Admiralty Wireless.]

(No. 31)

(Telegraphic) R

*Jeddah, February 18, 1925*

VOU R telegram No. 11.

Beirut message unfounded; it is perhaps Hedjaz propaganda.

Shelling, which was fairly heavy for four days, has decreased steadily. Shells fired into Jeddah yesterday probably not more than twenty, and usual morning shelling entirely omitted to-day. Agency buildings have been hit twice, and consulates of other countries all hit or narrowly missed, but not only are there no casualties among staffs, but, so far as I know, not a single foreign subject has been hurt by shell fire, dangers of which can be almost entirely eliminated by living in lower rooms.

Shelling is unpleasant, but as we are living in fortified town we have no cause for complaint against Ibn Saud.

No. 35

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, (Received March 1)*

[Via Admiralty Wireless.]

No. 37.

(Telegraphic) R

*Jeddah, February 25, 1925*

SITUATION unchanged; some shelling morning and evening. I learn that total civilian casualties [about] 80 killed, over 100 wounded. British subjects safe.

(Sent to India)



(No. 12. Secret.)

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 20th January to the 10th February

I have, &c.  
R. W. BILLARD

*Report for the Period January 20 to February 9, 1925*

For the Wahabis have guns. These guns were left at Mecca at the time of the evacuation. The Sirhanis, the Hedjazis, the Meccan Ministry of War at the time, was supposed to render them useless, but did nothing. A few Sirhanis, Wahabis, one Turk and some Arabs who were formerly gunners in the Hedjaz service, and they seem to be rather better than the artillery on the Hedjaz side. At the time when a general attack seemed to be in preparation they scattered a good deal of shrapnel over the trenches. They then, though outraged by the Hedjaz guns, moved in closer, and dropped small high-explosive shells (about 24-inch) on various parts of Jeddah. None of these exploded, but either that was merely a warning or the Wahabi gunners have since found out how to deal with high-explosive shells, for during the last few days many shells (perhaps 200), most of which have burst, have fallen into the town. The casualties have been very few, two killed and a few slightly wounded. This agency has been narrowly missed several times and hit once, but not seriously damaged.

The fatality of Arab desert warfare seems to have been imported into the siege of Jeddah. So far as can be seen the artillery duel does no serious damage to either side, and though there is a pretty constant crackle of rifle fire from the Wahabi positions, they are too far from the trenches on this side for their shots to take effect except by a rare chance. If they think by besieging the town to induce the Jeddah people to revolt against King Ali that is a very more futile than their other ideas. The people of Jeddah are too mean-spirited to take any action whatsoever.

to the hostilities. The reason is that the Wahibis regard the Hedjaz people as "polytheists," because of the exaggerated respect they are alleged to pay to the Prophet. The close season does not apply when polytheists are the object of attack

3. Of the six Germans who left Jedidah after a very short stay because they could not agree with the Hedjaz Government about their pay, one returned from

4. As the Hedjaz Government refused to allow them to go to Ibn Saud unless they first recognised the independence of the Hedjaz under King Ali as the basis of negotiations, the Indian delegation, after consulting the Caliphate Committee by telegram, left Jeddah for India, via Suez, on the 30th January. The Caliphate Committee seem to be very angry at the attitude of the Hedjaz Government, but in view of the admittedly hostile views of the committee, King Ali seems to have acted more generously than most Governments would have done in such circumstances, he would have been justified in putting the delegates into prison and preventing them from coming into contact with the people.

it may be that the March was postponed for a year, for three reasons —

- (1) Certain Moslem countries want to send delegates beforehand to find out what the objects, scope, &c., of the conference are.
- (2) The Hedjaz and other Arab countries are at war.
- (3) Egypt is busy with the elections.

King Ali has replied, expressing the readiness of the Hedjaz to take part in the conference whenever it may meet, and protesting against the conference to which Ibn Saud has issued invitations as likely to sow dissension among Moslems.

6 Amin Rihani has returned to Syria, after writing to Ibn Saud once more to ask whether it was of any use his staying any longer. There are no signs of yielding in Ibn Saud now. He was particularly violent in his last letter to the Caliphate Committee delegates. His war against Ah is now a jihad.

7 Amongst the persons other than Nejdia, who are known to be with Ibn Saud, are the following :—

Jamal Ghazzi, of Damascus. Formerly aide-de-camp to Enver Pasha  
 Mahmud Hammudah, a Syrian doctor  
 Yusuf Yasin, a Syrian journalist of no repute.  
 Muhammad Bey Nabhas, a Syrian, who was in the Finance Department when  
 Faisal was ruler of Syria  
 Hafiz Wahbi, an Egyptian belonging to the Hizb-al Watani.



8. The Jeddah-Port Sudan cable touches land on this side at a point some 2 miles north of Jeddah town. This point is some distance outside the fortified area, and the Wahabis have cut the cable and have hitherto frustrated the attempts of the Hedjaz Government to repair it and keep it intact. The Hedjaz Government have therefore applied to the Sudan authorities for the Eastern Telegraphs cable ship "Mirror" to be sent to transfer the head of the cable to a point inside the wire. The political objections to this are obvious, and there would appear to be military risks too, unless a fresh piece of cable could be laid from Jeddah town and joined to the cable at a point some distance out to sea. The Sudan Government have consented to this, but it is an emergency measure.

9. The Hedjaz Government are still maintaining the blockade in theory. A few dhows, some of which are alleged to have been attempting to evade the blockade, They are all Hedjaz craft. According to our information, plenty of small craft, owned by Hedjazis and Yemenis, are entering the blockaded ports, and it has been necessary to recommend to His Majesty's Government that British subjects should be told that the declaration of blockade can be disregarded.

In reply to an enquiry, in what court and under what law cases by which British subjects might be heard, the Hedjaz Government replied that "maritime cases, if there are any, will be heard in the maritime court, under the special law applicable." The Hedjaz authorities know nothing about international law, and no court they could set up could be expected to act in a manner which would satisfy a foreign Government.

10. No pilgrims have arrived except about thirty-five Africans (most of them Nigerians), who seem to have been allowed to leave the Sudan through some mistake. It is not clear whether the Haj can be made at present. All we can say is that the pilgrimage will be impossible unless Jeddah and Mecca are in the same hands by then, and that the chances are in favour of their being in Ibn Saud's hands.

Mecca appears to be quite quiet, but prices are very high. Several score of Javanese refugees from there have just left Jeddah for Batavia. According to their story all the Javanese would leave Mecca if they could bring their luggage with them.

February 10, 1925

11. The Wahab is on the southern side of the town seem to be making unskillful attempts to approach the wire by means of trenches. Two or three attacks by small bodies of men (perhaps a hundred or so each) were made on the night of the 9th-10th February, but they were beaten off.

The Wahabi bombardment of Jeddah, which went on during the hours of day light (with decent intervals for lunch) for four days, seems to have come to an end for the present. Six or seven guns were used. Most of the shells were very small, but there were some 7.5 cm. and—it is said—some 9 cm. The total civilian casualties are stated officially to be four killed and seven wounded, some of them severely.

R. W. BULLARD

No. 37

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain—(Received March 9)

(No. 38)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah (via Port Sudan), March 8, 1925

SOME Palestine soldiers in the Hedjaz army recently mutinied, demanding arrears of pay. Collapse of defence seemed probable, but Hussein sent £10,000 and postponed disaster.

Facing serious attack by Wahabias, of which there is no sign at present, situation might change if King would provide funds but probably at least £20,000 a month required.

(Sent to India, Singapore and Bushire)

No. 38

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain—(Received March 10)

[Via H.M.S. "Clematis" W/T.]

(No. 41 A)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, March 10, 1925

HEJAZ Government reported confident, owing, firstly, to arrival from Trieste of two [? German] armoured cars, 1,000 rifles and a large stock of ammunition for the Hedjaz army. They group undecipherable of advancing but I do not think that they can risk that.

(Sent to India, Jerusalem, Bagdad and Bushire.)

No. 39

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain—(Received March 12)

[Via "Clematis" W/T.]

(No. 43)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, March 11, 1925

MY telegram No. 41

Cars were made by Ansaldo and Company of Genoa, rifles are Austrian, and so, I believe, is ammunition, name on rifle is Steyr. British Khedivial steamer landed 5th March 200 boxes of small arm ammunition, ordered Antwerp, transhipped at Suez.

No. 40

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain—(Received March 16)

(No. 44)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah (via Port Sudan), March 15, 1925

ATTEMPT to take Wahabi positions made 14th March with maximum force was a complete failure. Unless more and better troops obtained, this must, I think, quench the wild hope of advancing on Mecca and inaugurate a contest between Ali's funds and Ibn Saud's patience with heavy odds on the latter.

(Sent to India, Jerusalem, Bagdad, Bushire, Aden, Cairo and Singapore.)

No. 41

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain—(Received March 17)

(No. 45)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, March 17, 1925

NEWS from Yambo suggests that Wahabis may take the town at any time. Hedjaz casualties 14th March very heavy for this small force. Wahabis establishing superiority incontestably.

(Sent to India, Jerusalem, Bagdad and Bushire.)



*Conant Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain — (Received March 28)*

(No. 15.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a report on the pilgrimage of 1924. Copies of the report are being sent to Delhi, Singapore, Cairo and Khartum sent to Palestine, Bagdad, Constantinople, Beirut, Aden, Nigeria, Somaliland and South Africa.

*Jeddah, February 27, 1925.*

A. W. BILLARD

Enclosure in No. 42

Pilgrimage Report, 1924

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## 1. *Introductory*

STCFF value as this annual report may have depends mainly on its usefulness as a guide to the future. Its composition this year has therefore been postponed, in the hope that a definite solution of the Hedjaz-Nejd conflict might be reached and a useful forecast as to the conditions at the time of the Hajj of 1925 might be made. The conflict, however, though it has now been in progress for six months and the collapse of the Hedjaz Government has seemed certain several times, is still undecided, and the report must be sent in for what it is worth. It has been shortened by the elimination of many details which might have been of interest if there had been no war and King Hussein had still been on the throne.

It can be assumed that there can be no pilgrimage on a large scale while Mecca is closed to pilgrims. The only alternative is a possible diversion of pilgrims to travel to Mecca via one of the ports which are in the Wahabite hands, e.g., Rabigh on the north or Kufudah on the south. In practice, however, this diversion of the pilgrim traffic is not possible except on a small scale. Pilgrims

would hardly like to come in such conditions, and, if they did come, they would find the lack of accommodation at the smaller ports, and the longer journey to Mecca, serious drawbacks. Moreover, while the Hedjaz Government would hardly prevent pilgrims from going to Mecca by such routes, they keep Mecca short of food by retaining its port, Jeddah, in their hands. That Jeddah is essential to Mecca is acknowledged by both sides. Ibn Saud has admitted it in writing more than once

Who will eventually obtain control of the two towns it is difficult to say. Ibn Saud seems the stronger candidate. If he should give up the struggle for the present it is not impossible that the ex King Hussein would oust the present King, Ali, and return to the throne. On the ruler of the Hedjaz depends very largely the treatment of pilgrims. Ibn Saud would support any ruler who would make the pilgrim routes safe, but he would probably be compelled, out of deference to the Nejdīs, on whom his power depends, to continue the Puritan policy he has already applied to Mecca by which fines are imposed for smoking, attendance at mosque for prayer five times a day is enforced, and certain practices which are very popular with some foreign pilgrims, e.g., visiting tombs, reading "maulids" or lives of the Prophet, and studying certain commentaries on the Koran, are forbidden. Hussein, if he should return, would be, as before, greedy, stupid and childishly obstructive. Ali is full of good intentions, and would not himself squeeze the pilgrims as his father did, but, being very weak, he would probably be unable to check the exploitation of pilgrims by others. Indeed, it is doubtful whether, whoever the ruler of the Hedjaz may be, the pilgrim will ever take much money away with him after his visit. Even Muhammad had to compromise with the vested interests of Mecca and to allow the Kuraish to continue to levy toll on visitors to the ancient shrine, and any reforming ruler would be opposed by a coalition consisting of the great and corrupt of the Hedjaz people and the piety and ignorance of the pilgrims. We can hope for an improvement in matters where the difficulties of the last few years have been due to stupidity and a desire to obstruct rather than to greed. For instance, it is unlikely that any other ruler than Hussein will enforce quarantine at Jeddah on pilgrims who have already passed through the station at Kamaran, or will interfere with pilgrims at the various stations on the coast. As the pilgrims are not the essentials from the Hedjaz, the interests of pilgrims, however, socialist non, and will not, prevent this agency from trying to remedy grievances, even if these grievances are not shared by the British Agent and by the Government of India than by the sufferers themselves.

### Statistics.

## 2 General

There was a still further increase in the number of pilgrims arriving by sea. The totals for the last three years are —

1922	58 310
1923	75 223
1924	92 707

1924 showed a marked increase in the number of pilgrims who sailed from British Malaya and Netherlands East Indies ports. The increase was not normal, it was due to the low price of tickets resulting from a rate-cutting war between the steamship companies.

The diminution in the number of pilgrims sailing from India is attributed to two causes: (1) the exclusion, by the deposit system, of the class of Indian who would have been able to pay the deposit in advance, and (2) the opinion expressed by certain religious leaders in India that intending pilgrims would be justified in postponing their journey until conditions in the Hedjaz improved.



The approximate figures in detail are:—

of embarkation.	Number of Pilgrims
British Malaya ... ..	21,263
Dutch East Indies ... ..	32,037
India ... ..	18,432
Persian Gulf ... ..	1,404
East Africa—	
Musawa ... ..	231
Elsewhere ... ..	326
Sudan (including many pilgrims from Nigeria and some from French African territories)	3,926
Syrians and a few Turks)	11,231
Syria ... ..	3,440
Mekalla ... ..	316
Aden ... ..	101
	<hr/> 92,707

The shipping by which these pilgrims were carried was as follows:—

	Number of Pilgrims
British	58,360
Dutch	23,101
Italian	7,433
Egyptian	2,200
French	791
Greek	179
	<hr/> 92,707

As usual, it is not possible to estimate the number of pilgrims who arrived by ship.

The first pilgrim ship arrived at Jeddah on the 26th January. The first ship carrying pilgrims from Jeddah left on the 19th July. The return pilgrimage cannot be said to be over yet (February 1925), since pilgrims from last year who have been delayed by the hostilities are still leaving an opportunity offers.

#### Public Health

It is calculated that there were about 150,000 pilgrims at Arafat on pilgrimage day (the 11th July) but, in spite of the accumulation of so many human beings in very primitive conditions, there was again no trace of plague or cholera, and the Quarantine Board at Alexandria having received a favourable report from the medical officer whom they had sent to keep them informed, declared the pilgrimage closed. It is true that there was an epidemic of dysentery in the Hedjaz. It is reported that, while both amoebic and bacillary dysentery were fairly common, there was no ground for thinking it worse than in 1923. The death rate on pilgrimage day seems to have been high this year, but most of the deaths were due to heat and lack of water. There was a shortage of water all through the season, and prices at Mecca were very high. This shortage was due to interference with Ain Zubaida, the stream which comes to Mecca from a place near Arafat, but the responsibility for the interference has never been traced—or, at least, never revealed. Pilgrims were glad to pay high prices for brackish well water. The shortage on the journey from Arafat to Mecca was very serious. The agency doctor, the acting French consul (an Algerian) and other reliable witnesses had pitiful tales to tell, how the old pilgrims hurried on fearing lest a like fate should befall themselves.

Dr. Munir-ud Din, the agency doctor, reports that, besides dysentery, there were sporadic cases of typhoid fever, and that diarrhoea was common. He also reports many cases of a mild form of influenza with sore throat. Pilgrims returned to Jeddah in a very exhausted state. My Netherlands colleague reports that, of 1,760 pilgrims who had booked by a steamer due to leave the following day, twenty-five died during the night. A death rate of over 1·4 within twenty-four hours is startling.

The only exact figures we have for British pilgrims are furnished by the records of the British Medical Association. In 1923, 17 per cent. died during the season.

As in earlier years, no serious effort was made by the Hedjaz Government to provide medical treatment for pilgrims. For the greater part of the return season the so-called hospital maintained by the Government at Jeddah had no doctor. It received casual visits from the Director-General of Quarantine, who was himself absent from Jeddah for a long time, his place being then taken by a dentist, and from an overworked private doctor. Dr. Munir-ud Din was invited by King Hussein to visit the public hospital at Mecca. He reports:—

"The hospital had about twenty beds, two of which were occupied by surgical cases. The remaining eighteen were empty. In the court yard there was a large canopy, under which about thirty pilgrims (not all Indians) were lying on the ground in a state of disorder without any mattresses or bedding. Many of them were unconscious or moribund."

#### Law and Order

Order was maintained on the Mecca-Jeddah road, but the routes from Mecca and Jeddah to Medina again proved to be beyond King Hussein's control. The first caravan from Mecca to Medina was carried off in slavery. The Bedouins demanded £1 to £3 a head as toll to the Bedouins, but suffered beatings, woundings, and the loss of one man and four women carried off in slavery.

To secure immunity for the great caravan which was to leave Mecca a few days after the Hajj, King Hussein proposed to the Bedouins, who provide the camels, that £100,000 out of the money due to them should be kept back until the pilgrims reached Mecca again. The Bedouins not only scoffed at this proposal, but even demanded a larger share of the proceeds than they had received the previous year. A long wrangle ensued between them and King Hussein as to the division of the spoil. At last, some weeks after the traditional date for the departure of the caravan, it was announced that an agreement had been concluded. The accumulation of pilgrims by that time was so large that they were split up into two bodies: the smaller started from Jeddah, the larger a little later from Mecca. Both were to go to Rabigh, and thence to proceed by the same route. The two caravans contained 25,000 persons, and all of them, except a few Afghans who finished the journey, broke faith with the Bedouins and gave them when the caravan was about to leave, a smaller sum than he had promised and that they thereupon took oath to let the caravans through. The death rate in these two caravans must have been high, for the pilgrims waited in the open for ten days or longer, hoping to get through and the weather at that time was particularly hot.

King Hussein made an attempt, after the Hajj, to settle the dispute with the Bedouins, but without success. A few Indians and Africans went to Medina on foot, but no caravans organised by the Government were allowed to pass. The alternative route via the railway from Maan was therefore organised, and many pilgrims went to Medina that way.

King Hussein was so badly shaken by the failure of so large a body of pilgrims to get through to Medina that he promised that the Indians should receive a refund of £10 a camel, and the Far Eastern pilgrims £2 a camel together with free transport to Arafat at the time of the Hajj and back to Jeddah. What is more remarkable is that the promise was (for the Hedjaz) tolerably well kept. The Netherlands consul had to use pressure in many cases to secure a refund for Javanese pilgrims. The agency doctor reports that the agency had received only £6 or £8 for £10, though there is reason to believe that they had received only £6 or £8. But this agency finds it difficult to defend the rights of pilgrims who consider it more in accordance with their religion to make false statements than to complain to this agency about the hardships or wrongs they suffer during the pilgrimage.

#### The Hedjaz Railway

On his way to Palestine in December 1923 King Hussein inspected the Hedjaz Railway. The immediate results were an order to all officials to subscribe a month's pay to the railway fund and the institution of a Hedjaz Railway stamp, in imitation of the Turkish practice, as a means of raising revenue. Very few trains ran to



Medina before the Hajj, but the King's quarrel with Bedouin on the roads from Mecca to Medina was a serious one. The —so to speak— "all green" route was boomed in the press and elsewhere, passengers would travel to Akaba by Hedjaz Government steamer, thence by motor or camel to Maan, and from Maan to Medina by train. The published tariff of charges was not observed, the Hedjaz Government cars and lorries were run as might be expected; and the pilgrims suffered various hardships—lack of drinking water on the ships, waits of as long as fourteen days for trains at Maan and Medina, and journeys in cattle-trucks which would have been intolerable if the train had not stopped every half-hour or so for the line to be repaired; but the route did work after a fashion, and some 2,000 pilgrims went to Medina that way. The Palestine Railways Administration, however, had to come to the help of the Hedjaz Government by running their trains as far as Teluk

#### *European Moslems as Pilgrims*

A young Englishman from British Malaya, Mr. J. H. Bamber, who had professed Islam for three years and bore the Moslem name of Abdul Hamid, came to Jeddah with pilgrims from Penang but was not allowed to go to Mecca. He might perhaps have got through, but he was foolish enough to have two passports with him, one the British passport on which he had left England after the war, the other the ordinary pilgrim passport giving him Moslem name. This was meat and drink to that spy machine, King Hussein. Mr. Bamber was kept in Jeddah while his papers were being sent to Mecca for examination, and was then, in spite of letters of recommendation from the Sheikh ul Islam of Kedah State and other

Mr. Bamber's claim that as a Moslem he had a right to go to Mecca, and confined to his quarters. It is probably good Moslem law that any person who repeats the simple Moslem confession of faith is entitled to go to Mecca but it is a religious question into which it would be unwise for this agency to enter, even if the circumstances had not given the Hedjaz authorities ground for suspicion. Whether Caliph or not, King Hussein was the highest spiritual and temporal authority in Mecca at the time, and it seemed that the question who might or might not go to Mecca could well be left to him and to Moslem opinion. There is in Jeddah a Netherlands subject (a European) who was converted to Islam five or six years ago, but could never obtain permission to go to Mecca. The excuse King Hussein gave was that to grant permission would lend colour to the accusation that he was subject to European influence, he had only allowed Lord Headley to perform the pilgrimage because Lord Headley had already been publicly recognised in Egypt as a Moslem.

It seems to have been not uncommon formerly for Europeans who professed to be converts to Islam to be allowed to go to Mecca. Snouck Hurgronje the great Dutch Orientalist not only went to Mecca without hindrance, but stayed there for some time and even taught in a mosque, and not many years before the war an Englishman, "Abdullah" Williams, who was subsequently well known in London, found no difficulty in getting to Mecca as a convert. Whether, now that King Hussein has gone, a more liberal spirit will prevail we cannot say; and it would therefore be well that the British authorities concerned should not issue a passport for Jeddah to any Mahometan pilgrim of European birth unless the applicant has first obtained permission from the authorities here to perform the pilgrimage.

#### *Pilgrims' Luggage*

There is a form of extortion always practised on pilgrims, and particularly rife last season which consists in compelling them to hire for the journey from Jeddah to Mecca more camels than the weight of their baggage warrants. This practice is agreeable to the camel drivers in any case, and last year it was enforced by King Hussein to an outrageous extent, by means of penalties, in order that the revenue from the tax levied on each camel load might be increased. The pilgrims could circumvent this to a large extent if they would cut down their luggage to a minimum. Indians are reasonable, and as a rule bring nothing beyond their personal effects but rice and oil. The Far Eastern pilgrims, however, bring the most fantastically unnecessary things: firewood, fruit, coconuts with the fibre on &c. Apart from the expense of getting the stuff to Jeddah and the landing and customs dues, they have to pay on such things, in camel hire to Mecca alone,

many times the price at which they could buy similar food or fuel in Mecca. It is from India wholesale must be cheaper than single sacks of Indian rice brought here via Java. The practice of bringing superfluous luggage has another disadvantage for the pilgrim. It increases the congestion of luggage at the custom-house and the consequent risk of loss. Every year there is a mountain of unclaimed (or unrecovered) luggage left behind by pilgrims.

#### *Estates of Deceased British Pilgrims*

We are still out of the Mecca records, but the returns furnished by the Hedjaz authorities of estates left by pilgrims who died in Jeddah show no improvement on those of 1923. According to these returns, of 101 Indians, 73 left nothing but a passport with a deposit receipt; and 28 Malays out of 20 and 13 Egyptians out of 15 left nothing but a return ticket. Doubtless in some cases relatives or friends take charge of any money or valuable effects that a pilgrim may have with him when he dies, but the phenomenon is too frequent for the guides and the officials of the Rait al Mat to be entirely acquitted of suspicion. The procedure needs overhauling.

#### *Slavery*

The stock of slaves in the Hedjaz, which is very large, is maintained partly by raiders who abduct Africans for the purpose—mainly from Abyssinia, but partly by the enslavement of Africans who come or are brought to the Hedjaz on the pilgrimage. It is not uncommon for a caravan of Nigerians or Soudanese travelling to or from Medina on foot to be raided by Bedouin and to have several of the younger members of the party carried off into slavery. A considerable number of African slaves have taken refuge in this agency during the last two months, and several stated that they were stolen from caravans in the Hedjaz while travelling on the pilgrimage. It is also, I am afraid, quite common for children or young people to be sold into slavery, often a relative, and it is stated with some authority that children are even sold by their own parents. To these penniless people the offer of £20 or £30 for a child must be a sore temptation. There is evidence that Africans who are coming on the pilgrimage sometimes bring with them, as though out of charity, young people whom they sell on arrival, and one Nigerian who had been in slavery for many years told me that he was brought to the Hedjaz as a child by a religious teacher to whom his parents had entrusted him for religious instruction in Mecca. Cases have even been discovered during the past year where young Javanese girls were handed over, by Javanese pilgrims, to men of pious reputation in Mecca, nominally for religious instruction but in fact as concubines.

The question of the liberation of slaves is too wide for discussion here, but it is pertinent to enquire whether anything can be done in the countries of origin and the ports of embarkation to see that minors do not sail from the Hedjaz unless they are under the care of some trustworthy person.

#### *Travelling to Medina on Foot*

In June the Hedjaz Government published a notice stating that no pilgrim would be allowed to go to Medina on foot unless he produced a certificate signed by himself and counter signed by the consular authority concerned, declaring that he insured himself for what might happen to him. In view of the additional risks to which pilgrims who travel on foot are exposed, a tolerably good case might be made out for this regulation. There are objections, however, and some of them were subsequently put forward by the Government of India, but the regulation does not seem to have been applied seriously, and unless the ex King Hussein should recover the throne the question is not likely to be raised again.

#### *3. Shipping*

##### *The Far East*

Messrs. Nemaee were again conspicuously inferior to the Holt and Dutch lines. This was particularly noticeable when the state of hostilities between Nejd and the Hedjaz compelled many Malay and Javanese pilgrims, who had intended to stay at Mecca for at least another year, to come to Jeddah in the hope of finding ships to



take them home. The season being over, there were no direct sailings, but the Holt and Dutch lines called for quite small batches of pilgrims, and accepted as payment the ordinary return tickets which are valid only during the season. Having no regular sailings down the Red Sea to the Far East, Messrs. Nemaze were perhaps not in a position to be equally generous, but that did not justify their agents in refusing to do anything whatever for refugees holding Nemaze return tickets. However, under pressure, they sent away the holders of such tickets by steamers of other lines.

The fault of Messrs. Nemaze lies not with the steamers, which are good, nor with the captains, who are usually quite up to the average, but with the incompetence of the management in Hong Kong and India, which is not equal to the task they attempt, viz., with a small fleet to engage in the pilgrim trade not only of Java and Malaya, but of India as well. This policy is possible for the outward voyages, as the Indians travel months later than the Far Eastern pilgrims, but it leads to much confusion after the Hajj, when all the pilgrims are wanting to leave at the same time.

#### *Egypt, Palestine, &c*

The contract for the conveyance of the Mahmal and the "official" Egyptian pilgrims was given to the Italian lines. The purpose steamers belonging to the Italian lines they represent. The work was admirably done, and seemed all the better from the contrast it afforded to the neglect and lack of organisation shown by Schemel and Co. in 1923.

The type of unscrupulous Syrian adventurer was, however, again in evidence as charterer of ships bringing pilgrims from Syria and Egypt. A fuller reference to this point will be found under the section on quarantine.

#### *Hedjaz Government Steamers*

The steamship "Tawil" is now so slow that she takes eight or ten days from Jeddah to Akaba, and the "Rushdi" was in dock during the whole of the pilgrim season. The Hedjaz Government, however, bought two other steamers, viz.:

Steamship "Shushitar" - British built (1907), previous owners, Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company (Limited), price, 140,000 rupees, net tonnage 1,718.

Steam yacht "Parnassos" - British built (1894), previous owner, Greek, price, £6,000 plus Suez Canal dues, tonnage gross 532, net 210.

These ships were renamed "Radhiwa" and "Raghamatam" respectively.

The "Radhiwa" carried Indian pilgrims for many years, and obtained a licence to carry 600 in 1924. The "Raghamatam" was a most impractical purchase - she had been a yacht, and was fitted for the comfort of a few passengers rather than the reasonable accommodation of a large number.

As it happened, these ships were of great use as the blocking of the ordinary routes to Mecca compelled many pilgrims to travel via Akaba. They also made one or two trips to Egypt and the Sudan with pilgrims.

Some Indian pilgrims complained that on the "Raghamatam" they had only about a pint and a half of drinking water a day, instead of the gallon which the regulations prescribe. This complaint was brought to the notice of the Hedjaz Government; they made no reply, but they increased the supply of water.

The steamship "Tawil," carrying sixty Syrian pilgrims from Akaba, ran on a reef but was towed off without any serious damage.

#### *Burning of the Steamship "Frangestan."*

The finest of the Nemaze steamers, the steamship "Frangestan," caught fire while steaming along the Red Sea to Jeddah with about 1,200 pilgrims on board. After trying vainly for over twelve hours to put out the fire the captain ordered the ship to be abandoned. All the passengers and crew were taken on board the "Tangistan," which was waiting behind all day, and conveyed to Port Sudan, whence they were brought to Jeddah by another vessel of the same line the steamship "Tangistan." There was no loss of life, but most of the deck passengers lost their kit, and the first and second class passengers their heavy luggage. Complaints that the Chinese crew of the "Tangistan" had stolen some of the kit saved from the fire were investigated on board by the British agent and the local police, but found to have very little foundation.

#### *4. Quarantine*

##### *Jeddah*

The farce of compelling pilgrims who had already undergone quarantine at Kamaran to spend a day on the islands at Jeddah was maintained, though it was waived on political grounds (as, e.g., in the case of the pilgrims rescued from the steamship "Frangestan") sufficiently often to show that it was a farce. The arrangement, however, which has been in force since the last Hajj, the management of the Kamaran station, may be considered to have come to an end with his reign. It is hoped that whatever Government is in power in future will make a corresponding reduction in the charges payable on arrival at Jeddah.

##### *Egypt and the Sudan*

Thanks to the intervention of His Majesty's representative in Egypt, a serious defect in the Quarantine Board's regulations, of which complaint was made in my last report, was remedied just in time for the return pilgrim season. The regulations required a pilgrim to book a ticket to some place beyond, and this had the ridiculous result of making it impossible for a foreign pilgrim, who was unable to book through to his destination from Jeddah, to land in Egypt in order to get his ticket, or, rather, it made it impossible for him to buy a ticket for Egypt from a reputable company in Jeddah. This has been set right by a circular from the Quarantine Board to the ship, and agencies in Egypt authorising them to issue tickets to Suez to any pilgrim who "is a pilgrim from Jeddah." The pilgrim is now allowed to go to Suez and get his ticket at the consulate.

It is to the Resident at Cairo that we are indebted also for a useful change in the Sudan quarantine regulations. In Egypt the pilgrim season is officially announced to be closed when nearly all the pilgrims are known to have left the Hedjaz, but this has not hitherto been held to apply to the Sudan; consequently any ship carrying to the Sudan from the Hedjaz, at any time, persons suspected of being pilgrims, had to be disinfected.

As this process cost £50, in addition to the loss resulting from the delay, the Khedivial Company, which provides the only regular means of communication with the Sudan, refused to carry Sudanese, Nigerians, &c., in numbers which might bring them within the scope of this onerous regulation. It has now been decided that once the pilgrimage is declared in Egypt to be over, ships may take to Sudan from Jeddah any number of pilgrims, within the limits of their ordinary passenger certificate. The pilgrims will be put in quarantine, but the ship will be allowed to leave at once with a clean bill of health.

Several steamers carrying pilgrims northward were found at Tor to have more than the permitted number of pilgrims. One of them was a French boat, the other Egyptian, but all were chartered by Syrians. The Quarantine Board seem to have contented themselves with warning the earlier boats, but later finding a French boat carrying about 30 per cent. more than her proper number of pilgrims, they executed their threat to apply article 148 of the convention, and fined the captain £T 5 for each pilgrim in excess. It appears that Thabit "Pasha," the Turk who was Director General of Quarantine in the Hedjaz, gave the earlier ships permission to carry more pilgrims than the number fixed by the Quarantine Board at Alexandria. It is regrettable that the first boat breaking the regulation was not fined heavily. The regulation is clear enough, and no permission had been obtained from this agency, which is responsible for Egyptian as well as for British vessels. The men who charter vessels for one or two trips to Jeddah during the pilgrim season - most of them Syrians - are quite unscrupulous, and, having no regular business, have no sense of responsibility. They squeeze what they can out of the pilgrim season and then disappear for another year. Thabit has gone, but it is unlikely that the Hedjaz quarantine authorities will for some time to come be of such a status that the strict application of the law by the Quarantine Board and the other authorities concerned is the only remedy against such abuses. It is satisfactory to record that the fine on the steamship "Tangistan" was duly levied by the authorities at Beirut. It is true that the fine was not paid at the paper and not the gold rate reduced the penalty to a sum which left a large profit on the excess pilgrims, but the Quarantine Board have taken up this matter, and it is hoped that in future all fines on this account will be levied at the gold rate.



### Kamran

The suggestion made in the Jeddah pilgrimage report for 1923, that when the pilgrimage is declared to be clean ships carrying pilgrims back to India and the Persian Gulf need not call at Kamran, was approved by the Government of India, and acted on.

Dr. W. Th. de Vogel, of the Netherlands East Indies Civil I., visited Jeddah and Kamran on a mission from the Netherlands Colonial Government to study the arrangements for the return pi.

The Netherlands consul at Jeddah brought up several cases where he considered that the medical authorities at Kamran had interpreted the regulations in such a way as to cause unnecessary suffering or inconvenience to Javanese pilgrims. The Government of India are satisfied, after receiving the medical officer's explanation that the complaints are unjustified. The Netherlands consul has withdrawn with the exception of the complaints which were founded on an ambiguous paragraph in the report furnished to him but maintains the others. The correspondence is not yet finished. The Netherlands East Indies furnish more than half the pilgrims who pass through the Kamran quarantine station, and the Netherlands authorities are therefore not unreasonable in keeping a very critical eye on the administration there, the more so as before the war the station was controlled by an international board on which Holland was represented. To meet their views His Majesty's Government are proposing that a Dutch doctor should be appointed to serve in the quarantine station.

### Mann

When King Hussein began to urge pilgrims from Syria and Palestine to travel to Medina by the Hedjaz Railway the authorities in Syria prohibited this route as giving no guarantee for sanitary supervision. Later the King decided to establish a quarantine station at Mann, and sent his director of quarantine there for the purpose, but he had only about £300 to spend, and little actually happened except that a place at Mann was called a quarantine station.

If this route is to be used it seems certain that the sanitary control cannot be left in the hands of the Hedjaz authorities.

### 5 India and the Pilgrimage

#### Staff

The pilgrimage officer, Mr. Mahammad Y., was unfortunately he was still here when hostilities broke out. He was sent to go to Mecca to investigate the reports of looting and a riot at Taif and to give advice to Indian pilgrims and residents.

Thanks to the generosity of the Government of India we have the services of a capable Indian clerk for the whole of the current year instead of for four months only. That this provision is not unnecessary is shown by the fact that, although it is more than six months since the Hajj, the clerk is still busy with deceased pilgrim-estates, and that, but for the hostilities between the Hedjaz and Nejd, a certain number of Indian pilgrims would now be arriving by each boat for the pilgrimage of 1925.

#### The Deposit System

The system recommended by this agency for several years, under which a deposit to cover the cost of the return journey would be taken from every Indian pilgrim before he left India for Jeddah, was brought into operation in time for the seasonal Hajj. As full reports have been sent to the Government of India it is not necessary to write much about the matter here. Possible improvements in the system are under discussion, but there is general agreement among the British officials and the shipping agents, both here and in India, that the system has been a success. In 1923 1,049 Indian pilgrims were carried home by the shipping companies free, while 1,314 contributed an average of only a few rupees each towards the cost of repatriation, viz., 25 rupees a head, the balance being made up by contributions from the Government of India (35,300 rupees) and from the Central Hajj Committee (2,600 rupees). What this meant—apart from the cost in money—to His Majesty's Government, the Government of India, this agency and all the pilgrims, destitutes and others, was that the pilgrims were able to return home without any further financial aid from the agency for free passages, and it is estimated that there would not have been more

than fifty or sixty for the whole season if the Wahabi attack had not frightened many from Mecca a considerable number of Indians who would probably have remained there, living on charitable funds or by begging, for years. It might perhaps be expected that but for the Wahabi menace there would have been no destitutes at all, but the deposit system did not affect people who came in previous years before the system was introduced, or who travelled overland via Persia and Irak, or who came as stowaways. A few of the Indians who applied for repatriation as destitutes had passports, saying that they did not make deposits in India as they were not like to return.

The effect of the deposit regulation was noticeable from the beginning of the season. Masters of pilgrim ships reported the almost complete disappearance of the type of pilgrim—so familiar in 1923—who was already penniless when he left India and had to beg for his food on the way to Jeddah.

The steady annual increase in the proportion of destitutes, under the encouragement of free and assisted repatriation, is shown strikingly in the following table.

Number of pilgrims sailing from India	Number of destitutes	Percentage of destitutes among pilgrims sailing from India
1922	1,049	10.4
1923	1,314	12.4
1924	1,314	12.4

The pilgrims who sail from India include "Bokharis," Afghans and other non-Indians. The percentages shown are therefore smaller than the proportion of destitute Indians to the total number of Indian pilgrims, but in showing a steady increase they are in line with the general trend of the statistics, since the flow of non-Indian pilgrims sailing from Indian ports probably constitutes a fairly constant proportion of the total.

The percentage for 1924, small as it is (nine-tenths of 1 per cent), is yet unjust to the deposit system, in that it represents, to the extent of perhaps two thirds or more, refugees rather than pilgrims. Even then, the cost to the Government of India was only £119 8s. Given normal circumstances and a few years of the deposit system, the Indian destitute should be almost unknown.

In pressing, after seeing the obvious advantages of the system at work, to learn that various Moslem bodies in India are strongly opposed, on religious grounds, to the Bill, and that the Government of India will not agree to provide funds for the repatriation of destitutes, otherwise, we must be prepared for an increasing drain on the Indian Treasury and the increasing demoralisation of the Indian pilgrim.

#### Deposits at Jeddah

As one result of the deposit system adopted in India there was a large reduction in the number of deposits made by pilgrims at this agency. The figures were,—

1923	Number of depositors, 385, amount deposited, 80,714 rupees = £78
1924	Number of depositors, 42, amount deposited, 26,647 rupees = £62

Every pilgrim being easy in his mind about his return journey, almost the only persons who made deposits were those who had large sums which they did not want for their immediate expenses.

#### Loans

Thanks also to the deposit system, we had no call to make loans, as we did in 1922 and 1923 as an experiment, to Indian pilgrims who applied for financial assistance. It is doubtful whether we should have continued the rather rash practice in any case, as there are loans amounting to 265 rupees still outstanding.

which will have to be written off is larger than the agency charity fund can afford to lose.



### Registration.

It was originally proposed, as part of the deposit scheme, that all Indian pilgrims should register at the agency. I have come to the conclusion that to register all Indians would require a much larger staff and, consequently, much heavier expenditure than I should be prepared to ask the Government of India to sanction.

### The Knife Robbery of 1923

This outrageous case, which was fully reported in 1923, led to a long correspondence with King Hussein. Finally, after a very strongly worded note from the Government of India for payment to the claimants £E 3,000, which is as nearly as we can calculate the amount taken from the British pilgrims in the caravan.

### Stowaways

It rarely happens that an Indian pilgrim ship arrives at Jeddah without at least two or three stowaways on board. Often there are more, and one ship in 1924 had nineteen. These people are equally unwelcome to the shipping company who lose the passage money, and to this agency, which sees in them among the most insolent in their demands for repatriation. My opinion, stowaways should be taken back on the same ship returning to India, otherwise they should be sent back on some other ship at the expense of the company on whose ship they came. The best way of discouraging such stowaways is to disappoint them of their intention to perform the Hajj at other people's expense.

When a stowaway is discovered the passengers sometimes subscribe the amount of the passage money. If this view is accepted (though it seems absurd to consider as respectable the religious feelings of a man who begins a pilgrimage by trying to swindle a shipping company), then it should be laid down that the stowaway shall be allowed to land only if the passengers subscribe not only the cost of the passage to Jeddah, but the deposit money (60 rupees) too, and the captain deposits the latter with the British agency at Jeddah.

I understand that the shipping companies in India are inclined to accept the proposal, but they consider that they ought not to have to pay Kamaran quarantine dues on stowaways they repatriate. This is not unreasonable, since it would appear that the responsibility for seeing that stowaways do not get on board pilgrim ships leaving for Jeddah does not fall exclusively on the captain and other employees of the company, but is shared with the authorities at the port of embarkation.

### Indian Wakfs in Mecca

It is believed that there are in Mecca a number of rest houses which were built by charitable Indians for the benefit of Indian pilgrims, but have been diverted from their proper use—a fate which the lack of a registration system for wakfs or any other form of property and the extraordinary rapacity and corruption of the Mecca people make only too likely. In their instructions for 1924, the Government of India requested the Indian pilgrimage officer to examine this question, under the agency's directions, and see what could be done to get the property reserved for the use of Indian pilgrims. Mr. A. K. I. knows Arabic and has had a legal training, should be sent to Mecca for the purpose before the forthcoming Hajj, so as to be able to return to Jeddah before the rush season begins. He took with him to India a list (supplied by the Hedjaz Government, and therefore probably incorrect) of properties said to be Indian wakfs, with the object of enquiring in India, if the Government of India should approve, into the terms of dedication.

### 5. British Malaya

#### New Passport and Registration System

The authorities in British Malaya are of the opinion that it is not desirable to compel all British pilgrims from there to register at this agency, but they have

introduced a very satisfactory form of passport, and all pilgrims holding such passports are advised to register here. The pilgrim reports on arrival and deposits the counterfoil of his passport and his return ticket, and he takes back the latter when he wants to return home. The passport is granted on the express understanding that, if the return ticket is not claimed within two months from the date of sailing of the last pilgrim steamer from Jeddah to the Straits, the agency shall send the ticket to Singapore, and the money it represents shall be paid by the shipping company to the next-of-kin. This excellent rule has not been acted on this year, because it was supposed that some of the unclaimed tickets belonged to people who had at first decided to stay in the Hedjaz, but had been induced by the difficulties resulting from the state of hostilities to change their mind, or who, having been disappointed in the hope to visit Medina before the Hajj, might try to visit it afterwards, and so outstay the period of two months fixed by the passport. In fact, many such people did apply for extensions after the expiry of the two months.

The new system, which was worked very well by the Malay pilgrimage officer attached to this agency, Mr. Abdul Majid, with the assistance of one Malay clerk, was first introduced in 1921. It was first suggested by King Hussein at first to instruct the pilgrim guides to co-operate with the agency. By the time his suspicions had been allayed, the pilgrims who arrived on the last few boats had already gone to Mecca.

An argument which will doubtless receive due attention, in favour of requiring all pilgrims who leave ports in British Malaya to provide themselves with passports, is that this would be of very great assistance in the detection of people engaged in the slave traffic.

### Death Rate

This system of registration provided the only reliable statistics of the death rate among British pilgrims. Of the 3,317 Malay pilgrims who were reported by our records 340 were definitely reported as having died in the Hedjaz—an appalling percentage of 17 per cent. for a period of about six months, and as some of the unclaimed tickets probably represent unreported deaths, the percentage may be even higher than that.

In nearly every case where the death was reported to the agency, the effects and the return ticket belonging to the deceased were handed over to relatives or friends for transmission to the next-of-kin.

### Prostitutes

A few Malays applied for assistance. In every case their need was due to the state of hostilities, which compelled them to leave their heavier belongings in Mecca and led to their being robbed on their way to Jeddah of such money as they had ventured to bring with them. Owing to the high reputation of the Malays and to their mutual helpfulness, very little assistance had to be given. We gave eighteen Malays 3 rupees each out of the charity fund, to provide them with food for a day or two, and we made loans of £5 to one person and £2 to each of six others on a guarantee by their pilgrim guide that if they did not repay the sums advanced he would.

### The Mahmal

#### 7. Egypt and the Pilgrimage

The Mahmal of 1921 was sent to Mecca by the Egyptian Government. King Hussein, however, refused to accept it, and it was not until 1922 that it was sent. King Hussein caused another dispute, he either cut out or covered up the name of King Fuad, which was embroidered on the Kaabah cover. The Amir al-Hajj protested violently, and left the country immediately with the Mahmal and its guard a month before the time fixed for his departure.

### Shipping

There was some accumulation of "official" Egyptian pilgrims towards the end of the season, and this led to violent scenes outside the agent's office. The fault lay, however, not with Messrs. Lazzerini, but with King Hussein. The early departure of the Mahmal dislocated the shipping programme, and the King's quarrel with the Bedouin closed the Medina road, so that many Egyptians who would ordinarily have gone to Medina after the Hajj desired to leave for Egypt immediately.



## 8. Other Territories.

## Nigeria.

The Nigerian Repatriation Fund, to which reference was made last year, has been very valuable. By its aid 1,293 Nigerians have been sent over to Suakin, whence they can usually find their way home. Nearly all have been sent by dhow, at a cost of only a few shillings a head. Children under 8 were not charged for. The figures are:—

1923. Adults, 268, children under 8, 31, cost, £112 10s 10d  
1924. Adults, 1,025, children under 8, 178, cost £587 7s. 8d

The large increase in 1924 is due to the state of hostilities existing in the Hedjaz. The large number of pilgrims who have worked here for a year or two to earn the money to take them home applied for repatriation. Moreover, the shortage of food and water in Jeddah and the news of what happened after the fall of Taif made it advisable to send away as soon as possible all British subjects who wished to go, so the usual plan of leaving applicants for a month or two in order that time might sift out those who were only pretending to be destitute had to be abandoned.

## Somaliland

The authorities of British Somaliland have informed this agency that district officers have been instructed to advise intending pilgrims to obtain certificates of identity and that it may be possible to obtain from the family or tribe of any British Somali assisted by this agency a refund of the expense incurred. They point out that persons claiming to be natives of that territory may quite possibly be Italian or French Somalia or even natives of Abyssinia or Aden.

No expenditure, however, was incurred on behalf of British Somali pilgrims in 1924. Seven destitute Somalis were sent away at the instance of this agency and they were given free passages to Aden on a British pilgrim ship touching there on her way to India and from Aden they seem to have found their way home somehow.

## South Africa

As in the case of the Middle East, the South African pilgrims in 1924 for one reason or another. Usually the agency sees little of them.

A group of South African pilgrims in 1924 were sent away at the instance of this agency and they were given free passages to Aden on a British pilgrim ship touching there on her way to India and from Aden they seem to have found their way home somehow.

## Palestine and Syria

The suggestions made in the 1923 report, that visas should be worded so as to cover the return journey via Egypt, and should be for a period long enough to cover the ordinary pilgrimage season, were acted upon. The agency had no trouble in this respect.

Pilgrims who took direct passages to Palestine and Syria again paid, in the form of enhanced fares, a concerted tax of £1 a head. The authorities wished to levy a similar tax on all pilgrims returning to Egypt (except those travelling under the auspices of the Egyptian Government), but dropped the project because they did not wish to collect the tax should be communicated to them in writing.

R. W. BULLARD

E 1781/10/91

No. 43.

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. — (Received March 23.)

(No. 17. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, February 28, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 11th to the 28th February.

The report is being sent to the following:—  
Khartoum, London, Singapore, Bombay, Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrain and Muscat.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD

## Enclosure in No. 43.

Report for the Period February 11 to 28, 1925.

1. Military activity on the part of the Wahabias to report, except the town of Jeddah. With an occasional day's rest their guns are firing day and evening. Not a single object of military importance has been hit, but there are civilian casualties every day (about eighty persons in all have been killed and over 100 wounded), but so far as is known no foreign subject has been hurt. The quarter near the King's "palace," where the foreign representatives live, has had at least its fair share of the shelling. The agency buildings have been hit by three shells, and all the other consulates have been hit or narrowly missed, but no serious damage has been done so far.

2. The so-called armoured cars have fully established their futility. Three of the Russian mechanics were persuaded to take one of them out with a party of cavalry, who made an attempt (apparently unsuccessful) to put two enemy guns out of action. They tell me that the Wahabias did not seem in the least alarmed at the car, but fired at it with rifles at short range. Many bullets passed through the plating, and the Russian who was driving was severely wounded. One of his companions managed to take his place and to keep the engine running, an important consideration, as these cars can be started only by a crank worked from outside.

3. The third and last of the Russian aviators has left, and the mechanic who was wounded in the car has gone to Egypt with one of his compatriots. Thus there are only two Russians left—mechanics. The four Germans are still here. Two of them have been employed in training men to use some old flame-throwers, which were left in the Hedjaz by the Turks. One of the Germans claims to be an air pilot, and to be willing to fly if paid in advance, but he has not made a flight yet.

4. On about the 15th February a body of Palestinian soldiers, which gradually increased to some 150, refused to obey orders. They fired over the heads of the British troops, and received the two months' arrears of pay due to them. Finally, the King went out to them and promised them that they would be paid in five or six days. Similar promises had been made before, but the soldiers went back to work. To the general surprise, the promise was kept.

5. News has been received from a source usually reliable that the Hedjaz authorities have been recruiting men in some territory or territories near Aden, and propose to bring several hundred of them to Jeddah soon. Let them should embarrass us by trying to sail from some port under our control, the Majesty's Government have been informed.

6. Five men accused of political agitation and/or correspondence with the Wahabias have been arrested and sent to Akaba. One of them has been openly pro-Wahabi ever since the war started, and there is probably good evidence against the others. Nevertheless, all five are being allowed to return. The whole population being indifferent, if not hostile, to the fate of the Hedjaz Government, Ali probably feels that there is no strong case for singling out five men for punishment.

7. The Hedjaz Government itself. But the Wahabias let the occasion pass. When they first reached Jeddah, early in January, the Hedjaz troops were in such a state of demoralisation that capture by assault should have been easy. It was expected that a general attack would be made about the time of the last new moon, and that such an attack could not but be successful, but no serious attack was made. It is now past the new moon again, but the Wahabias do nothing but fire guns during the daytime and at night let off a few rifles to make the defence waste their ammunition. It would be interesting to know why the attack was never made. Possibly the wire seemed formidable to Badawin, who had never seen such an obstacle before, and who did not know the state of mind of the troops behind it. Be that as it may, their failure to attack has given the Hedjaz army a better opinion of itself, and if only it could be regularly paid it might now be willing to continue to defend Jeddah for some time. The Hedjaz authorities talk about an advance, but this is hardly possible if any resistance is to be expected. The army has no boots for a march, and hardly any horses or mules in a state to draw supply carts, let alone guns. Moreover, the moral of the Hedjaz troops is not strongly rooted enough to bear transplantation to the desert, where there is no protective wire. One of the shereefs, Shakir, has been sent to Yambo in the hope that he will be able to raise the tribes to attack the Wahabias at







varied menace, that a Ruwala surrender to Ibn Saud involves a Wahabi domination of the Syrian desert.

My horizon is too limited for me to venture to offer any considered opinion on the alternative. From the language of the Emirs Fawwaz and Farhan, I gathered that they are seriously frightened, and that, if they do not soon receive some assurances from us, they will be driven to come to terms with Ibn Saud, whom they can with difficulty resist unaided. I understand that His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem are strongly in favour of support being given to the Ruwala. If His Majesty's Government should decide on this course, I venture to say that it would not, perhaps, be impossible for me to continue assisting Suleyman, temporarily at any rate, until we see how events shape, in various current affairs devoid of political tinge and unconnected with the Ruwala. Anomalies of this nature, though fantastic in a European atmosphere, are not so impossible on the shifting scene of the Arabian comedy. Nevertheless, if we decide to support the Ruwala, it would be inevitable

I venture to hope that, for my guidance in the present difficult situation, you will keep me fully informed of our Arabian policies as far as they affect me at Damascus.

I have presumed that I should continue to adopt an attitude of strict reserve regarding Ruwala-Nejdian affairs towards the French here, who are, of course, keenly interested in Wahabi developments. I should be grateful for warning of any approach to Anglo-French co-operation, such as suggested by Sir Henry Dobbs in his telegram above referred to, and of a nature to necessitate some modification of this reserve.

I have, &c.  
W. A. SMART

Enclosure in No. 44

Consul Smart to Colonel Cox (Amman)

(No. 21. Secret.)

Sir,

Damascus, February 19 1925

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge, with thanks, the receipt of your despatch of the 14th instant, with its enclosures.

I notice that, in the translation of Ibn Jalawi's letter, some passages of the original text have been omitted, which, though not important, with the exception of the following passage omitted—

"As for El Sayed Hussein, the Deputy of the Haram (Naib-ul-Haram), he has arrived here, and we sent him with a message of ours to the Imam. Very news about that reached us."

Presumably the "Haram" is the "Haram-as-Sherif" of Jerusalem. As this passage may be of interest to His Majesty's High Commissioner, I have ventured to draw attention to the omission in case the original text should escape notice at Jerusalem.

I would also draw attention to a very delicate aspect of this affair. There are references in these letters to letters written for Suleyman bin-Musheiqh by my dragoman, who, as you know, assists the Nejdian agency in its clerical work. A peculiarly awkward instance is the cypher, which was evidently sent in response to a letter written by my dragoman for Suleyman, asking that he be furnished with a cypher.

Suleyman, on the whole, has been exceedingly amenable to my direction. The dependence of the Nejdian agency on this consulate is of considerable value. Should it transpire that Nejdian correspondence has been intercepted, by whatever means, and subsequently come into our possession, it is obvious that the present intimate relations between the Nejdian agency and the consulate will suffer, and that which will probably result in my losing my control over the agency. I trust that these considerations will be carefully borne in mind.

I have, &c.  
W. A. SMART

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No. 45.

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 21. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, March 11, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 1st-11th March.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrain and Muscat.

I have, &c.  
R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 45.

Report for the Period March 1-11, 1925.

(Secret.)

THE Wahabi "bombardment" has diminished to a few shells soon after sunrise and before sunset. The Hedjaz Government profess to have kept account of the shells fired into the town and to know that the stock they left behind at Mecca must be nearly exhausted. Ibn Saud is still at his headquarters a few miles from Jeddah, but there is no sign of an attack.

Reports received during the last two or three days speak of Wahabi activity towards Yambo. The capture of Yambo would cut the Hedjaz Government's communications with Medina, as only the railway route via Maan and Akaba is being used, but it would deprive them of an alternative route and of a town which Ali is believed to favour as a base in case of retirement from Jeddah. Moreover, it would finally quench the hope which the Hedjaz Government cherish, that the Sherif Shukir can raise the Yambo tribes against the Wahabins.

2. The Hedjaz Government have suddenly become confident of a speedy and successful end to the war. This confidence is due mainly to the arrival of war material. On the 8th March an Italian steamer, the "Fausto Camille," from Trieste, put in at Jeddah. She flew no flag, and professed, even to a petty officer from an Italian merchant vessel, to be a private trader. She did land timber, but she also landed two armoured cars, 1,000 rifles and 694 boxes of small-arms ammunition. The Hedjaz Government were disappointed at getting only 1,000 rifles; they were expecting 2,000.

Two or three days before the British steamship "Konch" brought from Suez 200 cases of small-arms ammunition. I learn from the agent of the shipping company that this ammunition was ordered in Antwerp and shipped by the British Indian steamship "Margha." The freight was paid in London (? by Sir Foster Newland). Some machine guns or machine gun parts arrived with the ammunition.

This material adds greatly to the strength of the Hedjaz army. The five or six different patterns of rifle, for some of which there is little ammunition, can be replaced to a large extent by a uniform pattern with plenty of ammunition. But it is on the cars in particular that the Government are relying. They are not fakes, like the five received from Germany recently. They are small, but they look very useful—quick, light, and easy to handle. They were made by the Lancia Works (George Ansaldo), at Genoa. My Italian colleague has known for some time that the Hedjaz Government were expecting two cars from Trieste, but he believed—or said he did—that they were not of Italian make. The rifles are of Austrian manufacture (Steyr), and some specimens of the cartridges which I secured were pronounced by the commanding officer of the "Clematis" to be Austrian too.

Three drivers, who are believed to be Syrians, were recently brought from Egypt for these new armoured cars. The Russian mechanics have all left the country. The four Germans are still here, but they seem to do nothing except go out to every steamer that calls and treat it as a bar with an "on" and "off" licence.

3. Reports that Ibn Saud's men are dissatisfied and that many are returning home find ready credence in official circles in Jeddah. The belief in such reports has been greatly strengthened by a private letter addressed to Tahir Pasha, the commander of



the Hedjaz army, by Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud asks his "brother" to come and discuss the matter with him and see who is right—Ibn Saud or Ali. Tahsin is not replying to this letter.

Another sign of weakness is detected in a proclamation to the Mahometan world published by Ibn Saud in his newspaper towards the end of February. While he speaks confidently about occupying Jeddah soon, he does not promise that it will be open for the pilgrimage, but invites pilgrims to come to Mecca via ports which are already in his hands, e.g., Lath and Kufudah.

King Ali and the army officers are now talking even more confidently of marching out against the enemy in a few days, and all animals capable of being used for transport are being registered. The arrival of the new war material certainly makes the project less fantastic, but the main difficulty, to which I have before referred, viz., lack of reliable troops, still exists. The mutiny which I reported last time was, I have since found, staved off without payment of all the arrears of pay; many of the men are still a month behind, and will therefore have a claim for two months' pay on the 24th March, when the Arabic month ends.

5. The two Arabs who obtained the war material from Trieste have been decorated by Ali, and one of them, a Syrian named Mshir-al-Din Shatila, has been appointed Hedjaz consul and commercial agent in Trieste. I do not know whether this appointment has been accepted by the Italian Government. I am inclined to believe that the war material was not smuggled out without their knowledge. It is perhaps not unreasonable to see a connection between the export of this material and the fact that, whereas the other foreign representatives, in view of the difficulty of the situation, avoid seeing the King unless it is absolutely necessary, the Italian consul has frequent interviews with him.

6. The Hedjaz Government have asked for visas for three men whom they wish to send to India to counter the Caliphate committee's propaganda against the Hedjaz.

and to be the only Hedjaz official who ever tried to live on his official pay. As the Hedjaz Government allowed the Indian delegation to come to Jeddah, I saw no harm in the proposal, but it seemed better to ask the Government of India whether they had any objection. The reply has not yet been received.

The Hedjaz Government are managing somehow to conduct propaganda. It is believed that they run two papers in Bombay, "Wahidiah" and "Ghaibi-Atola," and one in Egypt, "Al Shuyukh."

7. According to reports made by Javanese pilgrims who have arrived from Mecca, the Senoussi reached Mecca on the 1st March, and was given an ostentatious reception.

Anna Ribent reports from Syria, on the authority of Turks of importance, with whom he is in touch there, that the Senoussi is charged with a mission from the Turks, and that it includes the establishment of close and friendly relations between Ibn Saud and the Imam.

8. It is difficult to find out what conditions in Mecca are now, as very few pilgrims are coming down to Jeddah. Such reports as have been received lately show that prices are not nearly so high as they were at first, and that considerable stores of food stuffs come by caravan from Nejd and from the blockaded ports on the Red Sea. But the low prices are believed to be due largely to the lack of demand resulting from—

1. The absence of pilgrims;
2. The departure of many of the inhabitants; and
3. The poverty of such of the inhabitants as have remained behind.

Any persons who are inclined to accept Ibn Saud's invitation (see paragraph 3) to go to Mecca via Lath or some other minor port would do well to consider whether the necessary organisation for landing, housing and feeding large bodies of foreigners is likely to exist at such ports, and whether such supplies as reach Mecca are likely to suffice if there is a large influx of visitors.

9. On the 9th March the (Mahometan) anniversary of the Arab revolt against the Turks was celebrated. The consular corps were invited to call on King Ali. The call was paid in plain clothes, as Ali has never been officially recognised.

Certain Syrians who hold positions of authority in the Hedjaz, viz., Tahsin Pasha, who is Minister for War and Army Commander, the Minister of Marine, and the Chief Medical Officer, seized the opportunity to hold a political meeting. According to people who were present, they spoke much about the unity of Syria (including Palestine and Transjordan), the unity of the Arabs in general, the wickedness of the French,

and the fine qualities of the Syrians. The few Bagdad officers who remain here detest the Syrians and speak of them as incapable braggarts who came into the Arab movement at the eleventh hour and now claim all the credit. One of them, in the presence of two others, told me that if he could be sure he would not be shot at night by some ignorant Wahabi, he would desert to Ibn Saud and show him how easy it would be to circumvent the clumsy defence plans of Tahsin Pasha.

So much for the unity of the Arabs.

R. W. BULLARD,  
Agent and Consul.

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No. 46.

Consul-General Satow to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 30)

(No 32. Confidential.)

Sir,

Beirut, March 13, 1925.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 3 of to-day's date, I have the honour to report that Mahmoud Nedim Bey, who was accompanied by his aide-de-camp, arrived at Beirut on or about the 16th February. On the 18th he paid a courtesy visit to General Sarrail, to whom he does not appear to have made any special request. He informed the general that he intended to pass through Beirut again in about three months on his return from Angora, whither he was proceeding. While in Beirut he stayed at the Hôtel Matham Arabi, which is the rendezvous of the pro-Turks and

Moharrem, a Turkish sympathiser. These two persons visited him daily, or even oftener, during his stay. Mahmoud Nedim Bey also called on the Governor of the Great Lebanon and on Prince Selim, son of Sultan Abdul Hamid, and on the other refugee Turkish princes who are now here. He was also visited several times by Amin Rihany was, as you know, recently at Jeddah endeavouring to intervene between Ibn Saud and King Ali. The Amir Said Jassarly came over from Damascus to see him but missed him.

Mahmoud Nedim Bey stated while here that he was proceeding to Angora on an mission from Mustafa Kemal Pasha with a view to negotiating on behalf of the Turkish Government the recognition of the independence of the Yemen under Turkish suzerainty on lines which would reconcile the interests of both parties. There seems to be also reason to believe that he may attempt to obtain munitions from the Turks to be used against the British.

Mahmoud Nedim stayed here about a week, after which he proceeded to Tripoli where he stayed for some time with a certain Mustafa Pasha Inja. From Tripoli he was to proceed via Hama and Hama to Aleppo and thence to Angora.

I recently had a talk with Commandant Dentz, the chief of the French Intelligence Service, who had, when Mahmoud Nedim Bey was here, mentioned to me that he had called to see him. He told me that his arrival had coincided with that of a Turkish officer, whom, however, he had not seen, who had come from Ibn Saud. Commandant Dentz believes that the Turks are taking an increased interest in the Arab countries and that these visits are symptomatic of that interest. He referred in this connection to the journey of Ahmed Senussi to join Ibn Saud, and said that, while he did not believe the Turks had actually sent him on a mission, it seemed likely that they were a long two birds with one stone in that they were able to get rid of a tiresome guest and at the same time to use him for liaison purposes with Ibn Saud.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW

*Note Communicated by the Marquess della Toretta, March 31*  
(Translation.)

THE Legation of the Hedjaz at Rome have addressed to the Italian Embassy for Foreign Affairs a note in which they demand the recognition by the Italian Government of the blockade of the coast from Rabig to Confeda and El Leit proclaimed by the Hashimite Government. The Legation state that the blockade must be considered effective since the Hedjaz have equipped, for that purpose, three steamships. The Italian Government have replied to the said Legation the effectiveness of the blockade has been proved by recent captures of Eretrian sambuks.

The Italian Embassy would be glad to learn (1) whether the British Government intend to persist in the non-recognition of the blockade despite the measures which the Hashimite Government have taken to render it effective, (2) how the British Government propose to regard the steamships employed by the Hedjaz, which, as it appears, are manned by native crews.

*Italian Embassy, London*  
*March 31, 1925*

No. 48

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 6.)*

*Jeddah (old Port Sudan), April 4, 1925*

THE HEDJAZ troops getting desperate for lack of pay, several deserters to the enemy lately. Unless Government can obtain large sum within a very few weeks they must admit defeat.

Road to Medina from Yanbo cut, and Yanbo threatened by Wahabia, otherwise military situation unchanged.

(Sent to India, Jerusalem, Bagdad and Bushire.)

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 7.)*

*Jeddah, March 19, 1925*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 12th to 19th March.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartoum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Kowloon, Bahrain and Muskat.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD

Enclosure in No. 49

*Report for the Period March 12 to 19, 1925.*

(Secret.)

THE Hedjaz war command consists principally of three persons: Talism Pasha, the Pasha, who is Minister of War and Army Commander; a Bagdadi General Janul, who is attached to the King, and the King himself. As it seems no Bagdadi ever agrees with any Syrian, and as the King ticks from one side to the other with the pendulum of a clock, there is a certain lack of unity and purpose in the campaign. However, at last the die was cast for a sortie, and an attempt to occupy the Wahabis's positions and capture or destroy their guns. On the

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 8.)*

(No. 49)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, April 4, 1925*

YOUR despatch No. 14 of the 23rd February: Hedjaz Treaty

Naji holds out to Ali hope of favourable reply from you in order to obtain money. Ali distrusts Naji, and asks whether there is real hope that His Majesty's Government will answer in the sense of second paragraph of letter to India Office enclosed in above-mentioned despatch.

I venture to think unequivocal reply should be given.



14th March the garrison kept up a fairly heavy bombardment of the Wahabis positions for most of the day. In this they had the assistance of four heavier guns (4-5-inch) which had just arrived from Medina via Maan and Akaba. On the 14th, at 11 A.M., the Hedjaz forces moved out towards the north and north-east in four separate bodies on a front of almost 2 miles. The main attacks were against a village on the left wing and trenches in the plain on the right. The operation was a complete failure. The Wahabis had four or five machine guns in various parts of the front, and with these and rifle fire they inflicted casualties amounting in all to nearly 200 on the Hedjaz forces. The Wahabis fought, by all reports, with the greatest ferocity, and could be seen from the roofs of the town, with a good deal of accuracy. Hedjaz troops appeared to have no heart for the work, and this is borne out by the fact that a high proportion of the wounds received are in the discreet rather than the valiant portions of the body, viz., the back and buttocks. The heaviest casualties were suffered by the remnants of King Hussein's regular army, which consist of "Hedjazis" (cultivators from the country between Mecca and Taif) and "Yemenis" (men of Yemen stock, though mostly born in the Hedjaz; they came under machine-gun fire from the village). The Palestinians, who were supported by armoured cars, behaved better. A few days before the battle a few hundred "scallywags" from the desert were recruited at £2 a month, and given old rifles. A large proportion of them were boys of 14 and under. These troops took no prominent part in the battle.

The two new Italian armoured cars were hardly more successful than the protected lorries obtained from Germany. One never got far beyond the wire, though whether the breakdown was in the machinery or in the German who was driving it has not been discovered. The other went out at a good pace, but came back as quickly with several holes in the armour, the driver wounded in the neck, and the officer commanding armoured cars with a piece of the plating in a bullet wound in his leg.

This failure, which was anticipated by everyone else, was a heavy blow to the command, who now appear to realise that they would need more and better men to drive the Wahabis back. But, as they are desperate and as they can always leave for a safer place in case of disaster, there may be something in the rumour that they propose to make another attack. The attack of the 14th has done nothing but dishearten the defence and (doubtless) strengthen Ibn Saud's determination to hold on until Jeddah surrenders.

2. All the news from Yanbo is, from the point of view of the Hedjaz Government, bad. There are considerable Wahabi forces near the town, and they seem to have been successful in a skirmish of some importance, the Governor is clamouring for reinforcements from Jeddah; and the Sharif Shakir is afraid (probably with good reason) to distribute rifles to the Balouin, who profess to be anxious to support him against the Wahabis.

There are stories that Medina too is in a bad way. I cannot confirm them, but they are reasonable, and the King is certainly anxious about Medina. They are to the effect that the army, being months in arrears with its pay (this is a fact), is entirely unreliable, and that the population, knowing this, want Ali to withdraw the army, so that its futile resistance may not anger the Wahabis.

3. Facing another windfall, such as King Hussein's contribution of £10,000, the Hedjaz treasury will be empty in a few days, when pay-day comes. The authorities are now requisitioning goods which they propose to sell to obtain money for their most urgent requirements. They have included foreigners in their demand (most of them Indians and Persians), but, on being warned by the consular corps, have refrained from the use of force against our nationals. They are now arguing the point, with the assistance of an Arabic book on international law which they have just obtained from Egypt. Unfortunately for them the book does not say anything about countries which, like the Hedjaz, are still subject to "Capitulations." Nor is there any well-known parallel to the political situation here, where the population has long been opposed to further resistance, and the Government relies on an army which is composed mainly of foreigners. This latter argument cannot be used against the Hedjaz Government, but it strengthens our resolve to use all legitimate means to protect our nationals from requisitions by a Government which it seems most cease to exist very soon.

R. W. BULLARD, Agent and Consul.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul Bullard (Jeddah)

No. 21)

Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, April 7, 1925

YOUR telegram No. 40 of 4th April Anglo-Hashimite Treaty negotiations  
You may inform Emir Ali that so long as present unsettled conditions in  
Hedjaz continue, there can be no question whatever of His Majesty's Gov-  
ernment reopening negotiations for a treaty with the Hedjaz

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No 51

Consul Bullard to Mr Austen Chamberlain—(Received April 15.)

(No. 25)

Sir,

Jeddah, March 27, 1925

I HAVE the honour to send herewith copies of correspondence between the  
Hedjaz Government and the foreign representatives in Jeddah, on the subject of a  
forced loan to which the Hedjaz Government desire foreigners as well as local  
subjects to subscribe

2. About a week before the Foreign Secretary's letter of the 21st March was  
written, I heard that the British Indian commercial community had been summoned  
by a Hedjaz official and told that they were expected to hand over about 1,500 bags  
of food stuffs to the Government, and that they had been threatened with vague  
penalties to be applied in case of refusal. I consulted my colleagues, several of whom  
had received similar reports about their own nationals, and at the request of the  
Consular Corps I saw the Foreign Secretary and said that, in our opinion, such  
levies could not be applied to foreigners in the Hedjaz. He said that there was no

Government wished to raise. A few days later, Sheikh Fud told me that great  
pressure was being brought to bear on him to allow goods to be requisitioned from  
the extremists for the moment. He told me confidentially—not for my colleagues'—  
information—that it would make his position much easier if we would couple with  
the refusal which it would doubtless be necessary for us to send, a promise to  
transmit the Hedjaz Government's request to our respective Governments.

2. The reply to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, of which a copy is attached,  
was drafted by me and approved by all my colleagues except the Soviet agent.  
M. Khakimov explained that he could not plead the Capitulations, as the Soviet  
Government had no such rights. He added that he was telegraphing to his Government for instructions. He added that  
even if there were no Capitulations, the Hedjaz Government's demand was  
unacceptable—an opinion which the rest of the corps were not prepared to endorse  
without further examination

3. If you approve the contention that the Capitulations protect British subjects  
and the Hedjaz Government requisitioned a few thousand bags of food stuffs  
from foreigners against a written promise to pay for the goods within a short  
time, the import trade has stopped, we should be justified in asking that the drafts should  
be good against the general revenues of the country. But the—probably  
unprecedented—conditions prevailing here make it desirable to resist the proposed  
levy by all reasonable means. Repayment obviously depends on King Ali's victory.  
The Hedjaz Government has no regular revenue at present and will not have any  
again unless it defeats the Wahabites and recovers at least Mecca. If Ibn Saud wins,  
the Hedjaz Government ceases to exist. Moreover, the people who are pressing for  
the levy are mainly the Syrian adventurers, who, with their foreign troops, are  
masters here, and who can and probably will, decamp when the merchants here  
have been infuriated against the population of Jeddah by the long resistance.

4. A copy of this letter is being sent to the Government of India

I have, &amp;c

R W BULLARD

Enclosure 1 in No. 51.

Translation of a Circular Letter addressed by the Hedjaz Minister for Foreign  
Affairs to the Foreign Representatives in Jeddah on March 25 1925  
(March 21, 1925).

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the commission charged  
with the task of levying the temporary internal loan for the military needs of the  
country has again [sic] drawn my attention to the fact that certain (foreign)  
subjects, who have been resident in the Hedjaz for a long time, are hesitating to  
assist the country from which they have profited, in the belief that this loan does not  
apply to them. I have, therefore, thought it necessary to explain to you,  
before taking any action, the view the Hedjaz Government takes in this respect—

1. The British and American theories agree that the neutral has certain  
obligations towards the belligerent country which harbours him and in which he has  
his interests, so long as he does not choose to leave it. Germany asked, at the  
second Hague Conference, that the enrolment of neutrals in armed forces should  
be forbidden, but even this demand was rejected, and it was decided that the military  
obligations relating to foreigners should be regulated by special treaties.

2. There is nothing in international law to prevent the levying of all kinds of  
taxes on foreigners. The right to levy taxes does not necessarily postulate  
a bond of loyalty between the individuals and the State levying (the tax): it is a  
right based on the connection between the property and the State, or on the fact that  
the refusal of the German demand at the second Hague Conference that the  
levying of war taxes on the subjects of neutral States should be prohibited.

This is the legal view of the question of defence and taxes. Nevertheless, the  
commission charged with the levying of this temporary internal loan desired to be  
conciliatory, and decided, in exercise of the Government's legal right, that a  
loan should be levied on all subjects of the Hedjaz, and that both natives of the country and other residents should participate in it, on the  
following grounds:—

- (a) There is no legal objection to the employment of the method of a loan—  
even of a forced loan—by a belligerent
- (b) It is impossible to raise objections against a belligerent for refusing to  
exempt neutral foreigners unless there exists a treaty providing for such  
exemption
- (c) Such a loan is legal if it is just in its incidence and no distinction is made  
between local and foreign subjects

Your Excellency will see from this that the attitude of the Hedjaz Government  
in this respect is incontestably correct in law, but, in view of the state of friendship  
existing between them and the Great Powers, who have under their protection  
subjects residing in the Hedjaz, the Hedjaz authorities have contented themselves  
with using some of the obvious rights they have in this respect, and the duty of the  
commission, which is animated with the utmost generosity and benevolence, has been  
limited as follows

- (1) Payment by the neutral of an amount fixed according to his commercial  
position. Payment to be made in food stuffs he may have in stock, at the  
current market price, or in cash
- (2) Acceptance (by the neutral) of a draft for that amount on the Department  
(the Ministry) of Taxes.
- (3) Gradual repayment of the amount (to begin one month later) by means of  
remission of customs dues on his goods

It is to be noted that the Government cannot possibly be unable to settle them  
at the appointed time, and, secondly, that the term is short, since payment is to be  
made, gradually, after one month, and if you will take into account what the  
negotiations for the loan have cost the Government, you will  
see that the action (proposed) is permissible according to international law. It was  
on that that America and Great Britain based their action in 1918, in a far greater



and more important matter, in the incident of the neutral ships the two Powers seized

This is why the Hedjaz Government considered it necessary to place its views before you.

It is not necessary for me to point out to your Excellency how painful an impression a negative attitude on the part of the said (foreign) subjects would cause if the latter saw the foreigners in question refusing to lend their aid to so small an extent at a time so difficult—the more so as the demand is perfectly legal and legitimate

(Compliments.)

FCAD-AL-KHATIB,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Enclosure 2 in No. 51

*Draft of Identical Letter (in Arabic) sent to the Hedjaz Minister for Foreign Affairs by the British, French, Italian, Netherlands and Persian Representatives.*

(The Russian Representative answered in a different sense.)

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jeddah.  
(After respects)

Jeddah, March 23, 1925

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 25th March, in which you claim for the Hedjaz Government the right to compel foreign subjects residing in the Hedjaz to contribute, either in goods or in money, to a forced loan which the Hedjaz Government proposes to raise.

I beg to inform your Excellency that it is not necessary, in my opinion, to argue the general question, as your Excellency has done, since foreign subjects in the Hedjaz are protected by the Capitulations from liability to contribute to forced loans, requisitions, &c.

In view of the importance which your Excellency appears to attach to the matter, I am forwarding to my Government a translation of your letter. I must ask your Excellency to take the necessary steps, in the meanwhile, to see that British subjects are not only not required to contribute to the forced loan, but are left in undisturbed enjoyment of all the rights and privileges to which they are entitled under the capitulatory régime now in force.

(Compliments.)

R. W. BULLARD

E 2352/10 91]

No. 52

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 20.)*

(No. 206.)

Sir,

Constantinople, April 13, 1925

I HAVE the honour to report that Shereef Ali Haider sent word to me through his son Shereef Mohammed Emin, who was educated at St. Andrews University, that he wished to make a communication to me, and I received Mohammed Emin to day. Ali Haider's view of the situation in Arabia was that things had now come to a deadlock between Ibn Saud and Ali and that Great Britain was being blamed for the consequences. Ibn Saud had made his mistakes; he might in the early stages of his campaign have cleared up the whole situation by a vigorous attack on Jeddah immediately after the fall of Mecca, but he had not done so, now the task might be beyond his strength. Though he had in the past crushed Ibn Rashid, the latter's tribes still existed and though held down by force might take an opportunity to rise. A disappearance of Ibn Saud would remove the stable element in Arab politics and increase the welter of confusion. Ali Haider considered that his own appearance on the scene would turn the scales in favour of Ibn Saud with whom he always had been and still was on good terms. He had already been talked of as a possible Shereef of Mecca in the future, and when Ibn Saud had occupied the

Holy Places of Islam he had stated that he would hold them not for himself, but for those to whom they should belong. Ali Haider suggested that if he now put himself actively forward in conjunction with Ibn Saud he might receive British help, the form of which, however, was not defined. His suggestion was made, as Mohammed Emin frankly admitted, in his own interests, but still more in the interests of his race and of his religion. It was not less to the interest of Great Britain, with her numerous Moslem subjects, to see the situation in Arabia cleared up quickly, which could now best be done in the manner he proposed.

2 I replied that His Majesty's Government were often unjustly accused of intervention in Moslem affairs and always blamed, also unjustly, whatever it was that went wrong. They had decided that, though they desired on behalf of their Moslem subjects that the Holy Places should be opened to pilgrims, the best course they could take was to remain completely outside all struggles in progress and they had adopted an attitude of the most complete non-intervention in the whole question. It seemed to me the wisest policy they could adopt and I saw no chance of their departing from it in the future. I begged Mohammed Emin to present my compliments to his father, but could give no other answer than the above to his suggestion.

3 It is impossible for me to say whether or not the Turkish authorities are taken at the instigation or with the cognisance of the Turkish authorities, but I have no justification for suggesting that it was or was not. Mohammed Emin told me that his elder brother, Shereef Abdul Mejid, lives now at Beirut and is deeply immersed in Arab politics.

4 I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt and to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

E 2219, 2219 91]

No. 53

*Foreign Office to Consul Bullard (Jeddah)*

(No. 50.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 22, 1925

WITH reference to your despatch No. 25 of the 27th March, relative to the proposal of the Hedjaz Government to levy a forced loan from the subjects of foreign Powers resident in the Hedjaz, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to inform you that he approves the action taken by you in this matter and considers that the Capitulations afford a sufficiently strong ground for adopting this attitude to impose a forced loan upon British subjects, since the British claim to the existence of the Capitulations affords a sufficiently strong ground for adopting this attitude.

2 Mr. Chamberlain is advised that if British subjects did not enjoy capitulatory rights in the Hedjaz, the claim of the Hashimite Government could not be resisted in the absence of any treaty provisions on the subject, since it cannot be denied that foreigners who do not enjoy such a treaty right are not exempt from requisitions or forced loans made in the country where they are resident.

3 In these circumstances, you should continue to resist any attempts by the Hashimite Government to compel British subjects to subscribe to a loan.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT

No. 54

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 23.)*

(No. 50.)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, April 22, 1925.

SOVIET representative just visited Mecca with consent of both sides nominally as a private person and pilgrim. Native vice-consul of Dutch Government there at the same time met him. There is some ground for believing Khakimov tried to enlist [Ibn Saud's] sympathy with Bolshevik Eastern policy, but failed completely.

Dutch consul has information that at Mecca Khakimov engaged publicly in violent propaganda, partly against Dutch Government, but mainly against His

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Majesty's Government. My colleague, though by no means alarmist, regards news as most serious. He is writing to his Government. He cannot give me full information, as it was obtained confidentially. He tells me strictly confidentially that he is urging his Government to communicate information to His Majesty's Government.

No. 55

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. (Received April 24.)*

(No. 80)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah April 23, 1925

THROUGH secret channel I have received letter from Ibn Saud, in which he states, for the information of His Majesty's Government, that he has never closed the door against peace. This is ostensibly prompted by recent visit of Soviet, Persian and other emissaries to Jeddah. Ibn Saud is anxious to see the end of the present state of peace. Minister for Foreign Affairs told me in confidence that he has received most conciliatory letter from Ibn Saud, who asks to see him, saying that he wants certain explanations and to know what guarantees of peace could be given; latter, of course, means how could King Hussain be chained and muzzled.

Interview is to take place shortly

(Repeated to India)

E 2315 10 91]

No. 56

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess della Torretta*

Your Excellency

Foreign Office, April 24, 1925

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government have decided to adhere to the non-recognition of this blockade on the ground that it is not effective.

2. The information which I have just received from Jeddah shows that at no period have more than two Hashimite steamers been employed on blockading duties, and that for long periods those steamers have either remained at Jeddah or have been engaged on other business. The armed dhows employed by the Hashimite Government are believed to number no more than three or four.

3. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government propose not to recognize the blockade and to ignore the activities of the Hashimite steamships so long as they are not directed against ships or dhows flying the British flag.

I have, &c

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

E 2434 10 91]

No. 57

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. (Received April 27.)*

(No. 31. Secret)

SIR,

Jeddah, April 11, 1925.

1. I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 20th March to the 11th April.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrain and Muskat.

I have, &c

R. W. BULLARD

Enclosure in No. 57

*Report for the Period March 20-April 11, 1925*

(Secret.)

RAMADAN has confirmed the lull in hostilities. A few shells are fired morning and evening, and that is all. The Wahabis' shelling is reduced to a few shots daily at the Hedjaz guns and barracks. Occasionally a shell falls into the town, but that is now very rare. The Hedjaz troops are free to fast and many of the men are taking advantage of the permission. It is believed that all the Wahabis are fasting.

On the 23rd March the two Italian cars were sent out and for several hours there was much machine-gun and rifle fire. The Hedjaz Government report at least 300 enemy casualties at a cost of six wounded on this side. Why a performance so simple and so effective is not repeated several times a day is not explained. Perhaps it is realised that such operations are governed by the law of diminishing returns.

One of these cars has since had a Wahabi shell through it and all the crew wounded except one, who was killed. This was in a fierce attack they made on five Javanese pilgrims, whom they took for Wahabis. They fired many rounds at the pilgrims from their machine-guns, but without hitting any of them.

The Wahabis are alarmed. They have been obliged to allow thirty-five Egyptians and Italians to demand their release. Most of them seem prepared to cut their losses if they can only get away.

Private individuals can pass between Yambo and Medina, but the road is cut against the Hedjaz Government. Yambo might fall into the Wahabis' hands at any time.

2. The Italian consul says he has received orders from M. Mussolini to assure all his colleagues that he is much annoyed to hear that munitions have been landed at Jeddah from an Italian steamer and that if the munitions are Italian they must have made false declarations. The ship's papers gave the cargo as lumber only.

3. The Wahabis are alarmed. They have been obliged to allow thirty-five Egyptians and Italians to demand their release. Most of them seem prepared to cut their losses if they can only get away.

4. A German, who is unlikely to honour them, they may not be here much longer. Willi Beirsdorff of Berlin is adviser on fortifications and teaches the use of flame-throwers. He has been driver of the King's car and of one of the Italian armoured cars since the Palestinian who formerly drove them was wounded in the attack of the 14th March.

I ought to have corrected before this the report I mentioned some time ago, that the Wahabis had captured the flame-throwers left behind by the Turks. The flame-throwers (forty in number) came from Germany with the protected lorries. They are, however, at present useless, because the necessary oxygen was not sent with them.

3. The Hedjaz steamer "Rushdi" recently seized three dhows which were flying the Italian flag and brought them to Jeddah, where the authorities discharged the cargo. It seems that the goods, which were the property of Jeddah merchants, were being taken from Kufudah to Lith, whence they were to go to Mecca by land. The Italian consul secured the immediate release of the dhows, and, on instructions from his Government, the return of the goods also.

The manner in which the capture was effected only serves to show how ineffective the blockade is. The Director of Customs, who was recently given a visa for Massana, learned on his arrival there of the approaching departure of the three dhows and telegraphed the news to the Government here in cypher, and the "Rushdi," which would otherwise have been wandering about ineffectively, was sent down with the certainty of catching them.

4. The cutting of the cable by the Wahabis, which was reported some weeks ago, has hampered communications badly. The agency has been able to send and receive telegrams through H.M.S. "Clematis," but the local authorities, who were dependent on their own wireless, have had great difficulties. Stimulated by the King's complaints, the quarantine doctor went out and fished up the cable at a point where it was being cut. A cable station has been established in a dhow. For this service the doctor has been





Consul Bullard to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 30)

(No. 53.)  
(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, April 28, 1925.

CONVERSATIONS have been held between Ibn Saud and Hedjaz Minister for Foreign Affairs, but broke down completely. Former insists on retirement of Ali. This destroys hope of settlement before pilgrimage. Circular all addresses.

Consul Bullard to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 9)

(No. 59)

Jeddah, May 8, 1925

GOVERNMENT of India telegram No 4-9 S

Of the four points, viz., the two holy cities and their natural ports, Ali holds Medina, Yenbo and Jeddah. Ibn Saud has hitherto ignored Medina. Ali is weak at Yenbo, while at Jeddah he is now, with fresh munitions, pretty strong for defence.

this scale and largely tribal, one cannot be certain. At least twice unexpected assistance has revived Ali's cause, first, arrival of recruits from Akaba, later, receipt of money from King Hussein. Two more Germans arrived 5th May, making five, besides one gone to Germany on Hedjaz business, and if war material waiting at Hamburg, consisting of aeroplanes and, it is believed, tanks, could be shipped to Jeddah, this might have some effect on the army of Ibn Saud, which is not large.

Then there are munitions of war at Suez, believed to be thousand rifles and million rounds, which only a hitch at last moment prevented from being shipped here. I do not think Hedjaz will get Yemen soldiers they hope for, but if they did that would be an important factor. Nearly 300 recruits arrived at Akaba 26th April. On the other hand, many here believe that, when Nejd pilgrims come to Mecca, as they will probably do in large numbers, they will force Ibn Saud to rush Jeddah whatever the cost.

I believe that in spite of advantage Ali enjoys in being able to get foreign experts and munitions of war, Ibn Saud will win if the war is left to take its course.

Ali would incline to non-interference, but, as that would mean certain defeat he might well be influenced by subordinates. He is easily led. For this reason, and also to prevent, as far as possible, indirect hindrance of measures we might consider necessary, e.g., to obtain dhows, His Majesty's Government should, I venture to think, tell Ali distinctly if they adopt Rabigh project that they cannot allow him to, even if his power to do so seems slight.

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(Sent to Simla.)

Consul Bullard to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 14)

(No. 74)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, May 14, 1925.

HAVING come to the conclusion that blockade of Kufudah has failed, Hedjaz Government has been considering whether they should not try to retake and hold it, this is perhaps beyond their powers, but they attribute [1 delay] to non arrival of munitions of war from Suez. The Government received telegram 13th May stating that pilgrims are leaving Bombay 16th May for Kufudah, Lath or Rabigh; they have also seen telegram from protector of pilgrimage, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, as it was *en clair*. Minister for Foreign Affairs asked what would be attitude of His Majesty's Government if his Government tried to carry out above-mentioned or similar plan and British subjects were hurt incidentally. I said that I could not say anything which might be taken as binding His Majesty's Government. Hedjaz must interpret its rights as combatant, His Majesty's Government theirs as neutral. Minister for Foreign Affairs took this, I think, as a warning. I gather that cleavage of opinion foreshadowed in my telegram No. 69 is already apparent.

(Sent to India)

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No. 61

Consul Bullard to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 18)

(No. 39. Secret)

Jeddah, April 30, 1925

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 12th to 30th April.

2 Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Muskat.

I have, &c.

R W BULLARD

Enclosure in No. 61

Report for the Period April 12-30, 1925

(Secret)

SHIFIKH FI AD, the Hedjaz Foreign Secretary, has paid a visit to Ibn Saud to talk about peace, and has returned unsuccessful. The suggestion for the meeting, probably came from Sheikh Fuad, though the Hedjaz Government attribute it publicly to Ibn Saud. All hope of agreement was wrecked on the old rock. Ibn Saud wants to secure himself against the Hussein family so far as the Hedjaz is concerned, and he therefore still insists on Ali's retirement. The King and Sheikh Fuad are disappointed, but the Syrian adventurers, who are disguised as generals and what not, pretend to be pleased and are holding out for battle. They have talked valiantly all through Ramadan of the attack they would make after the feast. It is supposed that Ibn Saud sees and understands the situation in the Hedjaz. He is called June, when the hordes of Nejd will come to the pilgrimage for the first time for some years and will be able to help him to retake the old city.

It seems almost certain that there can be no decision, either by agreement or by battle, in time for pilgrims to go to Mecca through Jeddah for this pilgrimage.

2 Yambo is as it was—not safe, but still under the Hedjaz Government. Wejh seems to have been lost, or at least all the country round has gone. Possibly all that has happened is that the local tribe, the Bili, have gone over to Ibn Saud, and that no considerable body of Wahabis has reached Wejh, but the information received here is scanty.

3 The German, Stefan, is still here. He proposes to leave soon. He is attempting unobtrusively about ways of getting to Hodeidah—doubtless hoping to sell arms to the Hedjaz. He told me that he had seen a report that the Hedjaz Government spent some £200,000 on aeroplanes, tanks, &c., they might do



something, but—alas!—they had not the money. Before he formed the plan to go to Hodeidah he was thinking of paying a visit to Hussein at Akaba—not because Hussein holds the purse-strings, but out of pure admiration for the character of that grand old maniac. M. Steffen called on me to impart many pieces of information, especially the news that the export of arms from Germany is absolutely impossible. M. Steffen said that the most people here he has already exported from Germany to this country flame-throwers and machine guns and ammunition, and has bombing aeroplanes and other war material awaiting shipment to Jeddah at Hamburg.

4. The departure of over thirty Palestinian and Egyptian soldiers stimulated many others to demand their release. Fearing that they would lose the backbone of their army, the military authorities caused several men whom they detected visiting this agency to be beaten and sent to Yumbo and Wejh. In answer to private inquiries I was told that the beating was inflicted without his knowledge, and that he has issued strict orders against the beating of soldiers in such cases in future. What effect this treatment by itself would have had cannot be judged, for at that moment a contribution of £20,000 arrived from Hussein, and the troops were made tolerably happy by the issue of a month's pay.

The detention as soldiers of foreigners who have no written contract and who wish to leave because their pay is several months in arrears has made it necessary to apply to His Majesty's Government again for instructions. The letter had hardly been posted when a batch of over 200 more recruits arrived from Akaba—most of them Palestinians.

There is reason to believe that the rumour reported some time ago, that the Hedjaz Government were trying to recruit men from territories near Aden, was well founded. The recruiting agent seems to have been one Ahmad Sakka, who went to Aden with several thousand pounds for the purpose. The Foreign Secretary complained to one of my colleagues that they could have secured thousands of Hadhrani recruits if His Majesty's Government had not interfered.

5. No staple food-stuffs have been imported into Jeddah for some months, merchants having been discouraged by the requisitioning of considerable quantities. Stocks of flour will last only about a month. There will still remain large stocks of rice, but the local people are not used to a diet of rice and will not take to it gladly.

6. The Foreign Secretary professes to hope that troops may now be obtained from the Imam. He has shown me a letter which is certainly sealed with the Imam's seal but the only part I was allowed to read was a non-committal statement about excluding foreign influence and "European education," and applying the Shari' Law. The Imam's motive is probably to allay any suspicions Ali may have while the Idriai is being dealt with.

7. Permission to enter India having been received from the Government of India the three men whom the Hedjaz Government had selected as a deputation left for Aden on the 18th April on their way to Bombay. They are:—

Sayyid Tahir Dabbagh, formerly clerk in the Finance Department. He became Minister of Finance on Hussein's fall, but resigned on his departure for India.

Ahmad Ghazzawi, chief clerk to the Prime Minister.

Al Taib-al Sasi, who in Hussein's time was assistant editor of the "Kibla".

It is understood that they are not going as an official delegation, their object being ostensibly for the purchase of food-stuffs for the Hedjaz army.

8. The seizure of a Kamaran dhow at Hali by Hedjaz armed craft raised the question of the status of Kamaran. The Hedjaz Government have placed the dhow decremated at the time of seizure, is on the way to Jeddah to take delivery of them. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government have agreed that for the purposes of the blockade Kamaran dhows should be regarded as though they were British.

9. The Soviet and Persian representatives returned after spending five or six days in Mecca. With M. Khakimov the reaction after this prolonged period of piety was very severe, he drank steadily for twenty-four hours and was more or less unconscious for forty-eight. He does not seem to have been very successful with Ibn Saud.

The Netherlands vice-consul, Sheikh Pravira, was allowed to move about freely in Mecca, but M. Khakimov and Ahmad Lari, the acting Persian consul, were given Wahabi attendants without whom they were not supposed to go anywhere; they evaded the attendants on one occasion and paid a secret visit to the Senusai, to the great indignation of Ibn Saud's representative in Mecca.

In Ibn Saud's camp M. Khakimov was taken at his own valuation as a private. He has commanded respect, for one of Ibn Saud's chief men, Damluji, asked Sheikh Pravira in full assembly, and so loudly that M. Khakimov could not fail to hear, how he could bring himself to travel with "this miner who pretended to be a consul-general." As to his politics: At a dinner given to the three consular representatives Ibn Saud went out of his way to say very emphatically that for himself he had no quarrel whatever with the European Powers, from whom, indeed, he thought there was much to be learned.

There is good reason to believe that M. Khakimov publicly engaged in violent propaganda against the "imperialistic" Powers, especially His Majesty's Government.

10. There are many matters concerning British subjects in Mecca that need attention, and I am hoping to be able to send a capable Indian clerk to Mecca in a few days to deal with them. It is a little difficult to satisfy the wants of all those who look to His Majesty's Government for protection. Many British Malays are coming to Mecca, but when, with some difficulty, I obtained permission for fifteen Malays who had drifted down via Medina to return to Mecca to fetch their luggage and return tickets, all but two or three decided to stay there. Several Indian merchants have returned to Mecca via Mazawwa, and several others have appeared to me to get them permission to go to Mecca.

A letter signed by several Indians in Mecca demanding free passages for themselves and their families from Mecca to India, immediately; one of the signatories is a prosperous merchant who was in Jeddah last autumn as a refugee from Taif, and insisted on returning to Mecca just before the road was cut, while another is a professional beggar who has frequently tried to get a free passage home though quite able to pay for it himself. It is suggestive that this letter, which is peremptory in tone, was brought to Jeddah by M. Khakimov.

It has been found possible to send to Mecca a draft for the payment of certain Malay and other pensioners who draw their money through this agency.

11. Ibn Saud's plan to invite pilgrims to come to Mecca via Kufidah and other small ports, was probably meant to throw into relief Ali's policy of blocking the main route rather than as a serious proposal, but it seems to have been taken seriously in India, and the Moslem press is demanding that it should be acted on. But the matter cannot be settled by simply deciding whether pilgrim ships may land their passengers at Kufidah, Rabigh or Lith instead of Jeddah. To handle a large number of pilgrims in a short time requires an elaborate organisation, and a breakdown or even a slight hitch or inadequacy in this organisation may mean great hardship and even death to many pilgrims.

12. For the 1926 pilgrim season there should be two measures in force which should make things easier for British pilgrims and more difficult for the parasites who prey on them. The scheme requiring all Indian pilgrims to deposit in India the cost of their return journey has been sanctioned by law; and for pilgrims from the Straits Settlements passports are to be compulsory. The obligation on people leaving Malayan ports for Jeddah to take out a passport will not only help the ordinary pilgrim, but will also drag such people into the ordinary passport system with success—to export Chinese and other women through Singapore under the guise of pilgrims, for sale as slaves in the Hedjaz.

13. In one respect Ibn Saud has proved himself to be more enlightened than Hussein. At the request of the Netherlands vice-consul he had a Javanese girl released who had been kept as a slave in Mecca for several years. Hussein promised most solemnly, a year ago, to have her set free, but connived at her re-enslavement. Ibn Saud showed that he was in favour of slavery as an institution, but agreed that, according to the Shari', a girl born a Moslem could not legally be held in slavery.

14. The Egyptian who was promoted to lieutenant-general (and Pasha) for setting up the Arab camp at Hali, is now in the office of Director of Quarantine, the Turk, Thabit, who has retired

to Egypt with a very pretty fortune. His own methods are very different, he is the one honest servant the King has. "Of course," he explained recently to two Europeans when in his cups, "I take my percentage on the quarantine dues; mais ça, ce n'est pas voler." It is not surprising, then, to learn that, while he agrees that pilgrims who have been quarantined at Kamaran should not go through the farce of quarantine at Jeddah, he thinks that the dues should not be reduced; the money not required to maintain the Jeddah station for emergencies would be used to establish hospitals. The larger the basis of calculation the larger the proceeds of that little percentage.

R. W. BULLARD

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No. 6.

Mr Austen Chamberlain to M de Fleurbaey.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, May 18, 1925

YOUR Excellency is no doubt aware of the correspondence which I exchanged with M. de Saint-Aulaire regarding the ex-Turkish lighthouses in the Red Sea (ending with your predecessor's note of the 19th November last).

2 I understand that the French Government are anxious to arrive at an understanding with His Majesty's Government regarding the future of these lighthouses, and I desire to assure you that a friendly solution of this question, enabling the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration to resume the task of maintaining and exhibiting the lights, would give His Majesty's Government great satisfaction. With this object in view, unofficial conversations have been in progress during the last few months between the competent Departments of His Majesty's Government and representatives of the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration, which give rise to the hope that a solution satisfactory to all parties is attainable. I am, however, advised that owing to the indeterminate status of the three islands of Abu Ail, Jebel Zubeir and Jebel Teir, there are certain difficulties in the way of concluding an arrangement between His Majesty's Government and the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration on the basis proposed. The nature of these difficulties is explained in the accompanying memorandum.

3. The situation which would be produced by a strict application of the Concessions Protocol of the Treaty of Lausanne, in the manner indicated in the memorandum, is so unsatisfactory as to render essential a friendly solution of the problem by some arrangement between the French Government and His Majesty's Government. Failure to reach such an agreement would be detrimental to the interests of all parties, particularly to those of the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration, who at present are precluded from the exploitation of their concessions.

4. It is to the general advantage that the lights should be maintained and exhibited with the fullest efficiency for the benefit of the shipping of all nations, but it is equally to the advantage of all parties that the lights should be maintained and exhibited by the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration so long as His Majesty's Government are merely in occupation of the three islands and the sovereignty remains indeterminate.

5. The most satisfactory solution would, in my opinion, be an arrangement under which His Majesty's Government would invite the interested Powers to become parties, by which the sovereignty of the islands would be vested in His Britannic Majesty, the upkeep of the lights would be vested in the Lighthouse Administration on reasonable terms for the duration of their concession, and light dues would be levied on shipping which benefits by the lights.

6. As regards the Mocha Light, the position is, of course, different, that lighthouse being situated within the territory of the Imam of the Yemen. His Majesty's Government will leave it to the Imam of the Yemen to decide whether he will accept the light dues proposed by the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration.

7 I am confident that the French Government will realise how greatly it is to the interest of all parties that the present anomalous situation should be terminated at an early date, and I hope therefore to learn from your Excellency that the above proposals meet with their acceptance.

I have, &c  
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

Enclosure in No. 62.

*Memorandum on Red Sea Lighthouses.*

UNDER article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey renounced the sovereignty over the territories and islands situated outside the frontiers laid down in the treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled, or to be settled, by the Council of the League of Nations. The Red Sea is one of the areas in which these lighthouses were erected, are covered by this clause. Turkish sovereignty has been renounced, but no arrangement has been come to between the parties concerned as regards their future.

2 The three lighthouses in the Red Sea were erected as the result of the agreement between the Turkish Government and the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration in 1899. At that time the islands were under Turkish sovereignty, and the lighthouses became Turkish property. The agreement provided that the islands should remain under Turkish sovereignty until such time as the sovereignty of the islands should be determined.

3 If a detached territory can pass, there must be a State to which the sovereignty of the detached territory passes. Consequently, until some arrangement is arrived at between the parties concerned in regard to the sovereignty over these three islands of Abu Ail, Jebel Zubeir and Jebel Teir, article 60 of the Treaty of Lausanne does not apply. The lighthouses, therefore, until such arrangement is made, cannot be transferred to the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration, but the British Government, having bound herself by article 60, cannot transfer or deal with the ownership of the lighthouses in any manner which would exclude the automatic passage of the property in the lighthouses the moment that the sovereignty of the islands is determined. It is, therefore, difficult to discover any legal basis for a permanent arrangement on the part of His Majesty's Government with the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration for the working of these lights until such time as the sovereignty over the three islands is by some appropriate act vested in His Britannic Majesty. It is true that at the present moment the islands are subject to British occupation and possession, and in virtue of such occupation His Majesty's Government would be entitled to enter into an arrangement with the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration for the duration of the occupation; but such an arrangement, which in any case could not achieve all that is desired both by His Majesty's Government and the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration, would of necessity be provisional in character and would terminate as soon as the future sovereignty of the islands is settled between the parties concerned and full effect can be given to article 60.

4 From the moment when the sovereignty of these islands is by some appropriate transaction vested in His Britannic Majesty, the property in the lighthouses will pass from the Turkish Government to the British Government. At the same moment the Concessions Protocol will come into operation, as His Majesty's Government do not maintain that the agreement between the Turkish Government and the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration of the 8th May, 1899, was not a concessionary contract. That agreement provides for the maintenance and lighting of the three lights in perpetuity, but it is of great difficulty and produces most unexpected results.

5 Under article 9 of that protocol His Majesty's Government would acquire the rights and obligations of Turkey as from the 8th October, 1918. The effect of article 10 of the protocol is that this subrogation will have to be regulated by the application of articles 1, 4 and 5. Article 3 would not apply, because His Majesty's Government have not made use of the property or the services of the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration.

6 Under article 1 of the Concessions Protocol concessions are to be maintained. His Majesty's Government understand this to mean that all the provisions of the convention of 1899 will stand unaltered, except in so far as under article 4 changes must be made to suit new economic conditions, and under article 9 rights and obligations incumbent on Turkey as the territorial sovereign become incumbent upon His Majesty's Government as the territorial sovereign. To determine what changes in the concession must for these reasons be made depends on the convention of 1899 and the circumstances existing at the time the convention was made and the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration.



8. The readaptation of the concession under article 4 only relates to new economic conditions. It would not enable the Lighthouse Administration to claim that the concessionary had advanced the cost of the Lighthouse of Great Britain to the Turkish Government. The concessionary had to bear the full share of the Mediterranean light dues. As the lights were, under the convention of 1899, to be maintained for the account of the Turkish Government, no adaptation would appear to be required, as the increased cost of wages and material would merely increase the amount which the company recovered from Turkish funds in their hands.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul Bullard (Jeddah)

Telegrams:

Foreign Office, May 19, 1925.

GOVERNMENT of India telegram No. 520 of 13th May

Government of India still desire to secure information regarding conditions at the three ports, and suggest that you may be able to send some trustworthy unofficial person to obtain this information.

If such a person is available, please instruct him to proceed to the three ports and obtain the necessary information. Possibly the Indian doctor mentioned in your telegram No. 75 may be able to execute this mission.

Please endeavour also to communicate to Ibn Saud the message contained in Government of India's telegram No. 475 S of 5th May to India Office.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 75)

(Telegrammic)

YOUR telegram No. 73.

Constantinople, May 20, 1925

Some time ago, post to send by train to Hadyat in Beirut District in July 1977  
 Railway through Transjordania. French are willing to grant transit visas for Syria  
 provided that His Majesty's Government grant transit visas through Transjordania.

In view of last sentence of your telegram No 78 I presume I should also refuse these facilities. I should be glad, however, to learn what reasons I should give for such refusal in the event of an explanation being requested.

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austin Chamberlain — (Received May 21)

(No. 80)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, May 20, 1925

I PRESUME instructions conveyed in your telegram No. 28 obsolete in view of later messages, which show that steamers are sailing for Rabigh. In any case, investigation would take far too long to be of any use.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople.)*

(No. 46)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, May 26 1925

SOICR telegram No. 75 of 20th May: Soviet pilgrims to the Hedya.

nothing to facilitate the object in view.

Mr. Austin Chamberlain to Consul Bullard (Jeddah)

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, May 27, 1925

YOF R telegrams No. 78 of 17th May and No. 79 of 20th May.

Following message should be despatched to the Saud by earliest possible opportunity —

"His Majesty's Government have received your Highness's intimation of your intention to dispatch a force against Akaba. Your Highness will recollect that this town lies within the boundary within which you were informed in October last that my Government agreed not to have Akaba's port would be regarded as an attack upon territory for which His Majesty's Government are responsible. His Majesty's Government cannot allow Akhwan forces to violate the frontier laid down, and, if Akhwan force attempts to enter Akaba, His Majesty's Government will inevitably be compelled to take such steps as are necessary to prevent or eject them."

His Majesty's Government fully realise that your Highness would have a legitimate cause of complaint were territory within this boundary to be used as a base for operations against Nejd. They understand that your Highness's anxiety was to effect a settlement and they realise that the recent action of ex King Hussein at Akaba lends colour to this view. They have therefore decided to invite him to proceed elsewhere. At the same time, they are taking steps to establish an authority in the Haifa-Jordan Valley, and in the whole area within the boundary communicated to you in October last. This will remove all possible danger of territory under their mandate being used as a base for operations against your Highness. They are ready and anxious to consult with you with a view to the actual delimitation of the frontier between Nejd and

at 2. Methyl ester of 2,4,6-trimethyl-5-methyl-3-oxocyclohexanecarboxylic acid

1970

At least ten of the 120,000 people who died in the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic were children.

[ Via Wireless ]

Foreign Office, May 27, 1925.

[illegible]

(Addressed to H.M.S. "Cornflower," No. 1, in Government code. Repeated, at 2 A.M., in R, to Jeddah, No. 33, Bagdad, No. 6, Jerusalem, No. 1, and Bushire, No. 1.)

No. 69

No. 301

Belonging to the } R

[illegible]

Only translation of message to King Hussein is in at [redacted] dated [redacted]  
King Ab

Reported at 2 p.m. to Officer Commanding H.M.S. "Cornflower," No. 4, in Government code. Repeated in R to Bagdad, No. 9, Jerusalem, No. 4; and Bushire, No. 4.)

84

No. 70

Mr. Tolson and Mr. Boardman, I am sure, will be glad to hear from you.

18. 22

W. W. L. L.

2-102

MY immediately preceding telegram, inviting King Hussein to leave

necessary by force. If, on the other hand, the Wahabis do not attack, His Majesty's Government are prepared to allow him to remain for a maximum of three weeks. But no time should be lost in conveying the message and reporting how it is received.

It is not as easy as it seems to be. The first step is to find out what the message is. The second step is to find out how it is received. The third step is to find out how it is interpreted. The fourth step is to find out how it is used. The fifth step is to find out how it is changed. The sixth step is to find out how it is passed on. The seventh step is to find out how it is forgotten. The eighth step is to find out how it is remembered. The ninth step is to find out how it is shared. The tenth step is to find out how it is hidden. The eleventh step is to find out how it is revealed. The twelfth step is to find out how it is kept. The thirteenth step is to find out how it is lost. The fourteenth step is to find out how it is found. The fifteenth step is to find out how it is used. The sixteenth step is to find out how it is changed. The seventeenth step is to find out how it is passed on. The eighteenth step is to find out how it is forgotten. The nineteenth step is to find out how it is remembered. The twentieth step is to find out how it is shared. The twenty-first step is to find out how it is hidden. The twenty-second step is to find out how it is revealed. The twenty-third step is to find out how it is kept. The twenty-fourth step is to find out how it is lost. The twenty-fifth step is to find out how it is found. The twenty-sixth step is to find out how it is used. The twenty-seventh step is to find out how it is changed. The twenty-eighth step is to find out how it is passed on. The twenty-ninth step is to find out how it is forgotten. The thirtieth step is to find out how it is remembered. The thirty-first step is to find out how it is shared. The thirty-second step is to find out how it is hidden. The thirty-third step is to find out how it is revealed. The thirty-fourth step is to find out how it is kept. The thirty-fifth step is to find out how it is lost. The thirty-sixth step is to find out how it is found. The thirty-seventh step is to find out how it is used. The thirty-eighth step is to find out how it is changed. The thirty-ninth step is to find out how it is passed on. The fortieth step is to find out how it is forgotten. The forty-first step is to find out how it is remembered. The forty-second step is to find out how it is shared. The forty-third step is to find out how it is hidden. The forty-fourth step is to find out how it is revealed. The forty-fifth step is to find out how it is kept. The forty-sixth step is to find out how it is lost. The forty-seventh step is to find out how it is found. The forty-eighth step is to find out how it is used. The forty-ninth step is to find out how it is changed. The fiftieth step is to find out how it is passed on. The fifty-first step is to find out how it is forgotten. The fifty-second step is to find out how it is remembered. The fifty-third step is to find out how it is shared. The fifty-fourth step is to find out how it is hidden. The fifty-fifth step is to find out how it is revealed. The fifty-sixth step is to find out how it is kept. The fifty-seventh step is to find out how it is lost. The fifty-eighth step is to find out how it is found. The fifty-ninth step is to find out how it is used. The sixtieth step is to find out how it is changed. The sixty-first step is to find out how it is passed on. The sixty-second step is to find out how it is forgotten. The sixty-third step is to find out how it is remembered. The sixty-fourth step is to find out how it is shared. The sixty-fifth step is to find out how it is hidden. The sixty-sixth step is to find out how it is revealed. The sixty-seventh step is to find out how it is kept. The sixty-eighth step is to find out how it is lost. The sixty-ninth step is to find out how it is found. The seventieth step is to find out how it is used. The seventy-first step is to find out how it is changed. The seventy-second step is to find out how it is passed on. The seventy-third step is to find out how it is forgotten. The seventy-fourth step is to find out how it is remembered. The seventy-fifth step is to find out how it is shared. The seventy-sixth step is to find out how it is hidden. The seventy-seventh step is to find out how it is revealed. The seventy-eighth step is to find out how it is kept. The seventy-ninth step is to find out how it is lost. The eightieth step is to find out how it is found. The eighty-first step is to find out how it is used. The eighty-second step is to find out how it is changed. The eighty-third step is to find out how it is passed on. The eighty-fourth step is to find out how it is forgotten. The eighty-fifth step is to find out how it is remembered. The eighty-sixth step is to find out how it is shared. The eighty-seventh step is to find out how it is hidden. The eighty-eighth step is to find out how it is revealed. The eighty-ninth step is to find out how it is kept. The ninetieth step is to find out how it is lost. The ninety-first step is to find out how it is found. The ninety-second step is to find out how it is used. The ninety-third step is to find out how it is changed. The ninety-fourth step is to find out how it is passed on. The ninety-fifth step is to find out how it is forgotten. The ninety-sixth step is to find out how it is remembered. The ninety-seventh step is to find out how it is shared. The ninety-eighth step is to find out how it is hidden. The ninety-ninth step is to find out how it is revealed. The hundredth step is to find out how it is kept.

Repeating at 24 V and 1 kHz, the N<sub>2</sub> and H<sub>2</sub> data No 7 are for No 2 and No 1.

No. 71

Figure 1. The effect of the initial concentration of the monomer on the rate of polymerization.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

Abgeschlossenheit (closedness) ist ein Merkmal, das in der Topologie eine zentrale Rolle spielt. Es beschreibt die Eigenschaft eines Raumes, alle seine Randpunkte zu enthalten. In der Analysis ist dies eng mit der Stetigkeit von Funktionen verbunden. Ein abgeschlossener Intervall  $[a, b]$  ist ein Beispiel für einen abgeschlossenen Raum, während das offene Intervall  $(a, b)$  nicht abgeschlossen ist, da es seine Randpunkte  $a$  und  $b$  nicht enthält. Diese Eigenschaften sind wichtig, um die Vollständigkeit eines Raumes zu verstehen, was wiederum die Existenz von Grenzwerten und Nullstellen von Funktionen sicherstellt.

[illegible][illegible]

F E R A C O P P O S I T I O N E M A D D U C I T

1.  $\int_{\mathbb{R}^n} |f(x)|^p dx = 0$  if and only if  $f(x) = 0$  almost everywhere. (This is a special case of the more general result that  $\int_{\mathbb{R}^n} |f(x)|^p dx = 0$  if and only if  $f(x) = 0$  almost everywhere.)

42

*H. V. S., "Delhi" to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)*

(Unnumbered )  
(Telegraphic )

[Via Wireless.]

*J. Polym. Sci.* **31**: 197-200

**FULLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL**

Helmut Stur, Rainer Ueddelohr, and Peter Ullrich: *On the expected behavior of the  $\chi^2$ -test for the hypothesis of independence in the case of a  $2 \times 2$  contingency table*. *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 86 (1991), 1031-1036.

"Abdullah arrived Akaba by motor."



No. 73

Officer Commanding H.M.S. "Cornflower" to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—  
(Received May 31)

[By Wireless.]

(Telegraphic)

May 30, 1925

THE following is the ~~text~~ of a letter written ~~to~~ in Akaba given to me for transmission:—

"To His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, No. 50."

"I have answered the letter given to me by Commanding Officer 'Cornflower,' and this is to supplement it. Since the letter was translated to me I have carefully considered it, and so far as I can see I have committed no offence against Great Britain justifying this treatment of me. You [?] used to communicate with me every week, asking me, as you [?] now have, to leave this village and five other districts near. There is no need for Great Britain to force me and treat me in this way, which is contrary to her law. I hope Great Britain will not be responsible for any future troubles between us and the Sultan of Nejd. Your order has told [?] me to leave Akaba within three weeks, and it is not necessary for you to give me an order like this, as you well know our other [?] to be revenged on my enemy, since I and my people have served the British with all our hearts. You think that I am making this for military district [?], but I consider that did you not send on [?] soldiers who come to me and ask to be allowed to defend Hedjaz against Ibn Saud. I think your request will only make me more respected by my own people, since you treat me like this, although [?] are concerned it would be better for me to die.—(Signed) KING HUSSEIN, dated 17th Dergida."

No. 74

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 1)

(No. 87)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, May 31, 1925

TWO smallest Hedjaz steamers left for Rabigh 30th May with guns, machine guns, etc. I believe Government seriously intend to [?] 2 or 3 miles inland, but I understand steamer boats [?] near landing but that no dhows were found.

(Sent to India, Aden, and so that warning may be given to agency [?] possible, and to masters of pilgrim ships) to Governor, Port Sudan.)

No. 75

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 2)

(No. 88)

(Telegraphic) R

Jeddah, June 1, 1925

In a letter of 1st June, Minister for Foreign Affairs states [?] blockade of Rabigh has been instituted. Hedjaz steamship 'Tawil' [?] there continuously with some armed dhows, and when twelve days' notice expires [?] is being bombarded from sea, and land operations also are in progress against it."

(Sent to India and Aden)

53

No. 76

Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea, to Commander in Chief, Mediterranean.—(Received June 2, 1925)

(Telegraphic)

[Via Rinella W/T.]

FOR Foreign Office

Ex King Hussein now [?] where he is to go. Request that I may be informed if there is any objection to his residing [?] anywhere, except at Akaba [and] Maan

No. 77

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 2)

(No. 89)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, June 1, 1925

MY telegram No. 88.

I believe Government seriously intend to [?] 2 or 3 miles inland, but I understand steamer boats [?] near landing but that no dhows were found.

It looks as though pilgrims would be able to land at Rabigh only if, firstly, His Majesty's Government refuse to recognise even this blockade (this does not apply to first ship) which should arrive before notice expires) and secondly, masters disembark passengers in British dhows from, e.g., [?] group omitted] or Aden in ferry boats.

(Sent to India and Aden. Port Sudan will be informed.)

No. 78

Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea, to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.—(Received June 3, 1925)

(Telegraphic)

FOR Foreign Office.

Ex-King Hussein would prefer British Government to decide the place for him to go. If he must decide he would like to be taken to Jeddah. If British will not permit this he would like to go to Iraq, but not Basra, as it is very hot, and not suitable for his health.

No. 79

Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea, to Admiralty.—(Received June 3)

[Via Ipswich-Rinella W/T]

(Telegraphic)

June 3, 1925.

THE following message is transmitted for Foreign Office:—

"Conference was held on board H.M.S. 'Delhi' this afternoon, Monday, 1st June, at the request of ex King Hussein, who was accompanied by King Abdullah. The result of two and a half hours' conversation was as follows:—

"King Hussein is prepared to accept orders contained in Foreign Office [?] on following conditions:

"1. That the British Government will select a place for him to live in suitable to his health and mode of life. To be accompanied by his family and retinue—about 100.

"He does not wish to live in Europe, Egypt, India or Turkey.

"2. He prays and petitions British Government to permit him to remain at Akaba until League of Nations has decided on question of Transjordanian boundaries.

[18651]

L 2

"This he holds firmly to, as he considers it affects his honour and prestige among his own people."

"I informed him my instructions from British Government would not permit of his remaining after 17th June. A further confidential message has since been received from King Hussein, and states that his desire is not to stay in Akaba for ever, but in order to settle his affairs. He then intends to go to London as a visitor, and also hopes to confer with British Government. Taking into account the fact that he has been in Akaba for some time, and that he has been to me, it appears probable that he desires, if possible, an invitation to London, which would enable him to leave Akaba without loss of prestige among his own people."

(Addressed Admiralty and Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.)

## No. 80

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 3.)*

(No. 90)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 2, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 35

Letter despatched 1st June. I hope it will reach Ibn Saud not later than 4th June—impossible send before.

(Sent to Jerusalem, Bagdad and Bushire.)

## No. 81

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 3.)*

(No. 91)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 2, 1925.

LETTER warning Ibn Saud that pilgrims are coming via Rabigh can hardly have had news through Aden or elsewhere.

(Sent to Simla.)

## No. 82

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 5.)*

(No. 93)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 7, 1925.

I HAVE received from Ali message which ex King wishes me to transmit to King and Prime Minister of England. Hussein accepts notice to leave Akaba, although it condemns what is left of his life, enquires where he is to go, specifies that he is to be sent to London, and asks for a passport and a visa.

Above sent at Ali's urgent request.

(Sent to Jerusalem.)

## No. 83

*Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Consul Bullard (Jeddah)*

(No. 28)

(Telegraphic.) R

Foreign Office, June 8, 1925.

THE Government of India are anxious that everything practicable shall be done to ensure the safety of pilgrims who are already on their way from India or on the point of sailing. They suggest that the particular measures to be taken be settled direct between themselves and you, under my orders.

I am as anxious as the Government of India that the pilgrims should come to no harm. I leave you discretion if you feel in particular circumstances that, in

your opinion, the suggestions of the Government of India cannot, for local reasons, be complied with.

In general you should keep both the Government of India and the Resident at Aden informed of new developments in the situation in order that the necessary instructions may be sent to those in charge of the pilgrimage. In this matter the India Office have already requested the Government of India to communicate to you direct if they desire you to do anything further.

## No. 84

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 9.)*

(No. 94)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 8, 1925.

GOVERNMENT of India telegram No. 8468

According to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Wahabis at Rabigh have one gun and Hedjaz steamer is obliged to keep out of its range.

It seems that there has been skirmish, probably quite insignificant, north of Badr, midway between Rabigh and Yambo. Indian clerk and doctor were unable to get to Rabigh from Port Sudan by dhow; they will proceed with first pilgrim vessel.

(Sent to Simla and Aden.)

## No. 85

*Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 94)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 10, 1925.

MY telegram No. 86 of 26th May: Russian pilgrims to the Hedjaz.

If Soviet representative requests facilities for transit of pilgrims through transjordan, you should inform him that His Majesty's Government do not consider the route suitable at present for large bodies of pilgrims, as the Hedjaz Railway is not running regularly and quarantine arrangements are not yet established.

## No. 86

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 10.)*

(No. 95)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 9, 1925.

I LEARN from a reliable source that second Hedjaz steamship, which went to Rabigh few days ago, sank dhow and captured crew. Dhow had approached on instructions from Governor of Rabigh, who took vessel for a pilgrim ship.

This information conveyed to Port Sudan through shipping agent.

(Sent to Simla and Aden.)

## No. 87

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 11.)*

(No. 96)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 11, 1925.

HEJAZ Government announce officially that their forces occupied Badr midway between Yambo and Rabigh.



(No. 97.)

*Sedona, June 11, 1925*

(sent to India and District Commissioner, Port Sudan)

*Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea, to Commander in Chief, Mediterranean.—(Repeated to Admiralty, Received June 12)*

June 11, 1920,

CONFIDENTIAL Foreign Office message No. 1440 of 27th May, addressed  
H.M.S. [redacted] and my No 0931 of 3rd June

King Hussein asks if a reply can now be made, as he is unable to complete his preparations for departure on 18th June until destination is known.

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Consul Bullard (Jeddah)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, June 14, 1925

MY telegram No. 39 of 9th June Situation at Akaba

You may now inform Ali that His Majesty's Government are notifying ex King Hussein that they are prepared to offer him asylum in Cyprus on the understanding

the proprietors of the Hotel Nicolson are being requested to endeavour to arrange accommodation for himself and a suite of 15 or 20 persons until he can make a more permanent arrangement, that they will afford him facilities to send a representative at once to Cyprus to make preliminary arrangements, and that about 1st June they will be pleased to afford him accommodation on board U. M. S. "Delhi" for the journey of himself with wife and personal limited suite to Cyprus.

Since above was drafted H.M.S. "Delhi" has explained in telegram dated 13th June that ex King desires to sail in her, in company with Hedjaz steamer "Rugman," which will convey his household and property.

You should explain this also to Ali

(Repeated to H M S, "Delhi" and "Cyprus")

No. 21

(No. 41 Secret)

*Jeddah, May 18, 1925*

I HAVE the honour to report that, having had no reliable information about British subjects in Mecca for some months, I took advantage of the precedent afforded by the recent visit of Russian, Persian and Netherlands officials to Mecca, and obtained permission from both of the belligerents to send to Mecca a representative of this agency. I communicated to both a written list of his duties, and gave an undertaking that he would have nothing to do with matters affecting the present Turkish-Egyptian dispute. I selected for the purpose an Indian prince, in the person of a

Ihsanullah. This man, a British Indian, was a merchant in Medina before the war, with a good business and a high reputation for integrity; but the war having ruined his business prospects he has since worked for the agency. He is particularly well versed in pilgrim work, but he is also a valuable source of information, as he is in touch with all classes of people and knows everyone of importance in Mecca, Medina and Jeddah. I may add that so far as my judgment goes, he combines strong Mahometan beliefs with loyalty to His Majesty's Government as the best defence of the rights and interests of the Indian Moslem community.

During his ten days in Mecca he accomplished a vast amount of useful work. He was given a free hand by the Sultan's representative in Mecca, and received much assistance from him.

Among the more important duties which he accomplished were these. —

(a.) He saw all the leading British Indians, and made full lists of all those who wish to leave the country. There are about 200 who can pay their own expenses, and nearly 100 who could get to Jeddah somehow, but would have to be repatriated from here. (I am unable to decide what action to take about these people until it is known for certain whether Indian pilgrims are coming to Mecca or not this year.)

(b) He saw all the leading British Malay pilgrims and received from them letters and telegrams to be sent to their relatives, a complete list, for reference, of all British Malays still in Mecca, and a list made out by the Malays themselves of relatives in the Straits Settlements, &c., who should be asked to send them funds through the agency.

(c.) He managed to wind up the estates of many deceased pilgrims, viz., 261 Indians, 49 Malays and 45 Egyptians. He did not, it is true, recover the money they had left, for the Wababi authorities had used it for general purposes, but he secured from Ibn Saud a representative in Mecca a promise to pay the amount (some £200) "on demand," and recovered passports bearing deposit receipts and return tickets, which are worth some £1,500 to the next of kin. In contrast to this I may note that my Soviet colleague tells me the Mecca authorities refused to give him any facilities in connection with estates of deceased Soviet Union citizens.

(d.) He managed, unofficially, to secure the release from prison of two Indian Muslims, [redacted] and [redacted]. These two men were [redacted] at Mecca. [redacted] Massawa not long before, had been imprisoned by the Wahabis for praying at Khadijah's tomb. The penalty was death or blood money - 1,000 dollars - and the men were penniless. After much intercession they were let off with a fine of 5 dollars each, which Munshi Ihsanullah paid.

and out many other minor duties, either on instructions he had taken with him or on his own initiative.

He also secured much information, the principal items of which are summarised in the following paragraphs.

[illegible]

1193. The Consul admitted frankly to Munshi Ihsanullah, as he previously admitted to the Netherlands vice-consul Sheikh Pratim, that he did not approve of this interference in harmless religious practices. He himself, for instance, did not believe

No 92

*Captain Bullard to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 15.)*

Jeddah, May 18, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 89, dated the 18th August, 1924, and to report further on the Soviet representative in Jeddah and his staff. In regard to one or two details my earlier despatch needs correction.

2. The staff consists of the following five persons:—

*Agent and Consul-General:* Kerim Khakimov, a Tartar from Ufa. Very young for his post (about 31 or 32), but clever and an enthusiastic Communist. Says that he was not called up for military service in 1914 because he was known to be an agitator, but joined the army when Kerenski came into power—"but not to fight; to agitate." Was with Rothstein in Persia, mostly at Meshed. Knows Persian very well, besides Russian, Turkish and Turki; and is learning Arabic very rapidly and picking up French. He told me recently that he thought a year was quite long enough to stay in Jeddah, and that if the Government refused to transfer him soon he would get a post with the Communist party; the party and the Government were always competing for men.

*First Secretary.* Timetov, a Tartar from the Caucasus. Formerly a clerk in a cotton factory. Was in Persia with Rothstein. Knows Russian, Turkish, Turki and Persian. Enthusiastic Communist and much trusted by Kakinov.

*Second Secretary.* Naum Markovitch Belkin, a Russian Jew. Says that before the war he was employed at Bagdad as an engineer on the Bagdad Railway. Besides Russian, he knows German very well and French very fairly. He is apparently not a very good Communist and is excluded from the inner councils of Klaskinov and Turmetov.

*Interpreter:* Ibrahim Amrhanov, of Russian Tartar origin, but has lived much in Syria. Educated partly at the American College at Beirut and knows English and Arabic as well as Russian and Turki.

**Clerk, Moses** Age 40, a young Russian Jew. Has a law degree, but seeing no career in the law, entered the Russian School of Oriental Studies. A keen Communist and much trusted by Khakimov.

It will be noticed that none of the five is Russian by race.

3. It will be remembered that M. Khakimov was received with open arms by King Peter, the Emperor of the Bulgarians. He was spoken of as a hero and had a spectacular reception in Leningrad. Very shortly afterwards, however, the Noyd (the Noyd was a very high rank in the Soviet Government) might well decide to await developments before pursuing any active policy. M. Khakimov seems to have lived very quietly for some months. He, however, sent proof of his activities (including his work as a correspondent for the Soviet Government) to Rome with despatches.

4. I have no evidence that M. Khakimov engaged in open propaganda at first. He professed (though not to me) to be deeply wounded at the suggestion made by the "Times," that there was some connection between his arrival and the flood of Bolshevik propaganda discovered in the Sudan, and talked of demanding a transfer to some place where he ~~thought~~ that he would not be exposed to such serious attacks. He, however, made an enthusiastic, though not very important, recruit in a certain Ahmad Lari, a young Persian who, in the absence of his father, a merchant, is in charge of Persian affairs. This young man he has provided with all the usual phrases as to the danger of Persia to the ~~Russian~~ Soviet Union from the lines of British imperialism, and so on.

5. M. Khakimov told Shakh Pravus, the Javaneese who holds the post of ~~Netherland's~~ ~~representative~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~city~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Netherland~~ ~~government~~ to set the Javaneese free from their Dutch oppressors. This did not prevent his trying to flatter the Netherlands consul, M Van der Plas, by praising the fatherly care the Dutch have for their Javaneese subjects.

6. Recently, as I have stated elsewhere, M. Khukimov obtained permission from both the belligerents to visit Mecca "to perform the minor pilgrimage." He took

[13651]



failed to secure Ibn Saud's support, he will think it worth while to give any active assistance to Ali.

13. Copies of this despatch are being sent to India, Singapore, Egypt and Khartum.

R W BILLARD

( E 3519, 10 91 )

No. 23.

*Consul Bullard to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 15)*

(No. 47 Secret.)

Jeddah, May 21, 1925

211

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 1st-21st May

Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Muskat.

I have, &c

R. W. BULLARD

† *ibid.* in No. 93.

Report for the Period May 1 to 21, 1925.

(Secret.)

AN Indian clerk attached to this agency has just paid a ten-days' visit to Mecca, with the consent of both sides, to advise and assist people for whom this agency is responsible. Besides winding up the estates of several hundred deceased persons, he picked up much information of a confidential nature of which are embodied in this report.

The principal items which are enumerated in this report are:

2. Mecca is governed by a Khairat el-Hadid, Waki at who is called Naib-el-Sultan (Vice-Sultan). He corresponds roughly to the Vali of Turkish times, while Khaid-el-Lawa exercises the functions of the Sherreef, i.e., he is responsible for the conduct of the pilgrimages, &c. The civil government is well run, and taxes are very light as compared with those levied in Hassan's time. Khaid however who it will be remembered, is a relative of Hussein's, appears to combine all the dishonesty and tyranny of the Sherreefs with the fanaticism of the Wahabism he has adopted. Khaid Wahabi does want us to believe Khaid but this is very little. The accounts previously received of the attitude of the more extreme of the Wahabis respecting the graves of the saints were true. All the tombs of the saints including that of Khatun, Mohammed's daughter, have been demolished. Smoking, reading "maulids," or lives of the Prophet, are forbidden, and infractions of the prohibition are punished with beating, fine or imprisonment. Our clerk found that there were in prison four men convicted of infraction of the law. Mohammed who had been condemned to death by the late Sultan, was also in prison. By private appeals he secured his release and paid 50 dollars each. They were trying to raise the 2,000 dollars

[illegible]

UN SING has not only a right to be heard, but also to be heard and tolerated. He urges Moslems not to attack Muslims, but to be tolerant and polytheist (common with all religions). We should not say that the Moslems are the only people whose religion is the best. We should say that all religions are equally good. Those who do not accept the religion of the Moslems should not be persecuted.

A further security aspect of this Mission is that, wherever else was the territory infested by the Soviet, this has been eradicated by pushing the east case over and the point of the less security.





No. 94.

(No. 51. Secret.)

*Jeldak, May 29, 1925.*

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, K... Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrain and Muskat.

H. W. BULLARD

Report for the Period May 22-29, 1925.

KAIMAKAM SALIH BEY ABDUL RAHMAN, who has been appointed vice-consul for Egypt in Jeddah, arrived on the 26th May. He will relieve this agency of one of its most thankless tasks—applying to the Egyptian authorities for permission for Hedjazis, penniless students, Russian refugees, &c., to go to Egypt.

authorise their representative to enter into official relations with the authorities here. The Hojuz Government heard privately of his approaching arrival and made special arrangements to greet him fittingly, but he made some excuse and the band and the guard of honour had to be taken away before he landed. Salih Bey is now waiting for instructions from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Cairo as to whether he may accept the invitation of King Ali to pay him a visit.

I hear that Habib Lutfullah took with him to Egypt a letter from Ali to King Fuad, expressing the hope that the misunderstandings engendered in King Hussein's reign had been removed, relations in the future would be cordial and so on.

2. The latest number of Ibn Saud's newspaper, "Umm-al-Kura" (No. 20), to reach Jeddah contains a long account of the recent peace move, in which Sheikh Fuad was concerned. It states that certain of the consular representatives who went to Mecca for the "umrah" spoke about peace in their private capacity, and said that Sheikh Fuad wanted to know whether Ibn Saud would receive him. (Two of them—the Russian and the Persian—have denied this; the third is on leave.) Ibn Saud said he was ready to see anyone. Then follow copies of correspondence between Sheikh Fuad and Ibn Saud. It appears that the initiative came from Sheikh Fuad. What is not clear is why Ibn Saud should have taken the trouble to send this agent just at this time. It is possible that the British Government is not yet ready to make any move.

3. The "Umm-al-Kura" emphatically contradicts the rumour that there is a treaty between Nejd and the Iuam. Ibn Saud, it says, is on very good terms with the Iuam, but so he is with the Idrisi, he is absolutely neutral in the present struggle between them.

4. In addition to the British victims of the Tuf massacre, whose names were given in the Jeddah reports at the time, it now seems certain that a member of the Bombay family of Khandwari was killed—He, viz., \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_.

I have been thinking about you very much lately. I am glad to hear from you and hope you are well. I am still in the same old place, but I must write you now. I hope you will write soon. Love, your mother.

[illegible][illegible]

On the other hand, it is also true that King Alon asked for  
the restoration of his name.

He has been wantonly attacked by Ibn Saud. Although in the right, he has always been willing to make peace. He allowed Philby, Rihani, Sayyid Tahir and Sheikh Fudal all to try to mediate, and he was prepared to welcome any attempt His Majesty's Government might like to make to secure peace. But to give facilities for the free movement of pilgrims and to allow the caravan to pass through the lines would be to allow a messenger from this agency to pass through the lines to tell Ibn Saud that he had outside support, and if he (Ali) were required to let food stuffs pass through the lines, it would be a further encouragement to him to continue his war. It was a short-sighted view, but political, and was the only one that could be taken from a political point of view which were perfectly correct. It was a necessary condition for the peace of the region, and was the only one that could be taken from a political point of view.

The King spoke with deep emotion. I think that the arrival of pilgrimage time with Ibn Saud still in Mecca has suddenly made him realise (though he still hardly dares to admit it, even to himself) that his cause is lost. Moreover, the subject of the Caliphate has become a pawn in the Caliphate Committee's game against His Majesty's Government.

can hardly arrive there before about the 6th June. The Indian pilgrims at the two, or at most three, shiploads of pilgrims, which is all that will be able to reach Rabugh in time for the Haj.

It has been impossible to inform Ibn Saud from here that pilgrim ships are making for the Red Sea coast of the Gulf of Aden, and that they will call at Massawa Port Sudan or elsewhere.

No. 95

- H. M. S. "Delphi" to Admiralty.*—(Received June 16.)

(Unnumbered ) [ V18 " Rinella " W, T ]  
(Telegraphic)

June 16, 1925

Later Amir Abdullah handed me two letters for transmission. Letters identical in substance, but one addressed Secretary of State for His Majesty the King. —

"I have been informed by Commanding Officer, H M S 'Delhi,' that it has been chosen by British Government that I should go to Cyprus with my family to visit His Majesty King George V. I have been offered to go to Jaffa or Haifa, but if His Majesty will not permit me to go to either of these places, I wish to proceed from there to London to see His Majesty."

(Repeated Commander in chief, Mediterranean)

No. 043

*Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Consul Bullard (Jeddah)*

(No 43)  
(Telegraphic) R

My telegram No 42 of 14th June. Situation at Akaba.  
 Hussein replied to message therein by a telegram to the King asking whether he might not be allowed to proceed to Jaffa or Haifa in preference to Cyprus. An answer has been sent to Hussein to-day to the effect that His Majesty's Government desire to show him every consideration possible, but regret that it is not possible to accept his offer. He has, however, agreed to accept the offer of the Government to proceed to Cyprus on 18th June.

You should inform Alt of the above  
(Reputed to Cairo, No 151 )

No. 97

Admiralty to H. H. S. "Delhi"

10. CLARENCE your No 2030 of 15th June  
Reply to ex King Hussein :—

"His Majesty's Government, whilst they are desirous of showing every possible consideration to ex King Hussein, regret that they do not find it possible to arrange for his reception at Jaffa or Haifa. They are glad that he is disappointed as Jaffa or Haifa are not possible, to accept their offer to convey him to Cyprus and to Greece. His Majesty's Government and they hope his Majesty will regard this arrangement as acceptable and proceed to Cyprus in H.M.S. 'Delhi' on 15th June."

(Repeated to Commander in chief, Mediterranean, No. 265)

R. W. BULLARD.



No 98

Consul Bullard to Government of India (Foreign Department) — (Repeated to Foreign Office; Received June 18)

(No 98)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, June 17, 1925

YOUR telegram No 741 S

I am confident that report is reliable

Provided it is not mentioned that release of the two Malabari pilgrims was due to intervention of representative of agency, I think news might be allowed to become known gradually and unofficially. I did not record the men's names, &c., and clerk has left for Rabigh

No 99

H.M.S. "Delhi" to Admiralty. — (Received June 20)

(Unnumbered)

(Via Rindella W/T)

(Telegraphic)

June 20, 1925

H.M.S. "Delhi" with ex King of Hedjaz sailed from Suez

(Addressed to Admiralty; Intelligence Staff Officer, Malta, and Commander in chief, Mediterranean. Repeated to "Cornflower")

No 100

Mr. Henderson to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. — (Received June 20)

(No 227)

(Telegraphic)

Cairo, June 19, 1925

FOLLOWING from Acting Governor-General of Sudan

"I am informed that 'Gorgistan,' another pilgrim ship is under orders of owners to leave Kamaran for Port Sudan. I have telegraphed to Isba asking for her and similar ships to be held at Kamaran pending instructions from His Majesty's Government

"While ready to assist Government of India, I would like to emphasise undesirability of overcrowding Port Sudan until situation is clearer"

No 101

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. — (Received June 21)

(No 102)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, June 20, 1925

NEWS from "Cornflower" and Indian doctor at Rabigh is that landing of pilgrims from first two steamers nearly completed by evening of 19th June. First caravan due to leave for Mecca 20th June. No interference from blockading vessel (Sent to India.)

No 102

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. — (Received June 21)

(No. 101)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, June 20, 1925

FOREIGN Secretary said on 19th June that he had heard two British steamers and a British ship were at Rabigh and that pilgrims were being landed under protection of His Majesty's Government. I refused to give him a lead by answering this question

I judge from description of Rabigh harbour given by commanding officer of sloop that entrance, which is very narrow, could be immediately watched by one

steamer on permanent guard, and that if blockading vessel had seized pilgrim ships it would have been hardly possible to argue that blockade was ineffective and illegal.

It is characteristic of Ali that he incurs all odium of hindering pilgrimage, but declined to take one step which would have made his interference effective.

Later. — Hedjaz Government are giving out that fear of man-of-war prevented their stopping pilgrim ships.

(Sent to India)

E 3679 1780 91]

No. 103.

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. — (Received June 22)

(No. 54.)

Sir,

Jeddah, June 9, 1925

I HAVE the honour to enclose a note on slavery in the Hedjaz

Copies of this despatch and of the note are being sent to Nigeria, Singapore, Khartum, Cairo and the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Patrol

I have, &amp;c

R W BULLARD

Enclosure in No 103

A Note on Slavery in the Hedjaz, with Suggestions for checking it.

THE Hedjaz is probably as keen a market for slaves as ever it was. There is no sign that the practice of keeping slaves is dying out. In the towns, free servants working for wages are relatively rare; nearly all families which can afford it keep slaves, both male and female. Slave-owning is common among the tribes also. So general is slavery in the Hedjaz that even some British Indians were found, a year ago, to have been in the habit of keeping slaves. Domiciled Indians, Javanese and other elements of foreign origin follow the general practice. The seal of official and social approval is set on the horrible traffic by the exclusive use of slave eunuchs as guardians of the shrine at Mecca.

2. Not infrequently natives of the Yemen are found as slaves in the Hedjaz. There are also a few women from the Far East, and in rare cases Indians have been stolen, yadun. The slaves are of various races. They are classed as Abyssinians, Sudanese and Takruni. "Abyssinian" covers all persons belonging to the black race, whether from Abyssinia or elsewhere. They may be from Italian or other adjacent territory. "Sudanese," natives of either Anglo-Egyptian or French Sudan, and "Takruni" (more correctly Takruri), all West Africans, whether they are from Nigeria, the Congo, the Cameroons, French West Africa or elsewhere.

3. The enslavement of Yemenis, who are natives of the Arabian peninsula and are often kept in slavery in their own country, stands on a different footing, from our point of view, from that of the slaves from Africa. To stop it would require measures which it is useless to hope for at present. It is therefore excluded from the scope of this memorandum.

4. It appears to have become rather the thing in the Hedjaz, among rich people, to have eunuchs and slaves. The slaves are of various races. They are rare in the towns and more common in the country. The price of a slave is about 1200 riyals and a eunuch is about 1700 riyals. The slaves are of various races. They are classed as Abyssinians, Sudanese and Takruni. "Abyssinian" covers all persons belonging to the black race, whether from Abyssinia or elsewhere. They may be from Italian or other adjacent territory. "Sudanese," natives of either Anglo-Egyptian or French Sudan, and "Takruni" (more correctly Takruri), all West Africans, whether they are from Nigeria, the Congo, the Cameroons, French West Africa or elsewhere.

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(13631)

N 2

5. The supply of African slaves is maintained in two ways. The first is the more spectacular one of slave-raiding. This applies almost exclusively to Abyssinia and to the Somali coast. The second is the more ordinary one of supply from the Yemen or Asir. They are more rarely brought up to the Hedjaz by dhow. The common procedure is to sell the slaves at Madi, in Asir. Those intended for the Hedjaz are then marched up by land.

Such evidence as is available here shows that the majority of the slaves are shipped from near Tajura, in French Somaliland.

6. There is another method of supply which I believe is responsible for by far the larger number of cases of slavery, viz., the enslavement of Africans who have come or been brought to the Hedjaz for some religious purpose, usually the pilgrimage. I give a few typical cases, drawn from the experience of the last two years.—

A man and his wife were attacked by Bedouin. One man is killed, the wife and brother of another are carried off into slavery.

The headman of a village in the Sudan is coming on the pilgrimage. He persuades several people to let their young sons go with him, this will enhance his importance, and in return the boys will perform the pilgrimage at his expense. Arrived in Mecca he sells the boys.

A child comes on the pilgrimage with its father or mother. The parent dies, and the child is then sold by anyone who can get hold of it.

A man of learning in Nigeria offers to take a young boy with him to Mecca to put him to school. In Mecca he sells the boy.

A Nigerian marries a widow with a young daughter. They come on the pilgrimage and he sells the daughter.

The headmen of the various African communities in Jeddah and elsewhere in the Hedjaz are well known to the Powers.

7. The Powers and especially from His Majesty's Government) at various times during the latter half of the 19th century, and under the Ottoman Constitution of 1868 the status of slavery ceased to exist in the Ottoman Empire. These measures were not very effective in the Hedjaz, where slave-owning was so firmly rooted and the source of supply so near, and where the Ottoman Government was obliged to compromise with local opinion on many points; but there was one provision which was of value, viz., that which provided for the manumission of African slaves. This was in accordance with Chapter IV of the General Act of the Brussels Conference, of which Turkey was a signatory. Article 71 of the Act provided that "diplomatic and consular agents . . . of contracting Powers shall . . . give their assistance to the local authorities, in order to assist in repressing the slave trade." What happened in practice was that slaves would take refuge with one of the foreign consuls at Jeddah or elsewhere (at Jeddah it was usually the British, sometimes the French consul), and the consul would then apply to the local authorities for their release.

I learn from a French consul who was at Jeddah before the war, as many as thirty slaves were taken refuge with the British and French consulates. The Turkish authorities grew alarmed at the discontent which this aroused among the people of Jeddah, and tried to restrain the efforts of His Britannic Majesty's consul by telling him that if he continued to show such activity in the liberation of slaves, they would not be answerable for his safety, except within the city walls. His Britannic Majesty's consul continued both to free slaves and to take rides and walks on the desert, with no untoward results.

8. The practice of manumission at the instance of the British representative in Jeddah seems to have fallen into abeyance during the war—no doubt because the British military mission was otherwise engaged, and it seems not to have been until about 1921 or 1922, when the Jeddah agency began to settle down to a more normal life, that the slavery question arose again. It was then found that the new king proposed to chastise slaves with scorpions. He took up an uncompromising attitude and in spite of remonstrances from His Majesty's Government, maintained it until the end of his reign. It was this. Slavery is legal according to the Koran, and he, therefore, could not prevent it in his territory, all slaves come from or

through territories controlled by European Powers, and these Powers had only to stop potential slaves from reaching the Hedjaz. He once freed a Sudanese, but only because the slave had been sold into slavery by other Sudanese and he wanted to convince the British agency that it was our people who were responsible. During my sixteen months' service in Jeddah before the abdication of King Hussein, only one slave—a Sudanese woman with a small child—applied to this agency for assistance. Several slaves have stated since that they were so much afraid of King Hussein that they did not dare to run away while he was king. The case of the Sudanese woman was taken up very strongly. She had actually been sold in the presence of the Governor of Jeddah after evidence had been given that she had recently come from the Sudan, and the Governor took great credit to himself for insisting on the woman's child being sold with the mother and not to a different master. King Hussein showed the greatest ill-will in the matter, and it was only after the strongest protests from this agency that the woman was sent away to the Sudan. In at least two cases in which my Netherlands colleague was concerned, King Hussein practised the meanest deceit. The Netherlands consul demanded the release of two girls who had been sold into slavery. In the presence of the Netherlands vice-consul (a Javanese) he handed over the charge of the girls to a disinterested third person and promised that they should be sent to Jeddah, but he profited by the departure of the Netherlands consul on leave shortly afterwards to allow them all to be taken back into slavery.

9. The outrageous attitude of King Hussein drove the Jeddah representatives of the four Powers to a scheme which it was hoped would tend to check at least the grosser abuses. The essence of it was that the four Powers should make joint representations to King Hussein, in which, while not admitting that the detention in slavery of any human being is legitimate, they should confine themselves to the suppression in the Hedjaz of the slave trade. They hoped that King Hussein would at least give written assurances on this point, and that the Powers could perhaps then induce or compel him to promise at least to instruct his officials to inform the consul concerned whenever it came to their notice that a foreign subject was being held in slavery in the Hedjaz.

The scheme was not proceeded with. Probably it was too optimistic in any case, and King Hussein's fanaticism, obstinacy, and resentment at what might appear foreign interference, would have been too strong for the Powers.

10. Soon after King Hussein's withdrawal from Jeddah to Akaba, African slaves went to any other foreign representative, but, except for a very few Abyssinians who went to the Italian consulate, all the runaways seem to have come to the British consul. The slave trade, but it is due partly to the fact that all Sudanese and all "Takranis" are considered vaguely as British subjects.

The question threatened to become embarrassing. The flood began just when the agency might at any moment need all its time and all its space for British refugees. The King was minded on the question of slavery. He declares that "after the war" the importation of human beings for the purpose of slavery, and even the sale of slaves within the Hedjaz, will be forbidden and suppressed, and that something at present his power is limited. This weakness makes him, on the one hand, unable to resist any reasonable demand this agency may make, and on the other, very profit in the institution of slavery. It was not possible for this agency to deny the right of asylum altogether in exchange for promises which, in my opinion, Ali will find the slavery question too hard, to create serious political troubles for the Hedjaz Government at the present time. Another reason for not carrying the matter with too high a hand is that we do not know what attitude Ibn Saud would adopt if he took Jeddah, if he proved difficult, the stronger the position taken up in Ali's time the more humiliating to His Majesty's Government it would be to have to recede



from it. Finally, a compromise was made. Slaves are allowed to take refuge in this agency, but in limited numbers. So far as possible the number kept to be sent away by the next steamer is limited to two or three, subsequent applicants are advised to return home quietly and wait for another boat, unless there is reason to believe that the slave's intention to escape has become known and that he will be ill-treated. A list of the slaves and their masters is sent privately to the Foreign Secretary. Unless he has some cause to show to the contrary (as e.g., where the slave is accused of having stolen money from his master) the slaves are then sent away by a convenient steamer. Under even this restricted scheme the agency has sent away nearly forty slaves during the last few months. Most of them were sent to the Sudan, but four Abyssinians who took refuge in this agency were given free passages to Maasawa on an Italian boat at the instance of the Italian consul.

11. There is no doubt that the measures taken by the European Powers outside the Hedjaz exercise a check on the importation of African slaves. The mere fact of the naval patrol discourages the slaver to some extent, and the capture of a slave ship by H.M.S. "Cornflower" in 1922, the release of about thirty slaves, and the condemnation of the slavers at Aden is believed to have exercised a deterrent effect for some considerable time. Another check was administered about a year ago, when, as the result of information obtained from the Italian consulate in Jeddah, a slaver was captured at Aden and he and several of his accomplices were tried and condemned to imprisonment and fines by a native court in Jibuti. Such measures, however, are not sufficient by themselves to stop the lucrative trade in Abyssinian slaves, and they do not touch the other half of the problem—the enslavement of Africans who come or are brought to the Hedjaz in connection with the pilgrimage or some other religious duty.

12. I do not think that any serious advance towards the suppression of slavery—or even of the enslavement of our own people—in the Hedjaz can be hoped for without the adoption of the following measures—

- (1.) Control, through the passport system or by other means, at the place of origin and or the port of final departure. An essential part of this control would be—
- (2.) Some restriction on the taking of children or young persons to the Hedjaz.
- (3.) The establishment of a committee of European representatives in Jeddah. This should be associated with—
- (4.) A scheme whereby the slaves can be sent out of the country (if they wish to go) immediately after manumission.

#### *Control at the Place of Origin and/or the Port of Final Departure.*

13. This applies to the Far East and to Africa.

- (1.) It has just been decided to compel all persons sailing for the Hedjaz from Singapore or Penang to undergo a medical examination. This should check, if not quite abolish, the trade in Javanese and Chinese girls and women which, it is believed, has begun to spring up.
- (2.) The Nigerian Government decided some time ago that for many reasons the flow of slaves from Nigeria to the Hedjaz should be stopped. Mr. G. J. Lethem, the Resident of Bornu, has recently visited the Sudan and Jeddah to investigate this and other questions.

#### *Some Restriction on the taking of Children or Young Persons on the Pilgrimage*

14.—(1.) The application of such a measure at Singapore and Penang would once for all stop the flow of Far Eastern pilgrims to the Hedjaz for less than four or five months, and many stay for a second pilgrimage, or even for several years, and many of them bring their children with them. Probably a restriction of this kind is unnecessary in the Far East, there is no evidence of more than sporadic cases of the enslavement of children from Java and other Far Eastern territories.

(2.) It is essential, I think, to apply some such restriction in Nigeria and the Sudan. A suggestion to this effect was made in the Jeddah Pilgrimage Report for 1924, and Mr. Lethem, before he reached Jeddah, had arrived independently at a similar conclusion. The typical cases I have quoted in paragraph 6 explain the necessity for it. Of the cases with which I have been directly concerned or of which I have information, eight or nine out of ten relate to slaves who were brought to this country when they were very young and sold either by the person who brought them

or by someone into whose hands they happened to fall. An adult can make some attempt to resist being captured or sold, and, in any case, has a clear memory of his country and his language, and will not easily abandon hope of flight, but a child, who is taken from his parents, has no memory of his country or language, and even the names of its parents and its native place.

#### *The Revival of the practice of Manumission at the instance of any of the European Representatives in Jeddah*

15. It is intolerable that slaves, nearly all of whom are of foreign birth, should be worse off in the Hedjaz now than when the country was under the Turks. His Majesty's Government have a peculiar right to insist on this, since they were the chief instrument in the liberation of the Hedjaz, while, on the other hand, many, if not most of the slaves are from territories for which they are responsible.

Besides this very strong moral argument, there is a practical argument in favour of the old manumission policy as against a more limited scheme such as that put forward in August 1924, under which each Power would have claimed freedom only for natives of its own territories. In the first place, "Abyssinians" would benefit, and so would the Arabs, who are the most numerous slaves in the Hedjaz. Besides, the old policy is a practical one. It is based on the fact that, in the Hedjaz, there is no racial distinction (though tribal face-marks may serve as a guide) between natives of Abyssinia, of the Sudan, of the West African States, and of the Hedjaz. A practical policy is to insist on the old right to manumission of any African slave who takes refuge with the representative in Jeddah of any Power signatory of the Brussels Convention.

#### *Provision for the Repatriation to Africa of every Manumitted Slave who wishes to leave the Hedjaz*

16. This I consider to be an essential part of the scheme. There is reason to believe that a considerable proportion of the slaves who were manumitted before the war at the instance of foreign consuls were re-enslaved, and that was in the time of the Turks, when there was a foreign Government not entirely dependent on local favour. Even where an owner frees a slave voluntarily, in order to gain the approval of Heaven, which the Koran promises, he frequently retains the certificate of manumission, and the slave, if he is not sent away, is often sold to a wealthy Javanese pilgrim to buy slaves and set them free as an act of charity, and to receive flowers at charity bazaars. It is to be expected, then, that many of the slaves who are manumitted at the instance of foreign consuls will be re-enslaved. The only way to prevent this is to provide for the repatriation of every manumitted slave who wishes to leave the Hedjaz. I have found many cases where the slaves who were manumitted at the instance of foreign consuls were re-enslaved, and I have found many cases where the slaves who were manumitted at the instance of foreign consuls were re-enslaved.

When this paragraph was drafted I have found support for my contention in a circular sent to the Valis of the Ottoman Empire by the Minister of the Interior on the 6th January, 1901. It is to be found in Young's "Correspondence of the Ottoman Empire," volume II, p. 194. According to this circular, the British Consul at Constantinople had stated that not only were African slaves being introduced into the Ottoman Empire in spite of the prohibition of the traffic, but sometimes those who had been set free and provided with certificates of manumission were sent away into the provinces, where they naturally fell back into slavery.

17. If the manumission-repatriation scheme were approved, the details of repatriation could be worked out later. It must be decided where the freed slaves are to be sent, and how the fund to provide for them until they are freed and to pay for their passage to their home countries is to be raised. The expenses of the last few months have fallen on the charity fund of this agency, except that the Italian consul obtained free passages to Musawwa for four Abyssinians, but this arrangement cannot go on long, the fund will not stand it. All the slaves whom this agency has been instrumental in sending away, except five Abyssinians, have been sent to the Sudan, with the kind permission of the Governor, Red Sea Province, who readily agreed to take any freed African slaves (except Abyssinians, for whom I proposed to make other arrangements) that were sent to him from Jeddah.

I have already made privately to the Governor, Red Sea Province. It is that there should be in the Sudan an institution—under the control, perhaps, of some anti-slavery society or some missionary organisation—to which slaves would be sent as a matter of course. The Sudan authorities may not have difficulty in dealing with the two or three at a time whom we are sending at present, but the adoption of a scheme such as I have suggested would probably produce a flood of freed slaves with which it would be unreasonable to expect the Sudan Government to deal. There would be old and sick people who could not work, and who would be a burden on the community. It is better to give each case individual treatment. Moreover, to such a society Jeddah could send a representative, who would be able to see that the work was done properly. The foreign representatives here, especially the British, would have enough to do to secure manumission, and to be able to ship all freed slaves to the Sudan would simplify the work, the more so as the Sudan is the only territory near by to which there is a regular and fairly frequent service of steamers, and these steamers are British.

18. The suggestions I have made have this to recommend them: they require nothing of the Hedjaz authorities except recognition of the manumission procedure which was in force under the Turks and for which there is much more to be said now. Once that recognition was obtained we should be independent of the attitude of the Hedjaz people and of any particular Hedjaz ruler. If the ruler happened (a most improbable hypothesis) to be both opposed to slavery and able to enforce his views, so much the better; but he is more likely to be like Hussein, fanatical and reactionary, or like Ali, amiable but far too weak to take an unpopular line. He would not be likely to allow an illiberal religious policy which he himself disapproves to be followed in Mecca, because he cannot afford to alienate his more fanatical followers. The matter of slavery in which their prejudices and their interests would be all against him. For it must be admitted that no help in securing the abolition or limitation of slavery is to be expected from the people of the Hedjaz. Many decent people in England found arguments for slavery little more than a century ago, and in the United States much later. It is not to be wondered at, then, that the Hedjazi who—thanks mainly to the parasitical life he leads—is one of the basest creatures on earth, finds much to be said in favour of a system which provides him not only with cheap labour but also with as many concubines as he can afford to buy.

R W BULLARD

No. 104

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 22)*

(No. 103)

(Telegraphic) R.

Jeddah, June 22, 1925.

WAHABI withdrawal from neighbourhood of Jeddah. Ibn Saud written to foreign representatives saying that although military considerations necessitate changes in disposition of army, siege of Jeddah by no means abandoned, and that he guarantees the safety of pilgrim routes.

He has probably withdrawn to some place on the Mecca road which can be held by small force while bulk of Wahabis perform pilgrimage.

(Sent to India)

No. 105

*Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 23)*

(No. 104)

(Telegraphic) R.

Jeddah, June 23, 1925.

Mr. Chamberlain's letter of 20th June received in interview with Ibn Saud. Says he has despatched orders that forces sent against Akaba and Muana should not attack, giving as reason that King Hussein is leaving Akaba and that Transjordan will send no more troops or munitions of war that way.

(Sent to Jerusalem, Bagdad and Cairo)

E 3515 10 91]

No. 106

*Foreign Office to Consul Bullard (Jeddah).*

(No. 105)

Foreign Office, June 23, 1925.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 41, Secret, of the 18th May, describing the recent visit to Mecca of a representative of His Majesty's agency.

2. Mr. Chamberlain has read your report with interest and desires that you will convey in a formal manner to Munshi Hasanullah an expression of his great appreciation of the zeal, ability and discretion which the munshi showed in performing in difficult circumstances much valuable work on behalf of British interests in the course of his visit to Mecca.

3. I am to add that Mr. Chamberlain considers that you exercised commendable discretion in despatching the munshi on this mission.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT

E 3771 10 91]

No. 107.

*Question asked in the House of Commons, June 24, 1925.*

THE HEDJAZ.

Mr. Ponsonby asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the report of Akaba, in the Hedjaz, has been abandoned by King Hussein, into whose hands it has now fallen?

Answer

Mr. Amery: I have been asked to reply to this question. His Majesty's Government have not received any news regarding the Akaba. The Hedjaz, nor has its occupation by the Hedjaz ever had their formal consent. Ex-King Hussein, who retired thither from Jeddah after his abdication, has now left it at the request of His Majesty's Government and has transferred his residence to Cyprus. The Government of Transjordan is taking steps to assert its authority over Akaba.

Captain Wedgwood Benn: Was Transjordan to be delimited under the mandate?

Mr. Amery: No. I will answer a question of the hon. and gallant Member later on that subject.

[13551]



No. 108.

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. — (Received June 25)

(No. 105)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, June 24, 1925

ALL THREE steamers landed at Ra'igh without interference. Caravan arrangements appear to be quite satisfactory. (Sent to India)

No. 109

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. — (Received June 27)

(No. 106)

(Telegraphic) R

Jeddah, June 27, 1925

ALI received from Abdullah request for transfer of railway in Maan district. I telegraphed to His Majesty's Government asking if this question cannot be left open for the present to safe and have been sent to the War Office. I have also received a message from the British Consul in Maan, stating that the route for munitions of war and that in any case British control presumably cannot prevent that.

I have also received a message from the British Consul in Maan, stating that the route for munitions of war and that in any case British control presumably cannot prevent that.

No. 110

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. — (Received June 27)

(No. 107)

(Telegraphic) R

Jeddah, June 27, 1925

ABOUT 250 British pilgrims had drifted to Jeddah by various routes. Some 80 were Indian, 150 Nigerian.

At my request, Ali yesterday allowed them to pass through lines in order to proceed to Mecca.

(Sent to India)

No. 111

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul Bullard (Jeddah)

(No. 108)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, June 29, 1925

YOUR MESSAGE should be despatched to Ibn Saud, in continuation of that contained in my telegram No. 35 of the 27th May. —

His Majesty's Government still await a reply from your Highness regarding their suggestion that negotiations should be opened immediately with a view to the settlement of all outstanding points between yourself and Transjordan and Iraq. In accordance with the decision of His Majesty's Government communicated to you in their previous message, ex King Hussein has been established. Steps have also been taken to re-establish the authority of the Transjordan Government in the Maan Vilayet and Akaba. Your Highness will thus observe that His Majesty's Government have thus removed any possible ground for the supposition that territory for which they are responsible is being or will be used as a base for Hedjaz operations against Nejd.

In these circumstances, there can, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, no longer be any obstacle to the opening of negotiations for a

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comprehensive settlement of outstanding disputes. His Majesty's Government will be glad to learn that your Highness is willing to co-operate in the early initiation of the proposed negotiations, and to receive any suggestions that you may have to offer regarding the venue and the general conduct of the discussions.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 10, Jerusalem, No. 5, and Bushire, No. 5.)

No. 112

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. — (Received June 30)

(No. 108)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, June 29, 1925

ALI has at last recognized that he is beaten. Last straw is final refusal of Palestine troops to serve any longer without pay. He has had to promise to repatriate them to Maan within about three weeks.

Other causes are: (1) Complete lack of money and probability that Hussein will be driven out of Mecca; (2) fact that several thousand pilgrims reached Mecca from overseas (successful disembarkation of Indians, and especially stores, at Ra'igh was a very severe blow); (3) defeat inflicted on Hedjaz forces which, emboldened by withdrawal of Wahabis from immediate neighbourhood, ventured out a few miles.

Ali is appealing to His Majesty's Government (my immediate telegram to Foreign Office only), though I have not ceased to keep before him the principle laid down by His Majesty's Government that only on application of both sides could they intervene.

Ali may hang on a few weeks (if not attacked) through sheer irresolution, but he has lost the illusions which sustained him, and cannot last long.

(Sent to Simla, Bushire, Bagdad and Jerusalem.)

No. 113

Consul Bullard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. — (Received June 30)

(No. 109)

(Telegraphic) R

Jeddah, June 29, 1925

ALI urgently requests me to send His Majesty's Government message of which following is a summary: —

"I am confident that His Majesty's Government, who took such an important part in securing independence of the Hedjaz, do not desire to see critical situation continue. (Group undecypherable) Maan and Akaba and lack of money necessitating demobilisation of Palestine troops compel me to appeal to them. Neutrality does not exclude friendship. Moreover, war now known to be personal and political and not religious.

"I need favour long shown to me and my country by British Government. They are aware of my friendship.

"I accepted the throne only under pressure from the Hedjaz people and because of barbarity of the enemy to which my honour would not let me expose them. Sincerely desirous of stopping bloodshed, I beg His Majesty's Government to take steps which appear to be the best way to ward off calamity. I should be glad to learn their views on this request, which I am confident will not be fruitless."

## CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE.

E 11059 4300 65,

No. 114

*Foreign Office to Colonial Office*

S r,

*Foreign Office, January 15, 1925*

WITH reference to your letter of the 5th ultimo on the subject of ecclesiastical property in Palestine, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to inform you that he concurs in the terms of the proposed procedure, as outlined in paragraph 4 of the draft despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner enclosed therein, for conducting the enquiry referred to in article 3 of the Order in Council of the 25th July 1924.

2. The Secretary of State is, however, inclined to doubt whether it is desirable as suggested in the fourth paragraph of your letter, to acquaint the Council of the League of Nations now with the procedure which it is proposed to adopt for dealing with the case of Russian ecclesiastical property and to seek the Council's approval thereof.

3. As a general rule, Mr. Chamberlain considers it neither right nor desirable that the mandatory Power should ask the Council for approval of some administrative action contemplated in mandated territory, before that action has actually been taken, for the mandatory has full authority to conduct the administration of the mandated territory in such manner as he thinks fit, subject to his general responsibility to the League and to his observance of the terms of the mandate of which the Council assures itself by means of the annual reports submitted to it by the mandatory and scrutinised by the Permanent Mandates Commission. It is, moreover, known that the Council is reluctant either to sanction or to disapprove in advance any administrative action contemplated by the mandatory in the future, as may be seen from the minutes of the discussion at Geneva on the 25th September, regarding a proposed ban to the Administration of New Guinea.

4. The problems which have arisen in Palestine in connection with the Holy Places and Russian ecclesiastical property. These problems stand on a somewhat different footing from purely local administrative questions in a mandated territory, which are dealt with in the mandatory's annual report and considered by the Permanent Mandates Commission.

Under article 14 of the mandate, the responsibility for all decisions affecting the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites remains, under article 13 of the mandate, with the mandatory, i.e., His Britannic Majesty, not the Palestine Administration—who is responsible solely to the League of Nations, as represented by the Council.

5. In these circumstances it appears to Mr. Chamberlain that the special case now under consideration should be decided by His Majesty's Government on its merits as a matter of policy, and that the dominating element in that decision should be the question whether His Majesty's Government stand to lose or gain by the delay in the establishment of the Holy Places Commission, to which the attention of the Council would inevitably be called by a communication of the nature indicated in the last paragraph of your letter. This delay is solely due to the failure of the Council to agree on the constitution of that body; and the mere attempt to reach such agreement has given rise to unedifying political wrangles between the chief Roman Catholic States, in which it is clearly impossible for His Majesty's Government to intervene. Mr. Chamberlain is therefore of opinion that unless Sir H. Samuel considers it necessary from a local point of view to expedite the setting up of the Commission, it would be preferable to allow the matter to rest as long as possible.

6. It is, on the other hand, arguable that if the Council were informed of the proposed procedure for dealing with cases withdrawn from the competence of the Commission, ensure justice being done to the various Christian communities concerned, the States represented on the Council might be the more content not to resume the difficult task of the Commission. There can, however, be no certainty that the Council would regard the matter in this light, and Mr. Chamberlain feels that the balance of argument is on

the whole against any communication being made to the Council on the subject. He will be glad to learn whether Mr. Secretary Amery shares this view and is disposed to act accordingly.

7. I am further directed to enquire, with reference to paragraph 4 of your Office letter of the 24th October, whether the duties hitherto performed by the Spanish consul at Jerusalem in connection with Russian property have now been transferred to a trustee appointed by the Palestine Government.

I am, &amp;c

D. G. OSBORNE

[E 2727 214 65]

No. 115.

*Memorandum communicated by the United States Embassy, May 9, 1925.*

THE American Embassy refers to a note dated the 10th December, 1924, from His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and to the Embassy's reply dated the 19th December, 1924, relative to the question of the jurisdiction of the Palestinian authorities over United States citizens, and to the desirability of a continuance of the discussions relating to this subject since the conclusion of the Palestine Convention signed on the 3rd December, 1924, between the United States and Great Britain. Reference is also made to an informal enquiry of the Foreign Office as to whether the United States Government is prepared to proceed to the exchange of ratifications of the convention.

In particular, this correspondence raises again (1) the status of certain cases, involving American citizens or interests adjudicated by the Palestine courts in contravention of the capitulatory rights of the United States and in disregard of the provisions of the convention of 1922 and 1923, and (2) the necessity of this Government's assent to the imposition upon American citizens or interests of any dues or taxes not contemplated by the capitulatory régime, or to the collection from its nationals or interests of any increase in such dues or taxes.

The Embassy learns that, in disregard of the agreement between the American consul at Jerusalem and the legal secretary, eight judgments against American citizens or interests have been rendered by the Palestine courts, that two of such judgments have been executed without the assistance of the consulate, and that there is now pending in a Palestine court one case wherein an American citizen is named as defendant. In each of the cases referred to the consulate has lodged a written protest against the action of the Palestine authorities.

In making such protests the consul has based his action on the following considerations. Article 8 of the convention of the 3rd December, 1924, provides that it shall enter into effect only upon the exchange of ratifications by the contracting parties, article 8 of the mandate for Palestine (incorporated in the preamble to the convention) provides that, during the period of the mandate, "the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as such, shall not be applicable in Palestine," and the United States Government has consistently maintained the position that the privileges and immunities in question could be relinquished only by treaty agreement.

The conclusion logically to be drawn from the above facts is that, pending the exchange of ratifications of the convention of the 3rd December, 1924, the American citizens and interests involved in the above-mentioned cases, involving American citizens, which, under the capitulatory régime, were properly within the jurisdiction of the American Consular Court. And this view the United States Government maintains. That this conclusion was accepted in principle is shown by the above-mentioned agreement concluded in 1922 and 1923 between the consulate and the legal secretary of the Palestine Government.

Before proceeding to the exchange of ratifications of the convention of the 3rd December, 1924, the American Embassy, under the instructions of its Govern-



ment, is therefore desirous of ascertaining whether His Majesty's Government is prepared to give assurances in the following sense —

1. That the pending case will be dropped,
2. That the two judgments, already rendered by the Palestine courts and executed in disregard of the provisional agreement, will be cancelled, and that sums collected from American citizens without the assistance of the consulate will be refunded, and
3. That the six judgments, already rendered but not as yet executed, will not be executed after the exchange of ratifications

The American Embassy adds that, after the entering into effect of the convention of the 3rd December, 1924, the United States Government would, of course, have no objection to the retrial of the nine cases in question. A further reason for desiring these assurances is that, in some, if not all, of the cases in question, judgment was rendered in *absentia*, the American defendant having absented himself from the court of trial upon the advice of the American consulate and as a protest against the assumption of jurisdiction by the Palestine court.

The question of the imposition upon American nationals of the increased Palestine import duties which have not received the assent of the United States Government is reserved for further discussion

*United States Embassy London, May 4, 1925*

## CHAPTER IV.—SYRIA.

[E 239 239 89]

No. 116.

*Consul Smart to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 15)*

(No. 1.)

Sir,

*Damascus, January 15, 1925*

WITH reference to Mr. Vaughan Russell's despatch No. 160 of the 14th October last, I have the honour to report that an *arrêté* of the High Commissioner (No. 2073 of the 3rd December, 1924, has now been published, definitely appointing Captain Carbillet Governor of the State of the Jebel Druze

I have a

W A SMART

[E 451/357/89]

No. 117.

*Consul-General Satow to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 20)*

(No. 4.)

Sir,

*Beirut, January 9, 1925*

DURING the last few weeks of 1924 the Administration was, so to speak, in a state of partially suspended animation. General Weygand had left on the 5th December, and General Sarrail his successor, had not yet arrived. It was realised that many changes would occur, and the natural tendency therefore was to mark time.

In May 1923, shortly before the arrival of General Weygand, there had been an outbreak of brigandage and murder in the Shouf district, and the old feuds between Druzes and Maronites showed signs of revival in a serious form. To deal with the situation special measures were taken, a kind of civil court martial was instituted, and the situation was brought under control. The measures succeeded, and towards the end of 1924 the Military Governorship of the Shouf was abolished.

In August last several cases of raiding by brigands from Transjordan occurred in the Damascus State, regarding which Mr. Smart fully reported. Thanks to the energy of the Palestine authorities, steps were taken to deal with the situation, which relieved and reassured the French authorities, who had become seriously alarmed.

The Bekaa brigands were, I think, in part at any rate a sequel to this. The Bekaa brigands were reputed to be in touch with their colleagues in Transjordan. Even if they had not been, their action, and, after a French non commissioned officer had been killed on the Baalbeck road, this action was taken by a column under Colonel Carron. The brigands and their leaders, of whom the chief was Milhem Kassam, were forced to surrender, and the villages of the district were for the third time disarmed, the number of weapons collected being very considerable.

Owing to better relations with the Turks, raids in the north by bands known as "chelehs" ceased as from the end of March while no trouble of any importance occurred in the eastern desert. The statement made on the departure of General Weygand that, during his tenure of office, public security had been improved and order maintained rests therefore on a substantial basis of fact. This does not mean, of course, that crime is non-existent but if it be taken into consideration that many parts of the country, including the Lebanon, are still very backward and that only a few years have elapsed since the war which left the country well stocked with arms, public security may be said to be good. The extent to which motor transport is used everywhere is a proof of this, and may even in part be a cause.

There is nothing very special to relate in regard to the administration of the State of the Great Lebanon. One innovation introduced was the separation of the offices of Governor and of delegate of the High Commissioner, which had up till then been held by the same person. Complaints are made that there are still too many officials, and that in the remoter districts the poorer classes of the community are apt to be treated in an arbitrary fashion. Naturally, in these districts there

are no resident French advisers. A body known as the Council of State was created during the year with a native president and two members, one Lebanese and one French. Owing to death the Representative Council acquired a new president in the person of Me. Emile Eddé, a local lawyer.

After the withdrawal of Commandant Trahsud, a personally charming French naval officer, who was from all accounts a pretty useless Governor, and interregnum occurred, during which a M. Aubouard, of the French Colonial Service, was in temporary charge of the Great Lebanon. About the end of June General Vandenberg took up the post. He is an old soldier with a distinguished record whose last active service had been on the Rhine at Wiesbaden. Despite his 68 years, he has shown a surprising energy and capacity for hard work. He has endeavoured to give as much personal supervision as possible and to establish the principle that the best men regardless of the religious confession to which they belong, should be employed. His services have, however, recently been dispensed with in circumstances which are described elsewhere.

As regards finance, the Great Lebanon appears to flourish. In 1923 the receipts of the State were £2,011,000 (Syrian) and £2,500,000 (French). The estimated receipts for the financial year ended the 31st December were £2,158,400 (Syrian) and £2,600,000 (French). In the estimates for the year ending the 31st December, 1925, receipts figure at £2,482,050 (Syrian). All these figures only refer to direct taxation collected by the State. There has been no fresh taxation, and the increased yield is due to more efficient collection. Salaries have been increased, and various expenditure has been incurred, or is contemplated in connection with a motor car and official residence for the Governor. There is, of course, also indirect taxation collected by the Public Debt, while the customs revenue is collected by the High Commission and credited to the various States on a *pro rata* basis. I understand that a considerable surplus over the estimate is likely this year.

[illegible]

Runes have a very special importance to the Lebanese. It is held and rightly that one of the miseries of this country should be its utter poverty. To get the visitors to their country, we are inclined to entice them to derive some pleasure from their stay in the way of exhibiting its rich and varied beauties in a special manner. I have only this to say that, on my last tour of inspection, I was stimulated at between fifteen and twenty thousand persons, most of them from Egypt, but Persian, American, Italian, and other foreign tourists. It is now feared that owing to the short-sighted rapacity of the Lebanese, many of these visitors went away disappointed.

It is unnecessary to say much about the importance of Beirut of the trans-desert motor routes which have been in regular operation for over a year. As a means of transport for passengers and goods these routes is absolutely established. As routes for passenger traffic they connect the inland centers of the interior and lead to the coast, a matter which the French authorities are well interested in. It is for economic reasons whether the hopes cherished are justified. One thing, at any rate, seems clear and that is that the passenger rates must with increasing competition decrease.

As regards the Education Department of the Great Lebanon, one paper has remarked with a certain bitterness that it consists of a director and several offices, but produces no results. It is, of course, the declared policy of the Administration to leave, for the time being at any rate, secondary education in the hands of foreign institutions, religious or lay. But too great a proportion of the educational facilities appears to be concentrated in or near Beirut. In certain outlying regions there are still no schools, either primary or secondary. Beirut with two universities

St. Joseph (Jesuit) and American, turns out an unceasing flow of doctors, dentists, and lawyers. What seems to be as much needed as anything are facilities for technical and agricultural instruction. The Beirut "Ecole des Arts et Métiers" has been reopened, but it seems to be working only in a modest way. Also, a normal school for training teachers was opened during the year.

To an onlooker it seems as if agriculture were rather neglected. The Government, on the whole, appears to adopt rather a passive attitude towards it. It is especially strange that no active measures are taken to combat the diseases of orange and kindred trees, which are obviously doing much harm. After all, even if the orange groves of Tripoli and Sidon cannot rival those of Jaffa, these are, at any rate a source of revenue.

The silk industry has certainly revived, and has regained much of the ground lost during the war. The authorities have done their best to aid and encourage this industry. Recently fears have been expressed as to the harm likely to result to it from the ever increasing use of artificial silk. Competent authorities in France have expressed the opinion that these fears are baseless. They have, however, pointed out that the Lebanese silk is prepared in a primitive fashion, and that to this fact is due the existence in France of an unsold stock of this silk. Until more modern methods of preparation and winding are introduced, local producers would do well to export only cocoons which can be wound in France.

More could undoubtedly be done to profit by the fruit-growing possibilities of the country, and I believe that an effort to develop the export of fruit to Egypt is to be made. As regards cereal crops, some drainage work has been undertaken in the Bekaa plain, which is intended to render its southern extremity less liable to flooding and therefore both more productive and more healthy. The possibilities of cotton-growing have been mentioned. The only cotton mill in Syria is a small one at Hama, but a new one is being built at Aleppo. M. Barre, who is connected with the Banque de Syrie et du Grand Liban, was here in the interests of a company known as the "Société colonnière de Syrie," which is to put up a cotton ginning plant at Hama. The company will be a joint one. The Comptoir d'Agence et de Tunisie is financially interested in this company.

Various schemes for granting concessions for the development of water power for the building of hotels and for the creation of a sewerage system in Beirut have been under discussion, but nothing has so far materialised. The question of hotels is apparently inextricably bound up with the question whether gambling should or should not be allowed in the Lebanon. At present it is forbidden by law but it is a pastime which makes a strong appeal to the natives and probably also to many of the summer visitors who have at present little else to occupy their time.

Although there is no society of which the avowed aim is to create a "Brighter Lebanon," the installation of electric light in the various Lebanese summer resorts is actually bringing this about. To cite a few examples, the Hotel de Ville, owned by a group of local notables and the place is a first class hotel.

[illegible][illegible]

It is a very difficult outlook for a North American to be looking at. It is never difficult to believe that such a thing could be downward as it can be contemplated.



As regards the Alaouite State, which is nominally within my district, I can, as I have never visited it, say nothing at first hand. The district has up till now only a nominal Governor, but has been since the French occupation (I was captured recently at Aleppo) and M. Cayla, the present Governor. It is reputed to be prosperous, and the town of Latakia, its capital, has, from all accounts, made considerable progress, a statement which I should like to confirm by a personal visit this spring. The State is now an independent entity, having cut loose from the Syrian Government, and is now, I understand, being organized as a separate State, during the past year provided with a Council of its own, but I should imagine that this body is well under the control of the Governor.

As far as I can judge, the people in the two States which form this consular district are not so well off as in the past. The franc is unfortunately unstable and the commercial hinterland of Beirut has permanently decreased in size. Unless the new High Commissioner introduces some very startling changes, I imagine, unlikely, there seems to be no reason why things should not go forward, steadily if slowly.

I have &  
H. E. SATOW

E 541/471/89]

No. 118.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 31.)

Paris, January 30, 1925.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been elected to the office of Justice of the Peace for the year 1900, in the several townships of the County of York, Ontario, at the annual election held on the 2nd day of November, 1900, at the County Court House, in the City of Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

"I can affirm that nothing is further from the truth than to say that the Government of Mustafa Kemal is determined to claim some part of Syrian territory. In making this statement, I speak as the negotiator of the Angora Treaty. The truth is that after long discussions between Mustafa Kemal and myself, the frontiers were determined in all good faith on both sides, without reserve. The position taken up by the Turks is the natural result of the new conceptions upon which the Angora Government is founded. Modern Turkey has accepted from the very beginning that the penalty of her action in joining with the Central Powers during the war was the loss of all her non-Turkish possessions. Since it is one of the principles of Turkey's present policy not to occupy territory which is not Turkish, we may be assured that the Government of Angora will keep its word.

"Since, however, certain elements of the Turkish population have of necessity remained on the French side of the frontier, and since there are Turkish interests on both sides of the line from Alexandria to Djerablous, the Angora Government

To assume from this that the Turkish Government is anxious to reconquer those territories which it has recognised as being Syrian is more than an error— it is injustice. We run the risk of creating artificially an 'irredentism' which does not really exist, and, under the pretext of defending French interests, we shall do them grave harm. Our policy should be to maintain that the frontier has been fixed in all good faith between the two nations in definitive. But at the same time a policy of complete friendship should be carried on on both sides of

the frontier, so that no boundary incident can arise. The greater our determination to remain in Syria grows, the more friendly must our policy towards Turkey become. Without this, Syria can only be a millstone around the neck of France."

I have, &c.  
ERIC PHIPPS.

[ E 1135 1135/89 ]

No. 119.

Consul Hough to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 25.)

No. 21. (Confidential)

Alenpo, February 12, 192

I HAVE the honour to submit the following notes on the present state of feeling among the Turkish element of the population of the Alexandria sanjak. My sources of information are too varied for enumeration, but I have no reason to doubt that the statements are accurate.

2 The Turkish attempt to create an "irredentist" movement may be said to have definitely failed. While the Turks on this side of the border have no active sympathy for the French, the reflection that, if their homes were a few miles further north, they would be liable to the hardships and miseries of service in the Turkish army is a powerful motive rather to deter the French borderers. As for some time they are not averse, on general principles, from giving the French Administration as much trouble as is consistent with the maintenance of their fortunate position. Thus, formerly they were in active sympathy with the marauding bands that came over the border and now, never engaged in a fight with the French, they find an intolerable nuisance to their own affairs and by arriving at the conclusion that they would be ill advised to continue assisting a movement whose aim is the incorporation of their own villages in a Turkish province, they have decided to stop. The final result is that such Turkish "chétés" as have recently crossed the border have been promptly seized by the villagers themselves and handed over to the French authorities. The French have even entrusted the mukhtars of the villages with rifles with which to defend themselves against the "chétés."

I quote a Turkish official of official standing, explaining a good deal of the apparent pro-Turkish feeling that still exists. His view is that, so long as Turkish elements maintain an affection of "irredentism," their favour will be sought by the French, their various demands will be granted, where possible, and they will be a strong and privileged power, while if they allowed the French to understand that they were entirely content with their mandate, there is almost certainly a good deal of truth in this.

of moving and trapping unmolested and of obtaining a good price for their products.

I have, &c.  
W. HUGH

E 1082 362/66

No. 120.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).*

[illegible]

(indicated thus = || = || = || on the accompanying map\*) upon the right bank of the Tigris was thus included in Syria.

3. The frontier between Syria and Mesopotamia, as laid down temporarily in article 1 of the Franco-British Convention signed at Paris on the 23rd December, 1920, is described as (a) the Tigris from Jazira as far as the boundary of the former vilayets of Diarbekir and Mosul, i.e., up to the point marked "A" on the accompanying map; and (b) from that point as following the aforesaid boundary of the former vilayets southwards as far as Roumelan-Kosul. Section (a) of this line is indicated thus o - o - o - o - o on the map, and section (b) thus + + + + +.

4. The boundary laid down in the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, has never been delimited on the spot, as provided in article 2; and in actual practice the boundary between Syria and Iraq has, since the signature of that convention, always been regarded as a straight line from the junction of the Khabur and Tigris to Tel-Roumelan (indicated thus - - - - - on the map). The junction of the Khabur and Tigris, together with the village of Faish-Khabur immediately to the south of that junction, have been occupied by the British, for obvious strategic reasons, ever since the Mosul Vilayet was taken over from the Turks in 1918, and the line laid down by the Council of the League of Nations at Brussels on the 30th October last as representing the status quo upon the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne (24th July, 1923) starts from the junction of the Khabur and the Tigris.

5. Technically, however, by the Anglo-French Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, Syria extends along the Tigris as far south of that junction as the point marked "A" on the accompanying map.\*

6. In July 1923, French officers visited Faish-Khabur and their escorts toured the area on the right bank of the Tigris. It is not known whether any French posts are situated on the right bank of the Tigris south of Tel-Roumelan. The Turkish point "A" is situated on the Tigris opposite the British posts south of the junction of the Khabur and the Tigris.

7. The British Government has never accepted the Turkish proposals for the modification of the Franco-Turkish frontier line between Nisibin and Jazira. As far as it was possible to ascertain accurately what the Turkish proposals were, they appeared to be a request for territory west and north of a line running from Jazira through Anjiwa and Maar to Girzerin. From Girzerin the line turns west and passes somewhat north of Hakeim to Girzerak, proceeding thence to Hakeim and thence westward in a line roughly the same distance southwards and more or less parallel to the Nisibin-Jazira frontier line as fixed by the Angora Agreement. It was only possible to note the names somewhat hastily from the map shown to the member of my staff by M. Clinchant, who agreed to the names being noted.

8. I should be glad if your Excellency will cause discreet enquiries to be made at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the subject with a view to clarifying their attitude as regards the regions indicated in the preceding paragraphs.

I am, &c

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 1493 362 65]

No. 121.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 13)

(No. 625. Confidential.)

Sir,

Paris, March 12, 1925.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 803 of the 7th March, I have the honour to report that a member of my staff called at the Quai d'Orsay yesterday afternoon and raised the question of the position in the section of Syrian territory separating the western frontier of Iraq from Turkey.

The circumstances regarding the frontier of this district as described in paragraph 8 of your despatch were explained to me by a member of my staff at the Quai d'Orsay. It was pointed out that in view of the fact that the southern

\* Not reproduced.

portion of the frontier between Syria and Mesopotamia, as laid down in the Franco-Turkish Convention of the 23rd December 1920, had never been delimited on the spot and of the fact that the territory south of the line between the junction of the Tigris and Khabur rivers and Tel-Roumelan still remain in British occupation, it was clear that considerable uncertainty prevailed regarding the whole district. Moreover, it was understood that while there were no French posts in the area in question, it was possible that Turkish posts existed south of Jazira and west of the Tigris. It was, of course, a matter of great importance to His Majesty's Government that the Turks should not have access to the territory on the right bank of the Tigris, south of Jazira, as it was quite clear that their presence in such proximity to the Iraq frontier would be undesirable.

The head of the Département d'Asie stated that there was no intention whatever of allowing the Turks to penetrate into this region, nor of entering into any agreement for such a purpose. Such action would indeed not be consistent with the position of France as mandatory for Syria. M. Clinchant alluded to the statement made by the President of the Council in the Chamber of Deputies on the 23rd January, in which M. Herriot asserted that the French Government had no intention of handing over any portion of Syrian territory. This statement and a statement made by M. Franklin-Bouillon were reported in Mr. Phillips' despatch No. 25 of the 10th March.

With regard to the suggestion as to the absence of French and presence of Turkish posts in this area, M. Clinchant undertook to make enquiries from Beirut and to furnish further information.

As regards the facts mentioned in paragraph 4 of your despatch concerning the position of the point "A" on the map, it is worth noting that M. Clinchant expressed surprise that the correct point should be from Tel-Roumelan to the point "A" on the map enclosed in your despatch and not from Tel-Roumelan to the Tigris-Khabur junction. He seemed, in conversation at least, to be unaware of any question of the Tel-Roumelan-point "A" boundary. In the course of the conversation M. Clinchant showed a map indicating the demands which have been made by the Turkish Government in the negotiations now proceeding for the modification of the Franco-Turkish frontier line between Nisibin and Jazira. As far as it was possible to ascertain accurately what the Turkish proposals were, they appeared to be a request for territory west and north of a line running from Jazira through Anjiwa and Maar to Girzerin. From Girzerin the line turns west and passes somewhat north of Hakeim to Girzerak, proceeding thence to Hakeim and thence westward in a line roughly the same distance southwards and more or less parallel to the Nisibin-Jazira frontier line as fixed by the Angora Agreement. It was only possible to note the names somewhat hastily from the map shown to the member of my staff by M. Clinchant, who agreed to the names being noted.

A member of my staff pointed out that the Turkish proposals were not accepted and that there was no question whatever of their being accepted as regards the whole of the territory indicated on the enclosed tracé. In particular, one serious objection to the Turkish proposals was that a strip of land would be left between the Tigris and the line of Jazira-Girzerin, communication with which from the rest of Syrian territory would be most inconvenient. It seemed likely that such concessions as would be made on the basis of the Turkish demands would be made further to the west.

I have, &c

CRTWE

[E 2056 471/89]

No. 122.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 805.)

Sir,

Paris, April 2, 1925.

IN my telegram No. 102 of the 14th March I had the honour to report the departure of M. Franklin-Bouillon for Angora. Since that date there has been a plentiful crop of rumours as to the nature of M. Franklin-Bouillon's activities in Turkey. Yesterday a report appeared in the "Sans Fil" to the effect that an

\* Not reproduced.



arrangement had been reached for the retrocession to Turkey of Alexandretta, Antioch and Aleppo.

It was the influence of this report that the French Government issued a statement to the effect that English newspapers had announced that M. Franklin-Bouillon had been entrusted with negotiations in the name of the French Government regarding the cession of certain Syrian territories to Turkey. These reports were without any foundation. It should be observed, moreover, that M. Franklin-Bouillon had gone to Angora in a purely private capacity, and that in no way whatever had he received a mandate to carry on negotiations on behalf of the French Government.

This *démenti* is commented on in one or two of this morning's newspapers. The "Petit Parisien," for instance, after quoting the *démenti*, states that it must be observed on the other hand that the various questions outstanding between the two Governments are in a fair way of settlement. With regard to the reported cession of Antioch and Alexandretta, the "Petit Parisien" writes that there was never any question of their return to Turkey. There had, however, been a question of setting up a *Commission Administrative* to take care of the *Administration* had now been set up to the complete satisfaction of the Ottoman Government. With regard to the schools, out of forty scholastic establishments, twenty-two had adopted Turkish as their principal language, including the *lycée* at Antioch.

The "Petit Parisien" continues that the question of the delimitation of the Turco-Syrian frontier is equally on the point of settlement. Differences of opinion had only occurred in connection with a very small part of that frontier on the north-eastern extremity of Syria, where a mixed commission had examined the frontier. There was no difference of opinion with regard to that portion of the frontier which lay along the Haglud Railway. As regards the Ottoman debt, there were hopes of an early agreement regarding the payment of coupons. Negotiations with regard to these various matters were nevertheless within the competence of M. Sarraut, the newly appointed French Ambassador.

The "Sans Fil" in publishing the *démenti*, also refers to various information which it has received, tending to show that M. Franklin-Bouillon's conversations have, in fact, touched upon the special régime to be given to the Vilayets of Antioch, Alexandretta and Aleppo, and states that the Turks are very anxious to see the terms of the Angora Agreement put into force in this connection.

I have, &c.  
CREWF

No 123

Consul General Sarraut to Mr. Austen Chamberlain - (Received April 10)

No 2

DAMASCUS

Telegram No 2

Lord Balfour arrived without incident yesterday evening, and he proceeded on board where he will remain.

(Sent to Jerusalem)

No 124

Consul Smart to Mr. Austen Chamberlain - (Received April 10)

No 2

DAMASCUS

Beirut April 10, 1925

LORD BALFOUR arrived yesterday amidst hostile popular demonstrations. To-day police dispersed second hostile demonstration by firing over heads of the crowd. At least one of the crowd killed. Lord Balfour, on recommendation of French High Commissioner, left this afternoon by car for Beirut, where he will go straight on board Messageries Maritimes boat now in port.

(Reported to Jerusalem and Beirut.)

E 2446 1065 65

Consul Smart to Mr. Austen Chamberlain - (Received April 24)

(No. 59)

Damascus, April 14, 1925

In continuation of my despatch No. 57 of the 26th ultimo, and with reference to my telegram No. 2 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report that from the date of Lord Balfour's arrival in Palestine the agitation here against him continued without intermission in the press, in the Representative Council and by distribution of mourning ribbons and leaflets calling on the people to display their sympathy with their Palestinian brethren and their detestation of Zionism. A protest against the policy of Lord Balfour's declaration, signed by various notables and students, was sent to the League of Nations and to both British Houses of Parliament. On the 4th instant the Representative Council approved the despatch of a protest to the League of Nations through the French High Commissioner. The French version of this protest is enclosed herewith. The Council then suspended its sitting for five minutes in sign of mourning.

The High Commissioner at Jerusalem, asking me to reserve hotel accommodation for Lord Balfour's party and giving exact dates of its progress through Syria. This unfortunate telegram rendered impossible any mystery about his Lordship's movements.

The train by which the party was coming from Palestine was due to arrive at Damascus at 8 P.M. on the 5th instant. In order to evade the demonstration being organised to receive him, the train was delayed at Kadim, where it was met by M. Béjean, the French Adviser of Police, Nicolas Shalun, the native Acting Director of Police, and myself proceeded with cars to Kadim, the first station outside Damascus, and brought the party in by road to the Hotel Victoria, where we arrived shortly before the train, which we had caused to be delayed at Kadim, steamed into the Hedjaz Station.

The crowd at that station, finding that it had been tricked, came down the broad avenue leading to the bridge over the River Barada in front of the hotel, being swelled by many new recruits on the way. It would have been quite easy for the police to have held this bridge and thus denied access to the hotel site. The crowd, unhindered, gathered before the hotel and indulged in noisy manifestations. Cries

of "Death to the English" and "Death to the Zionists" were heard. The people to strike on the morrow and collect in the Omayyad Mosque to prevent Lord Balfour entering it. Finally, the police, mounted and unmounted, which, under the leadership of M. Béjean, were going to the station and hitherto remained curiously passive, began to react. About a score of the more obstreperous demonstrators were seized and carried off to the neighbouring police-station, and the crowd was eventually altogether dispersed.

The demonstrators, who were largely students of the Schools of Law and Medicine probably numbered a few hundreds.

Lord Balfour agreed not to leave the hotel on the following morning, and before returning to the consulate, I obtained assurances from M. Béjean regarding his Lordship's safety at the hotel. A car-drive outside the town was planned for the following afternoon. A tour inside the town was considered unsafe.

On the following morning the bazaars were closed and the students of the various schools went on strike. A large crowd, which included the students of the Greek Orthodox School, gathered in the Omayyad Mosque, with the intention of closing the doors, when Lord Balfour's expected visit took place. Eventually, finding that he was not coming, the crowd left the mosque and proceeded towards the hotel to demonstrate. The Syrian gendarmerie and police, who were drawn up to bar the approaches to the hotel after trying in vain to check the rush by ordinary methods, began to fire over the heads of the mob, which was already indulging in stone-throwing and other acts of physical violence. This firing in the air lasted for about ten minutes, and the persistence of the crowd was quite remarkable, for in Damascus a few shots generally suffice to scatter any mob. The military now began to intervene. Cavalry came galloping on to the scene, and used the flats of their sabres with considerable effect. Towards 1 P.M. the crowd was entirely dispersed. At least one man of the crowd was killed, though the French, now anxious to minimise developments which exceeded their calculations, subsequently denied this fact, which at the time they admitted to me. A number on both sides were wounded and received contusions, but of these, only two or three of the crowd were seriously wounded.





Le peuple syrien continue à voir dans la Société des Nations un tribunal juste organisé pour la protection des nations faibles qui n'ont d'autres armes pour leur défense que celles que leur accorde la justice et le droit.

Le Conseil syrien se présente à votre Excellence avec cette protestation, qu'il a votée, pour être transmise à la Société des Nations, vous priant de croire à sa haute considération.

[E 2696/1065/85]

No. 126.

*Consul-General Satow to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 7.)*

(No. 50.)

Sir,

Beirut, April 26, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 44 of the 6th April and to my telegram No. 9 of the 10th April, and to complete the account of Lord Balfour's visit to Syria, given in Mr. Smart's despatch No. 59 of the 14th April, I have the honour to report that his Lordship reached the port station here at 9 p.m. on Thursday the 9th April. He had been brought into the town by a circuitous route, and his car was accompanied by two other cars containing secret police and gendarmes. On his arrival he was received by the local chiefs of police and by myself. The authorities had taken measures of precaution and police officers were much in evidence; but there was no sign of anything unusual, and Lord Balfour's arrival passed unnoticed. He at once went on board the steamship "Sphinx," where he remained until the vessel sailed on the Sunday morning. The secretary-general of the High Commission called on him that night and again on the following morning, while the High Commissioner, who only arrived from Damascus late on Saturday, also paid a visit. No demonstrations occurred during Lord Balfour's stay in Beirut, although an attempt was made to organise one. I understand that the demonstration was to have taken the form of closing the shops, and that the Christians were invited to take part in it. They did not, however, wish to do so, and some kept their shops open on Good Friday when they would otherwise have closed them.

I would add that, like Mr. Smart, I received no official advice regarding Lord Balfour's journey, and that, like him, I received on the 30th March an *en clair* telegram from Jerusalem as to securing hotel accommodation. My first knowledge of the visit was derived by chance from the assistant secretary-general of the High Commission, who showed me some time towards the end of March a letter from Sir Herbert Samuel to General Sarrail announcing the impending arrival of Lord Balfour, the date then given being, according to my recollection, the 4th April. I next, late on Saturday the 4th April, received a telegram from the acting inspector-general of police at Jerusalem asking me to warn the French that he had reliable information that an attempt would be made on Lord Balfour's life in Syria, Beirut being mentioned as a likely place. The High Commissioner, the secretary-general and his assistant happened all to be absent from Beirut at the time, and it was not until Monday that I was able to hand a copy to the "chef de cabinet." He told me that they had already had a similar warning, presumably sent through the French consul-general in Jerusalem, and that the "Directeur de la Sûreté générale" had that day gone to Baalbeck to make arrangements. The next morning the director called on me, and for the first time I learned Lord Balfour's complete programme. The director did not seem in any way alarmed at the prospects, but was anxious that, when Lord Balfour took his projected motor drive in the Lebanon, he should know the exact itinerary to be followed in order that he might make arrangements. I therefore prepared a list of suitable drives and sent it to Mr. Smart asking to be informed which one Lord Balfour would select in order that I might notify M. Fanjeau. Subsequent events rendered this unnecessary.

In conclusion I would state that neither the Director of Public Security nor those officials of the French High Commission with whom I had dealings regarding the visit gave any indication that it was either unwise or unwelcome. It was not for me to suggest that the visit had better be cancelled, but I gave them several opportunities of hinting this, which were not taken. In the circumstances I can only imagine that the French authorities were ill-informed as to the strength of public feeling in the matter, and that they thought that any demonstrations which might occur would be of a mild character and such as would redound to French advantage.

I regret that this report is somewhat belated, but it has been delayed by the fact that I had to take my local leave at notice so short that I was unable to write it before I left.

I have, &amp;c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 3567/3440/89]

No. 127.

*Consul Smart to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 17.)*

(No. 93.)

Sir,

Damascus, Syria, June 4, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to submit some general observations on the situation being created by the growing anti-British propaganda in the native press and schools at Damascus.

2. The two intellectual centres of Islam are Cairo and Damascus. The persistent hostility of the Cairo press to England is a fact already well known and, anyhow, outside my sphere of competence, except in so far as its anti-British influence is exercised in Syria. The Cairo papers, being better supplied with news, are unfortunately the sources from which the Damascus press draws most of its news and even transcribes entire articles. The hostility of the Damascus press is of more recent growth but is becoming equally marked. These two streams of anti-British propaganda effectively cover the whole of the Arabic-speaking East. Of the two streams, that issuing from Damascus has perhaps the greatest potentiality for evil.

3. No love is lost between the Egyptians and the Arabic-speaking peoples of Asia, and his long-established hostility deprives Egyptian propaganda of some of its force. But Damascus is an object of affection and pride to all the Arabian world. An anti-British propaganda organised from Damascus would find willing listeners anywhere in Arabian lands.

4. Besides the hostility of the press, there is that of the schools at Damascus. This hostility loses no opportunity of demonstrating itself by telegrams of protest on suitable occasions, by anti-British demonstrations, as in the case of the Lord Balfour incident.

5. Many of my native acquaintances have spoken to me of this growing hostility to England at Damascus, and its existence is now a fact to be examined, and, if possible, neutralised with care.

6. At Damascus any paper which writes anything offensive to the French is suppressed. No such restraint exists in the case of press attacks on England. It is obvious that this fact alone would encourage the press, powerless against France, to attack chauvinist approval by attacking England.

7. The same holds good of the schools. The slightest manifestation of anti-French sentiment on the part of the students is promptly and rigorously repressed. Anti-British ebullitions are subject to no such restraint. For instance, at the time of the murder of the late Sirdar of the Sudan or of Lord Balfour's arrival here, the students of the schools were allowed freely to demonstrate violent hostility to England.

8. The danger from this state of affairs alone would be sufficiently grave. Unfortunately, we have not only to count on French apathy towards such anti-British manifestations. We have to count on deliberate French encouragement thereof.

9. I have had neither the staff nor the time to keep you comprehensively acquainted with the anti-British tendencies of the local press. But I have studied them as carefully as my limited time would permit, and this study has revealed evident signs of French dictation. I would, as an instance, invite a reference to my despatch No. 87 of the 27th ultimo regarding "Al Mufid" newspaper.

10. The anti-British influence exercised by the French in the schools is partly evident in the tone of their own schools, and partly in the obvious encouragement, given by anticipated impunity, to native schools to indulge in anti-British manifestations.

11. Of course the French are doing themselves harm by these tactics. By showing the natives so clearly that they regard us as enemies to be attacked, the French encourage native opposition to themselves. Every Arab here knows that England



is stronger than France. If, then, he argues, France looks on England as an enemy, there is some chance that sooner or later such a redoubtable enemy and the Arabs between them will make things sufficiently awkward for France that she will have to disappear from the Arabian scene. In this order of ideas, a native acquaintance, in connection with the publication in the local papers of extracts from the Parisian press accusing us of supporting Abd-el-Krim, remarked to me recently that the Damascenes, knowing England's power, could only conclude that the Rifis, thus secretly backed by her, were likely to give France a very bad time. Obviously it is to France's interest to make the Syrians think that we are on her side generally, whether we are or not.

12. Such a comprehension of France's real interest is of course not to be expected from the present French delegation here, whose chiefs are not men able to take general views of things, and are, moreover, blinded by anglophobia. Possibly, however, at Paris it might be understood that, whatever inconvenience may be caused to us by French encouragement of anti-British sentiment at Damascus, the results for France may be infinitely more serious. England's positions in the Arabian world are long established and far flung. A weakening or a retirement here or there would not involve a general eclipse. But a French failure in Syria would mean the disappearance of France as a considerable political factor in the Near East.

13. Yet, in view of the general character of the officials France sends to her overseas possessions, it would be unwise to count on any consistent French co-operation in this matter. We must rely mainly on our own resources to neutralise the danger.

14. We can, *firstly*, exercise a moderating influence at Damascus by letting the French know that we are watching the situation. I have in my immediately preceding despatch reported the action recently taken by me with regard to press attacks on England. From time to time, it would, I think, be desirable that His Majesty's consul should give such signs to the French of his interest in anti-British propaganda at Damascus.

15. *Secondly*, we can directly restrain the Damascus press by threats of interdiction of circulation in our mandated territories. The Damascus papers depend for much of their revenue on subscriptions from persons in Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq, and interdiction of circulation there involves a severe financial loss for the organs concerned. I have only twice warned an editor that I should have to recommend such action to our mandated authorities, once in the case of outrageous attacks on our political agent at Bahrain, and once in the case of equally offensive attacks against Lord Balfour. In both cases the warning was effective. If I have been so sparing in using this defensive weapon, the reason has been that I did not know how far our mandated authorities would find it convenient to co-operate in such action. Needless to say, this weapon should be used sparingly and with moderation, and always in consultation with His Majesty's consul at Damascus, who alone is in a position to appreciate the opportunity of severity or leniency, as the case may be.

16. *Thirdly*, we can, by educative effort, endeavour gradually to turn back this anti-British current. It is with little optimism that I venture to mention this last remedy. England has in the Near and Middle East persistently left the schools to her rivals, whose educational network has become a vast national propaganda. There is not a single English school in Damascus technically equipped to an adequate degree, and yet the desire of an English education is widespread and sincere. In every country educated persons must lead the people, the mass of which, especially in the East, exercises little influence. If in Syria the educated classes are to issue mainly from schools hostile to England, we can hardly expect that the ruling elements of the future will be animated by friendly sentiments towards us. If, therefore, we are unable to found adequate schools and take our part in forming the minds of those who are to lead the masses in Syria, we must resign ourselves to general Syrian anglophobia as a permanent factor in the Arabian scheme of things.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 3591/357/89]

No. 128.

Consul Smart to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 96.)

Sir,

Damascus, Syria, June 5, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 24 of the 30th January last, I have the honour to report that two parties have now, with the authorisation of the Government, been constituted in view of the elections next October for the Representative Council, namely, the "Party of the People," which is the Nationalist party, and the "Party of Unity," i.e., Syrian unity, which has been formed to support the present Government. In its ranks are to be found the Ministers and a number of the present Deputies.

If the elections take place next October they are likely to be embarrassing to the mandatory Power. Captain Bourgeois, director of the press, expressed the opinion, in the course of conversation with me, that the situation in Syria would soon be the same as that in Egypt when a Zaghlulist majority came into power in 1924. In other words, a Nationalist majority would form a Government which would not try to work with the mandatory Power.

It will be much more difficult for France to "make" the elections this time as thoroughly as in 1923. Unless, however, a successful effort is made in this sense, a Nationalist majority appears inevitable, with a consequent breakdown of the Parliamentary system or the effacement of France to a degree incompatible with her mandatory function. It would appear that the French Government is now alive to the danger of the policy instituted by General Sarrail in Syria immediately on his arrival and before he could have any real knowledge of the situation. From a remark let drop by M. Brunot, the Deputy sent by the French Government for a general enquiry in Syria, it would seem that the mandatory Power may decide that the country is not yet ripe for Constitutional Government. The organic law, now under consideration, might then be framed so as to make the Government independent of the variations of a popularly elected Parliament.

It is to be hoped that France will find some satisfactory solution of the difficulty, for it is not to our interest that anything like the Egyptian situation should develop in Syria, on the borders of our mandated territories.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 3713/357/89]

No. 129.

Consul General Satow to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 79. Confidential.)

Sir,

Beirut, June 11, 1925.

IN the latter part of my despatch No. 45 of the 9th April, I referred to a scheme of electoral reform prepared by the present Governor of the Lebanon and to the cool reception with which the scheme had met. It was this lack of enthusiasm which decided the High Commissioner to submit the scheme to Paris for instructions. The reply has now been received and made public. It is to the effect that no change is to be made before the promulgation of the new Organic Law, and that the elections are to be held under the old system. The decision is no doubt a wise one, as, although the new scheme had certain advantages, it was undoubtedly of a very advanced nature for a country which has in its essentials in no way changed since the departure of the Turks. The rejection of the scheme is naturally considered as being somewhat of a rebuff to M. Cayla and to General Sarrail also.

2. In any case the matter is settled, and the electors of the first degree will cast their votes on the 28th June. For every 250 such electors one elector of the second degree will be chosen. These latter will, on the 12th July, elect thirty Deputies. The seats have been allotted on a confessional basis, one Deputy being allowed for every 20,000 adherents of each particular rite. The representation will be as follows: Maronites, 10; Sunni Moslems, 6; Shiah Moslems, 5; Greek Orthodox, 4; Greek Catholics, 2; Druzes, 2; Minorities, 1 = total 30.

3. The new council will be required to propose to the High Commissioner the names of three candidates for the post of Governor and then, provided all three names are approved, to elect one of them.

[13651]

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4. The Lebanon is thus in the throes of electioneering and seething with intrigue, doubtless to the great satisfaction of the inhabitants, to whom such things are as the breath of life. Bribery and corruption are not unknown, and a good deal of money will no doubt be made, mainly by the secondary electors.

5. There seems to be good reason for believing that the Government intends to "make" the elections so as to ensure that the right men are elected as Deputies. The present secretary-general of the Lebanon is reputed to be an adept in such matters. The fact that the elections are being held under the old system should facilitate things, as it is easier to influence the relatively small number of secondary electors.

6. As regards the choice of Governor which will have to be made by the new council, it is permissible to foresee that it will decide that, in present circumstances, a French Governor is still necessary, and that the right man for the post is M. Léon Cayla, the actual Governor.

7. M. Brunet, the Deputy mentioned in my despatch No. 62 of the 12th May as having come out to hold an enquiry, still here, but it is expected that he will leave within the next fortnight. He is reported to have spent much of his time in interviewing lawyers, journalists, politicians and the various others who consider their views as to the situation to be of value. The rest of his time he seems to have spent in accompanying the High Commissioner in the latter's rapid tours about the country. He is a personal friend of General Sarrail, and it is therefore assumed that he will report that everything is for the best both in Syria and the Lebanon. At the same time his arrival to hold what is regarded by many as an enquiry into complaints made both against the High Commissioner and the Governor of the Lebanon cannot have failed to weaken their authority and prestige in the country. There are, indeed, various signs that this is the case.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[3628/1065/85]

No. 130.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Consul-General Satow (Beirut).*

(No. 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, June 22, 1925.*

PLEASE see British liaison officers' memorandum of 28th May regarding recognition from British Government of officer and trooper wounded during Lord Balfour's visit.

Recommendation should have been made through you. I shall be glad to learn whether you consider presents from His Majesty's Government would be appreciated by recipients and improve general feeling. If so, please suggest form of presents.

## CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 429/175/44]

No. 131.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 90.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 21, 1925.*

THE Turkish Minister, whom I had not seen since my first reception of the Diplomatic Corps, called upon me this afternoon by appointment made at his request.

2. Zekiai Bey observed that he had had more than one conversation with Sir William Tyrrell, but this was his first opportunity of speaking to me about the relations between our two countries. It appeared to him that Turkey offered a great sphere for economic collaboration between the two countries. Were there, he asked himself, any political obstacles to such economic collaboration? He saw no insuperable obstacles either on the Turkish or on the British side. He thought, therefore, that such a collaboration was possible, and that the "little affair" of Mosul ought not to interpose an obstacle. All depended upon the attitude of the British Government and whether it was disposed to see Turkey established as a strong and stable Power.

3. I replied that there was no desire on the side of His Majesty's Government or the British people except to cultivate friendly relations with Turkey as now established.

4. Encouraged by this expression of our general policy, the Turkish Minister approached the question which really lay at the root of his demand for an interview. Why could we not settle together the question of the Mosul boundary without waiting for the decision of the League of Nations? For Turkey this was a vital matter. She could not acquiesce in the division of the Kurds. If we could agree to cede Mosul to Turkey, arrangements in regard to economic interests could easily be made. We might, he indicated, have the exploitation of the oil-fields and a guarantee from Turkey, as far as she was concerned, of the integrity of Irak as thus delimited.

5. I told Zekiai Bey that I regretted that the Turkish Government and our own had been unable to reach an accord on this subject at Lausanne. In spite of Lord Curzon's express declarations, the Turkish Government appeared still to be under the illusion that the policy of the British Government was influenced by some interest in the oil-fields which might be found in that quarter. This was a complete delusion, but, putting that misapprehension aside, and turning to the substance of his proposal, what was the actual position? We had agreed to refer our difference to the League of Nations. We had stated our case in our capacity as the mandatories of Irak and trustees for the people of that country, and it was impossible that I should bargain away their rights or interests against economic concessions to Britain or British citizens. Having once referred the matter to the League, we had better await the League's decision, which His Majesty's Government had in advance pledged themselves to accept.

6. Zekiai Bey then began to suggest that if the decision of the League was adverse Turkey might be unable to acquiesce. I told him that I could not suppose that in this he was speaking the mind of his Government. It would be a serious thing for the Turkish Government to defy the British Empire, a still more serious thing, perhaps, for Turkey to place itself in opposition to the body which represented, as far as anything could represent, the consensus of civilised opinion. I was sure that there was too much wisdom in the councils of Angora for them to take so very grave a decision.

7. Zekiai Bey turned around this point for some time, developing Turkish difficulties, suggesting an exchange of populations and so forth; but I declined to alter my position. I was wholly at one with him in desiring friendly relations between Turkey and Great Britain. I saw great economic advantages, especially for Turkey, in a cordial friendship between us, though I warned him incidentally that there could be no idea of a loan from the British Government; but I added that I did not think that we could usefully take up again the fruitless discussions of Lausanne, and that we should be wiser to await and to accept the decision of the Council of the League.

8. The Minister then asked me whether I refused to consider any proposals for an understanding. I told him that if the Turkish Government authorised him to make specific proposals I would, of course, give them most serious consideration, but



I deprecated his making any such proposals if their basis was to be the cession of Mosul in return for economic concessions, for to such proposals I could only return a negative; and, in the second place, I insisted that if any proposals were to be made they must not be mere feelers on his part, for which the time had gone by, but proposals definitely authorised by his Government and by which that Government was prepared to stand.

9. Before leaving, Zekia Bey asked whether, in the event of Turkey deciding to join the League of Nations, Great Britain would support a request by her for a permanent seat on the council. I told him that this was a request which apparently was going to be made to me by every country in turn. I could only say to him, as to others, that I must reserve our liberty till the question arose at Geneva.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 2421/788/44]

No. 132.

*Sir O. Russell to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 23.)*

(No. 56.)

Sir,

*British Legation to the Holy See,  
April 18, 1925.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 5 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a note from the Cardinal Secretary of State enquiring whether the French claim to protect Catholics in Egypt is recognised, and whether the relative liturgical honours are admitted as being rendered to the representative of France *quod* protecting Power.

When Cardinal Gasparri informed me that he was addressing me a note on the subject, I told him of the terms of the declaration to Egypt of February 1922, and said that the French claim appeared to me to be wholly inadmissible. I promised to lose no time in referring his note to you, although I had no doubt as to the answer.

His Eminence told me that the French Government had put forward their claim on the eve of their resignation, and with some warmth described their attitude as a farce.

I have, &c.

(For the Minister),

CECIL DORMER

Enclosure in No. 132.

*Cardinal Gasparri to Sir O. Russell.*

(Translation.)

Sir,

*Vatican, April 17, 1925.*

THE French Government have informed the Secretariat of State that the French protectorate of all Catholics, as it existed in the former Turkish Empire, with the relative liturgical honours, has always been admitted in Egypt, even after that territory was removed from Turkish dominion, and during the British occupation. They claim that it should still be maintained, notwithstanding the Treaty of Lausanne, which does not concern Egypt.

The undersigned Cardinal Secretary of State is desirous of ascertaining the exact position and would be grateful for information on the following points:—

1. Have the local authorities in Egypt admitted the intervention of the French representative on behalf of Catholics of other than French nationality? And are they disposed to admit such intervention in the future?
2. Have they tolerated hitherto liturgical honours being rendered to the representative of France as the protecting Power over Catholics, and are they disposed so to tolerate them in the future?

The undersigned Cardinal avails, &c.

P. CARDINAL GASPARRI.

[E 2421/788/44]

No. 123.

*Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).*

(No. 437.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 29, 1925.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of a telegram\* and of a despatch† from His Majesty's Minister to the Holy See regarding the French claim to a general protectorate over Catholics, and to special liturgical honours at Catholic services, in Egypt. There is reason to believe that the French *démarche* at the Vatican is due to recent action on the part of the Catholic authorities at Alexandria in connection with Catholic services last Easter.

2. I shall be glad if your Lordship will furnish me with a full report on the present position of this question in Egypt, with particular reference to the two questions asked by the Cardinal Secretary of State.

3. As you may be aware, His Majesty's Government have recently secured the termination of the French protectorate, and of the special liturgical honours which were dependent on it in Palestine, and on general grounds of policy it will probably be necessary to dispute the corresponding French claim in Egypt. Should this necessity arise, it is possible that the necessary basis may be furnished by the opening sentence of the third paragraph of the French note of 22nd March, 1922, which reads as follows:—

"Le Gouvernement de la République, fidèle à l'esprit des accords du 8 avril 1904, est tout disposé à reconnaître en Egypte au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, sous le nouveau régime [*i.e.*, independent Egypt], les droits qu'il eût tenus de l'exercice régulier du protectorat."

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 134.

*Sir O. Russell to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 15.)*

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Vatican, April 15, 1925.*

I UNDERSTAND from Cardinal Secretary of State that on the eve of their resignation French Government demanded Vatican recognition of French protectorate over Catholics in Egypt and liturgical honours. Vatican will not give way without knowing views of His Majesty's Government and are sending me a note. I said that claim was preposterous.